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95th Congress 1 
2d Session / 



COMMITTEE PRINT 



EXECUTIVE BRANCH REORGANIZATION 
AN OVERVIEW 



COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

PREPARED BY THE 

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 



23-8360 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 1978 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 



ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut, Chairman 



HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine 
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, Missouri 
LAWTON CHILES, Florida 
SAM NUNN, Georgia 
JOHN GLENN, Ohio 
JIM SASSER, Tennessee 
MURIEL HUMPHREY, Minnesota 



CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois 
JACOB JAVITS. New York 
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware 
TED STEVENS, Alaska 
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland 
H. JOHN HEINZ III, Pennsylvania 



Richard A. Wegman, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 



Paul Hoff, Counsel 

Eli E. Nobleman, Counsel 

Paul C. Rosenthal, Counsel 

Claude E. Barfield, Professional Staff 

Member 
Claudia T. Ingram, Professional Staff 

Member 



Ellen S. Miller, Professional Staff Member 
Theodore J. Jacobs, Counsel {Regulatory 

Reform) 
James M. Graham, Counsel {Regulatory 

Reform) 
Ethel Z. Geisinger, Special Assistant 

{Regulatory ^Reform) 



Marilyn A. Harris, Executive Administrator and Professional Staff Member 

Elizabeth A. Preast, Chief Clerk 

John B. Childers, Chief Counsel to the Minority 

Brian Conboy, Special Counsel to the Minority 

Constance B. Evans, Counsel to the Minority 

Harold C. Anderson, Staff Editor 

(II) 







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77-246 G 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
REORGANIZATION: AN OVERVIEW 



RONALD C. MOE 

Specialist in American National 

Government 

Government Division 

November 18, 1977 



CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 





(III) 



HCNRV M. JACKSON, WASM. 



THOMAS F. CACLrrON. MO. W1U.IAM V. HOTN. Jl».. DCl_ 

UkvnoN CKit-ts. Fm. tid •rrvrNj. auaska 

SAM NUNN. CA. CMARLCS MCC. MAT>(IA». J». 

JOHN CLCNN, OHIO JOHN C. DANFOITTH. MO. 



QlCTxiicb ^ictie& ^crralc 



COMMITTEE ON 
mCMAHO A. weCMAN GOVERNMENTAU AFFAIRS 

WASHINGTON. DC. 20510 



February 27, 1978 



The Honorable Walter F. Mondale 

President 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Mr. President: 

Last year, in the Reorganization Act of 1977, Congress 
renewed the authority for the President to undertake an ex- 
tensive restructuring of Executive agencies in order to pro- 
mote better execution of the laws of the land, and to provide 
more effective management of Federal programs. President 
Carter has made Federal Executive Reorganization a top priority 
of his administration. He sent the Congress two Reorganization 
Plans in 1977, and will be submitting additional proposals in 
this and subsequent years. 

The Committee has received numerous inquiries about the 
authority granted to the President under the Reorganization 
Act and about the process for Presidential and Congressional 
action prescribed under that Act. In November 197 7, the 
Congressional Reference Service of the Library of Congress com- 
pleted a thorough analysis of the history of the Reorganization 
Act authority and of organizational theories that have governed 
past and present Executive Reorganization plans. The study is 
entitled, "Executive Branch Reorganization: An Overview." 

The Committee feels that this document will be very useful 
in aiding both congressional staff and the general public in 
achieving an understanding of the current reorganization process 
and past reorganization authority accomplishments. Thus, we are 
requesting that it be printed as a Committee document. 



Sincerely, 

&U.IU 



Abe Ribicoff 
(V) 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



PAGE 



INTRODUCTION 



An Enduring Issue 1 

Centralized Versus Decentralized Administration 6 

LANDMARK STUDIES 11 

Keep Commission 12 

Committee on Economy and Efficiency 13 

Joint Committee on Reorganization 13 

Brownlow Committee 16 

First Hoover Commission 18 

Second Hoover Commission 23 

Study Commissions on Executive Reorganization 1953-1968 26 

Ash Council 32 

METHODS OF CHANGE 37 

How Reorganizations Happen 37 

Statutes 37 

Presidential Directives 38 

Internal Department Reorganizations 39 

Reorganization Plan 40 

REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1949 41 

Legislative Background 41 

Provisions of the Act 43 

Extensions and Amendments to the Act 46 

REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1977 49 

Legislative Background 49 

Senate Action 50 

House Action 52 

Presidential Signing 59 

REORGANIZATION IN PERSPECTIVE 60 

To Manage or Not to Manage? 60 

Strategic Options for a New President 65 

Conclusion 71 

APPENDICES 74 

(A) Extending the Period Within Which the President May 
Transmit to the Congress Plans for the Reorganization 
of Agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government 

(S. Rept. No. 92-485; November 17, 1971) 74 

(B) Extension of Reorganization Authority of the President 

(H. Rept, No. 95-105; March 22, 1977) 95 

(S. Rept. No. 95-32; March 1, 1977) 138 

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 169 

(VII) 



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INTRODUCTION 



Reorganization has become almost a religion in Washington. It has 
its symbol in the organization chart, old testament in the Hoover 
Commission reports, high priesthood in the Office of Management and 
Budget, and society for the propagation of the faith in sundry groups 
such as the Citizens Committee for Government Reorganization. 
Reorganization is deemed synonymous with reform and reform with 
progress. Periodic reorganizations are prescribed if for no other 
purpose than to purify the bureaucratic blood and to present 
stagnation. 1/ 



An Enduring Issue 

The subject of Executive Branch organization has an enduring quality. 
This is true, in part, because there is no neutral model for Executive Branch 
organization to which the various protagonists can repair. To be sure, there 
is an "orthodox theory" of organization, as typified in the analyses and 
recommendations of the two Hoover Commissions (1949 and 1955), but there is 
also much opposition to this "orthodoxy." 

To understand why the subject of Executive Branch reorganization 
periodically surfaces as a political issue, it is necessary to briefly 
review some academic history. The story of the "orthodox theory" of 
o-rganizations begins around the turn of the present century with the 
scientific management movement in business and the efforts of the New York 
Bureau of Municipal Research in government. These movements shared a vision 
that the problems of administering large organizations — in this instance 
public organizations — could be solved by the application of certain 



V Seidman, Harold. Politics, Position and Power: The Dynamics of 

Federal Organization, 2d ed. New York, Oxford University Press, 
1975, p. 1. 



CRS-2 

scientific principles. IJ The field of public administration, which was 
to emerge as a recognized academic discipline in the 1920s, was largely 
based on the promotion of these principles. 

Some years ago, Wallace Sayre provided a list of the premises 
undergirding the youthful public administration discipline. The major 
premises included the concept that administration and politics were 
separable and that administration could be improved through rigorous 
implementation of the principles of "scientific management." Proper 
organizational theory called for the separation of line and staff functions, 
limited span of control, and the subdivision of work according to such 
categories as process or clientele. An executive budget, based on the 
"purposes" of the organization, was a requirement. A "neutral civil 
service" was also necessary. And, finally, proper administration necessi- 
tated the development of an extended body of administrative regulations 
to assure due process. 3/ 

Kvery major study of the Executive Branch has reflected, to some 
degree, the influence of these administrative values. In the period 
both immediately preceding and following World War II, this orthodox 
view of public administration was particularly pervasive. It found 
expression in the work and reports of the two Hoover Commissions. 
However, during the very period (1947-1949) when the first Hoover 



y Dwight Waldo provides an insightful review of the development of 

"administrative principles" within the new discipline of public 
administration and how these principles shaped the attitudes oV 
scholars and practitioners towards Executive Branch organization. 
The Administrative State. New York, The Ronald Press, 1948. 

2/ Sayre, Wallace S. Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging. 
Public Administration Review, v. 18, Spring 1958: 102-103. 



CRS-3 



Commission was deliberating and writing its reports, the orthodox theory 
came under attack. The principal dissenters were political scientists 
who had been administrators during World War II and who critiqued 
with this experience in mind. The thrust of their argument was that 
politics, or policy, and administration were not separable. 4/ 
And, second, that there really were no "scientific principles" of 
administration. Rather, what was passed as principles were really 
normative values. bj 

During the same years that an apolitical administrative theory 
("orthodoxy") came to dominate the literature in public administration, 
another related movement emerged. The idea that the President should 
actively "manage" the Executive Branch also became a theme in much public 
administration literature, hj Both strains of thought, apolitical 
administrative theory and the managerial Presidency, found expression 
in the broader movement to reorganize the Executive Branch. 

The merging of the apolitical theory of administration with the 
concept of the President as manager was most evident in the reports of 
the first Hoover Commission (1949). The Commission was committed to 
"economy and efficiency" through "rational organizational structure." 
Overlapping and duplication were to be eliminated by grouping similar 



4/ See, for example: Appleby, Paul. Policy and Administration. 
University, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1949. 
pp. 169-170. 

bj Waldo, Dwight. The Administrative State. New York, The Ronald 
Press, 1948. Chapters 10 and 11. 

6/ Arnold, Peri E. Exeuctive Reorganization and Administrative Theory: 
Tne Origins of the Managerial Presidency. Paper delivered at 
the 1976 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associa- 
tion, Chicago, Sept. 2-5, 1976. 



CRS-4 



functions of government into major departments and agencies. The 
Commission further sought to insure that the clear lines of authority 
and control were achieved and that adequate staff support was made 
available to the President and the department heads. Within departments, 
bureaus were to be regrouped, budgets were to be made more flexible, and 
subject to greater control by department heads, and department-wide 
functions, such as procurement, were to be centralized. 7/ 

While a concentration on the reorganization of depart"ments , agencies, 
and certain functions may appear to be fulfilling the promise of the 
orthodox theory, it may also obscure what, to some, was the principal 
achievement of the first Hoover Commission, namely the enhancement of the 
Presidential office as manager of the Executive Branch. 8/ 

While the quest for an apolitical theory of administration, at least 
within academic circles, lost much of its appeal in the years following 
World War II, strong support remained for the idea of the President as 
manager, even for a President "dominant" over Congress. Beginning in the 
late 1960s and accelerating in the 1970s, the concept of the President 
as manager of the Executive Branch also came under question. 9_/ There 
remained, nonetheless, supporters of both the orthodox theory of organization 



7/ An excellent summary of the purposes and accomplishments of the first 
and second Hoover Commissions may be found in Emmerich, Herbert: 
Federal Organization and Administrative Management. University, 
Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1971, Chapters 5 and 6. 

d/ Arnold, Peri t. The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial 

Presidency. Journal of Politics, v. 38, February 1976: 46-70. 

9/ A recent exposition of the view that the President ought to forego 

a managerial role is to be found in: Hess, Stephen. Organizing 
tne Presidency. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1976. 



CRS-5 



(■'no one yet has come up with a better theory"') and of the President as 
manager ("if he does not try to manage the bureaucracy, who will?"), but 
they no longer nad the field to themselves. 

Although no new comprehensive theories have replaced the two original 
sources of impetus for Executive Branch reorganization, there are currently 
a number of competing values systems seeking expression. For instance, there 
are arguments that "participation," not "efficiency," should '.e the primary 
axiom of "good" administration. Others, however, suggest that the proper 
objective of administrative organization should be to be as "representative" 
of the people as possible. Still others assert that any Executive Branch 
reorganization should have as its purpose the specification of "targets" 
towards which the reorganized agencies will strive. In their journey 
towards these targets, the agencies should be periodically evaluated and 
as they reach their targets, the agencies should be subject to a 
"sunset" clause. In short, agencies should be organized around problems 
rather than around function or clientele. 

While there is no ideal Executive Branch organization by which to 
measure progress, certain values guidelines have emerged which prompt 
people to take sides on reorganization issues. Reorganization proposals 
are generally justified on rather formalistic grounds. Virtually all 
proposals will have enhanced "economy and efficiency" as one of their 
objectives. Improved "public responsiveness" is also a popular contemporary 
justification for reorganization. While suc:i formalistic objectives are 
often sincerely sought, it is generally true that reorganization proposals 
are motivated by a mixture of managerial and political goals. 



CRS-6 



A reorganization may be designed to upgrade or downgrade an agency 
or one of its programs, or even, on occasion, an individual associated 
witn an agency. frequently, it is easier to promote, diminish, or 
eliminate a program through reorganization than to try to act in a 
straightforward legislative manner. Sometimes reorganizations are 
a method of by-passing Congressional or interest group opposition. 
And, finally, reorganizations give the appearance, if not the reality, 
of "action," occasionally a worthwhile objective in itself. 

Reorganization is probably best understood as a continuing process 
rather than a static objective to be achieved. It is unusual, although 
not unknown, for someone to propose a reorganization of structure for the 
sheer sake of reorganizing. As a rule, however, reorganization proposals 
have as tneir objective the furtherance of some public policy. Indeed, 
reorganization appears to be a basic political process through which 
individuals and groups gain power and influence over others in order to 
acnieve the social and political change they consider desirable. 

Centralized Versus Decentralized Administration 

The Fraraers of the Constitution, familiar with the administrative 
difficulties of the Conf ederat ional period, were intent upon establishing 
centralized administrative leadership in the Executive Branch. 10/ 



10/ Snort, Lloyd M. The Development of National Administrative Organization 
in the United States. Urbaua, Illinois, Institute for government 
Research, 1923, chapters 2 and 3 generally. An incisive discussion 
of the early administrative history of the United States is to 
be found in: White, Leonard D. The Federalists: A Study in 
Administrative History. New York, Macmillan Company [1948]. 



CRS-7 



While the Constitution created a Presidency, it left to Congress the 
authority to create and abolish Executive Branch agencies and to pass the 
laws necessary to fund these agencies and their activities. 

In the first session of Congress, "organic" statutes were passed 
establishing three great departments; Treasury, State, and War. 11 / 
All the particular functions of the Federal Government, except that of 
prosecuting the law and postal affairs, were entrusted to these depart- 
ments. It was generally accepted throughout the first century of the 
Republic that all functions and agencies should be grouped under a 
single-headed department. 

In the years prior to the Civil War, only four "detached agencies;" 
the Library of Congress, the Smithsonian Institution, the Botanic Garden, 
and the Government Printing Office, were created. 12 / Beginning in the 
1860s, "independent departments" of a status inferior to Cabinet depart- 
ments, e.g.. Department of Education, were created as well as other 
"detached agencies." The major departure from departmentalism, however, 
occurred with the establishment of the Civil Service Commission in 1883 
and the Interstate Commere Commission in 1887. 13 / The remaining 
restraints on the creation of independent agencies crumbled with World 



11 / Discussion of the Acts creating the three "great departments" may 

be found in Hart, James. The American Presidency in Action, 

1789: A Study in Constitutional History. New York, Macmillan 

Company, 1948, chapter 7. 

12 / Short. The Development of National Administrative Organization 
in the United States. p. 417. 

13 / Wallace, Schyler C. federal Departmentalization: A Critique of 

Theories of Organization. New York, Columbia University Press 
1941. p. 31. 



CRS-8 



»Jar 1 and the emergence of the corporate form of organization. 14 / 
The corporate concept received added impetus during the Depression with 
tne formation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Tennesse 
Valley Authority. Indeed, when the President's Committee on Administrative 
Management (Brownlow Committee) issued its clarion call against further 
fragmentation of the Executive Branch, they counted over 100 agencies 
outside the Executive departments. 15/ 

By the time the Brownlow Committee report was published in 1937, 
tne conflict between proponents of a more integrated, hierarchical 
Executive Branch led by a strong, managerial President and those supporting 
the concept of a less integrated, less hierarchical Executive Branch 
administered jointly by the President and tne Congress had been underway 
for over a quarter of a century. 

It is not possible to assign conclusive winners and losers in this 
struggle over liow best to organize and manage the Executive Branch. One 
side may dominate for a period, then the advantage will appear to shift 
to tne opposition. Intellectually, the dominant group in this century 
regarding the organization of the Executive Branch may be described as 
the "Administrative Management" school. One of the major goals of this 
school has been to reinforce the institutionalized Presidency as the 
manager of the Executive Branch. 16/ 



14/ aeidman. Politics, Position, and Power. pp. 224-225. 

13/ U.S. President's Committee on Administrative Management. Administrative 
.lanagement in the United States. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off, 
19J7. p. 29. 

16/ Mansfield, riarvey. Federal Executive Reorganization: Thirty Years 

of Experience. Public Administration Review, v. 29, July/August 
1969: 332-344. For a recent call to strengthen the President in 
his managerial role over the bureaucracy, see: Nathan, Richard. 
The 'Administrative Presidency.' Tne Public Interest, no. 44, 
Summer 1976: 40-54. 



CRS-9 



A review of the results of reorganizations during this century 
suggests that Congress has given the President and his department heads 
many new forms of authority and staff to discharge their managerial 
responsibilities. Foremost among these managerial tools has been the 
implementation of the executive budget, the creation of the Executive 
Office of the President, and providing the President with the power to 
initiate Reorganization Plans subject to a legislative veto. 17 / 

While it is true that these tools represent major innovative 
steps contributing to cental administrative control by the President over 
the bureaucracy, it is also true that, in recent years. Congress has 
expanded its role in overseeing the administration of the Executive 
Branch. The combined practices of writing detailed specifications into 
legislation, extending the confirmation requirement to additional 
administrative offices, expanding the use of the legislative veto over 
administrative decisions, and the increased use of annual authorizations 
for programs have resulted in the development of a new relationship 
between Congress on the one hand and the President and the executive 
agencies on the other. Congress is now a much more active competitor 
in exerting influence over executive agency organization and policy. 18/ 



17 / Kallenbach, Joseph £. The American Chief Exeuctive: The Presidency 

and the Governorship. New York, Harper and Row. 1966. Chapters 
12 and 13. Also; National Academy of Public Administration. 
The President and Executive Management: Summary of a Symposium. 
Washington, National Academy of Public Administration. October 1976. 

18/ Schick, Allen. Congress and the 'Details' of Administration. Public 
Administration Review, v. 36, September/October 1976: 516-528. 
Watson, H. Lee. Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional 
Control of the Executive. California Law Review, v. 61, July 1975: 
983-1094. 



23-836 O - 78 - 2 



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Reorganization, in the broad sense of the word, is a continuing 
process in the Executive Branch. Whenever there is a change in the size, 
distribution, and nature of executive functions, a reorganization has 
occurred. For the most part, these reorganizations are incremental and 
of low visibility. Congress also involves itself in this continuing 
process through its oversight and appropriations responsibilities. 
Most changes in structure, however, are marginal and therefore go 
relatively unnoticed. 

During the 94th Congress, there were no efforts to effect a major 
reorganization of the Executive Branch, although a number of incremental 
changes did take place. The relative absence of activity in this field 
was attributable, in part, to the fact that the President's authority 
to submit Reorganization Plans to Congress expired on April 1, 1973, 
and was not renewed. 

Interest in Executive Branch reorganization was rekindled during the 
197b Presidential cmapaign when candidate Jimmy Carter complained that 
the structure of tne Executive Branch was a major contributor to 
the "ineffectiveness" of government service. He promised to make the 
reorganization of tne Executive Branch a primary emphasis of his 
Administration. On February 4, 1977, the new President sent a message 
to Congress requesting that the President's authority to submit Reorgani- 
zation Plans be reactivated. The bill, modified by amendments in both 
tne House and Senate, passed, and was signed by the President on April 
6, 1977. _1_9/ 

19/ P.L. 93-17; 91 Stat. 29; 5 U.S.C. 901-912. 



CRS-11 



LANDMARK STUDIES 

Executive reorganizar ion can be considered from either a comprehensive 
or a partial perspective. There have been several comprehensive reviews 
of Executive Branch structure and operations in the past, most notably 
the Brownlow Committee, the first and second Hoover Commissions, and the 
Ash Council. For the most part, however, the subject of executive 
reorganization has been studied on a more limited scale, principally 
in terms of a particular agency or policy field. 

The two Hoover Commissions were unusual among the studies of the 
Executive Branch in that they were congressional ly inspired — although 
with Presidential cooperation — comprehensive in coverage, bipartisan, 
and guided by a certain philosophical consensus as to the proper role 
of the President in the administrative structure of the Federal 
Government. 20/ The members were disposed towards strengthening the 
President and departmental secretaries as administrative managers of 
the Executive Branch. It is also noteworthy that during the period 
of the first Hoover Commission, 1947-49, the Executive Branch still had 
a number of agencies originally created during the depression and World 
War II. The Executive Branch, in a word, was considerably more fragmented 
tnan it is today. 



20 / Arnold, Peri E. The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial 

Presidency. Journal of Politics, v. 38, February 1976: 46-70, 



CRS-12 



There have been a number of studies of the Executive Branch, both in 
whole and in its parts, during the twentieth century. What follows is 
a brief description of those studies which have attained the status of 
landmarks in Federal administrative development. Both the President and 
Congress have exhibited initiative in the field of executive reorganization. 
These studies, reflecting the dominant administrative theories of the 
moment, have frequently resulted in structural and programmatic 
reorganizat ions . 
Keep Commission 

While there were several studies of various aspects of the Federal 
bureaucracy in the late 19th century, 21 / the first overall effort to 
review the workings of the Executive agencies was undertaken by the 
Commission on Department Methods (1905-1909), otherwise known as the 
Keep Commission, after its chairman, Charles Hallin Keep, Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury. Although the Commission did not publish a 
complete report on its activities, a number of its studies did find their 
way into Congressional documents. The findings of the Commission 
stimulated management improvements in many bureaus and in such fields 



21/ From 1789 to 1905 there were a number of Congressional inquiries into 
the conduct of activities of the Executive departments. Two 
major Congressional efforts of the late 19th century deserve 
special notice. A Select Committee of the Senate of which Senator 
Francis Cockrell of Missouri was chairman, conducted an investiga- 
tion of Executive agencies to determine why they were so slow 
in acting and apparently cost so much. (50th Congress, 1st session. 
S. Kept. 507, 1888). With a similar objective, a Joint Commission 
of both Houses was established in 1893 (Dockery-Cockrell Commission), 
jointly chaired by Senator Cockrell and Representative Alexander 
Oockery, which issued a report on the laws establishing each depart- 
ment (53d Congress, 1st session. H. Rept . 49, 1893). A number 
of laws altering the "business methods" of agencies were enacted 
as a direct result of the Commission's u-^^u 



CRS-13 



as accounting and costing, archives and records administration, simpli- 
fication of paperwork and improvements in personnel administration, 
procurement, and supply, and contracting procedures. 22/ 
Committee on Economy and Efficiency 

President William Howard Taft appointed a Committee on Economy and 
Efficiency in 1910 which worked through the remainder of his Administration. 
During this period the Committee, under the leadership of Frederick A. 
Cleveland, then Director of the Bureau of Municipal Research of New York 
City, issued a number of extensive reports including the first detailed 
account of how the Executive Branch was organized for the performance of 
its work and a report advocating a "national budget" and the establishment 
of a Bureau of the Budget. The latter recommendation languished for some 
years finding fruition in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. 23 / 
Joint Committee on Reorganization 

Through much of the 1920s there were Congressional efforts, with 
Presidential assistance, to review the organization of the Executive 
Branch. Most notable was the establishment of a Joint Committee on the 
Reorganization of the Administrative Branch of the Government. Originally, 
the Joint Committee consisted of three members of the Senate and three 
members of the House, but this membership was later altered to permit 



22 / tCraines, Oscar. The President Versus Congress: The Keep Commission, 

1905-1909, First Comprehensive Presidential Inquiry in Administra- 
tion. Western Political Quarterly, v. 23, March 1970: 5-54. 

23_/ For a discussion of the work and publications of the Committee on 

Economy and Efficiency, see: Weber, Gustavus. Organized Efforts 
for the Improvement of Methods of Administration in the United 
States. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1919, 84-103. 



CRS-14 



the President to designate a personal representative to the Committee. 
President Harding appointed Walter F. Brown as his personal representative 
and Congressional members promptly elected Mr. Bro%m as their Chairman. 

The values to be promoted through reorganization were decidedly at 
variance between Congress on the one hand and the President and the bulk 
of the academic community on the other. To Congress, Executive Branch 
reorganization was desirable if it could result in "economy." The 
President and the emerging discipline of public administration, however, 
were together in the promotion of reorganization as a method to achieve 
sound princples of administrative management irrespective of whether 
"economies" could be reasonably expected. 

The Joint Committee did not conduct an independent study of the 
organization of the Executive Branch. Instead, it relied on the President, 
who submitted his ideas in the form of an address to a Joint Session of 
Congress. Presentations were also forthcoming from outside groups and 
individuals, most notably the Institute for Governmental Research (later 
to be known as the Brookings Institution) and the National Budget 
Committee. Although Congress had for all intents and purposes turned over 
the initiative to the President, the Chief Executive did not have the 
institutional resources to conduct a major study of his own. He, therefore, 
had to rely on Walter Brown and whatever support he might find from the 
Cabinet. And in this regard the President was most fortunate to have a 
Secretary of Commerce whose judgment he trusted. 



CRS-15 



The major intellectual thrust in this reorganization effort came 
not from the President or Brown, but from the Secretary of Commerce, 
Herbert Hoover. Hoover was vitally interested in reorganization, 
and to this day stands out as perhaps the most prominent theoretician- 
practitioner in American public administration. Beyond this. Hoover 
was the pillar of the Harding cabinet. The President trusted his 
Secretary of Commerce and tended to rely on Hoover for advice on 
a wide range of policy matters. While President Harding used his 
position to support the reorganization planning effort, and Walter 
Brown offered the legitimizing aegis of the Joint Committee and 
served as coordinator, Herbert Hoover provided the intellectual 
thrust for the endeavor. 24 / 

After much jurisdictional strife within the Cabinet over what organiza- 
tional recommendations ought to be included in the President's report, the 
report was forwarded to the Joint Committee in June 1924. 2^/ The 
Committee held hearings 2b_/ and then made its own report to Congress. 27 / 
In its report, the Joint Committee largely adopted the President's recommenda- 
tions. The leaders of Congress were not persuaded, however, by the Joint 
Committee's report and no action was forthcoming. 



24 / Arnold, Peri E. Executive Reorganization and Administrative Theory: 

The Origins of the Managerial Presidency. Paper delivered at the 

1976 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
p. 12. 

25 / Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 4th session, 1923, LXIV, Part 4, 
3736. 

26 / U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Administrative 
Branch of the Government. Reorganization of Executive Departments. 
Hearings on S.J. Res. 282. 68th Congress, 1st session. January 
7 to 31, 1924. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1924. 

27 / Congressional Record, 68th Congress, 1st session, 1924, LXV, 
Part 10, 10252. 



CRS-16 



The experience of the Joint Committee, while not productive of orgaiiiza- 

tional change, was important in that it tended to galvanize support for the 

concept of tne President as manager of the Executive Branch, and in this 
sense was a precursor of the Brownlow Committee of 1936. 28/ 

The Brownlow Committee 

President Franklin Roosevelt made Executive Branch reorganization 

a major item on his agenda for his second term. In January 1937, the 

President submitted to Congress the Report of his Committee on Administrative 

Management (Brownlow Committee). 29/ This report proposed, among other 

things, that some 100 independent agencies, administrations, boards, and 

commissions be placed within 12 executive departments. Of these departments, 

two — Public kJorks and Social Welfare — would be new additions to the 

Cabinet. The report was particularly harsh on the independent regulatory 

commissions, referring to them as the "headless fourth branch of 

government." 

The independent commissions present a serious immediate problem. 
No administrative reorganization worthy of the name can leave hanging 
in the air more than a dozen powerful, irresponsible agencies free to 
determine policy and administer law. Any program to restore our 
constitutional ideal of a fully coordinated Executive Branch 
responsible to the President must bring within the reach of the that 
responsiole control all work done by these independent commissions 
which is not judicial in nature. That challenge cannot be ignored. 30/ 



16/ The view that the Joint Committee was a worthy precursor of the Brownlow 
Committee is aoly argued by Peri Arnold in a paper delivered at 
the 1976 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, cited above. 

29 / U.S. President's Committee on Administrative Management. Report with 
Special Studies. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1937. 

30/ Ibid. p. 37. 



CRS-17 



The principal thesis of the report was that the Executive Branch 
ought to be reorganized to create an integrated, hierarchical structure 
with the President as an active manager. The original Executive 
Reorganization bill of 1938, which contained many of the specific 
recommendations of the Brownlow Committee, was defeated in Congress, 
in part over concern that it would give too much power to the President 
and abet what many saw that year as a trend towards "Presidential 
dictatorship." 31 / 

In February 1939, still smarting from the defeat suffered the previous 
year, the President sent forward another Reorganization Act. This bill, 
however, was noteworthy for its apparent modest scope. It contained only 
two of the major proposals recommended by the Brownlow Committee. The 
bill authorized the President to appoint six administrative assistants 
and to submit Reorganization Plans to alter Executive Branch organization, 
such Plans being subject to a veto by a concurrent resolution. 32 / 
While there was considerable concern expressed regarding the constitutionality 
of the procedures outlined for approving Reorganization Plans, the House and 
Senate passed the bill. 33/ 



31 / For an excellent account of New Deal reorganization efforts generally, 
and of the Executive Reorganization bill of 1938 in particular, 
consult: Polenberg, Richard. Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government: 
The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization, 1936-1939. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1966. 
Also; Karl, Barry Dean. Executive Reorganization and Reform in 
the New Deal: The Genesis of Administrative Management, 1900-1939, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963. 

32 / Millett, John D. and Rogers, Lindsay. The Legislative Veto and the 
Reorganization Act of 1939. Public Administration Review, v. 1, 
Winter 1941: 176-189. 

33/ 53 Stat. 561. 



CRS-18 



Soon after the Act passed Congress, Louis Brovmlow and his two 
associates, Charles E. Merriam and Luther Gulick, were called back to 
Washington and together drafted two Reorganization Plans for the President 
to submit to Congress. Reorganization Plan No. 1 was broad in its 
coverage, creating a Federal Security Agency, a Federal Works Agency, 
and a Federal Loan Agency. Of more importance, it established the 
Executive Office of the President (EOP) which would include the White 
House Office, the Bureau of the Budget, and the National Resources 
Planning Board. 34 / There was surprisingly little opposition in Congress 
to this rather expansive application of the Reorganization Plan authority. 35 / 

First Hoover Commission 

The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 
(1947-1949), popularly known as the first Hoover Commission, was established 
in part, to bring into an integrated organizational structure the numerous 



34 / Graham, George A. The Presidency and the Executive Office of the 

President. Journal of Politics, v. 12, November 1950: 599-621. 

Several months after Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1939 establish- 
ing the Executive Office of the President (EOP) had been in effect 
President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8248 which reorganized 
the new EOP. There was established within the EOP the following six 
divisions: (1) The White House Office, (2) the Bureau of the Budget, 
(3) the National Resources Planning Board, (4) the Liaison Office 
for Personnel Management, (5) the Office of Government Reports, and 
(6) an "office for emergency management as the President shall 
determine." The President indicated that the Executive Order was 
"designed to implement" Reorganization Plans 1 and 2 of 1939. The 
question raised at the time was whether or not Executive Orders were 
the proper method to "implement" or "fill out" Reorganization Plans. 
In this instance, the issue was not joined because of Congress' 
traditional willingness to let the President organize his own office. 

35/ An insightful review of the legacy of the Brownlow Committee is provided 

by one of its former staff members, see: Mansfield, Harvey. Federal 
Executive Reorganization: Thirty Years of Experience. Public 
Administration Review, v. 29, July/August 1969: 332-345. 



CRS-19 



agencies left in the wake of the depression, the war, and demobilization. 
Although created by Congress, it had the active cooperation of President 
Truman tnroughout its existence. The enabling statute of the first Hoover 
Commission required tne Commission to be bipartisan and it was composed of 
six Democrats and six Republican members. 36 / Former President Herbert 
Hoover was selected as Chairman, a post from which he exerted considerable 
leadership. 37/ 

The original intellectual impetus for the Commission stemmed from a 
rather ''moralistic" view of administration and politics, a view charac- 
teristic of tne earlier Progressive era. 38/ The organization of the 
Federal Government was widely regarded as unnecessarily confused and costly 
with overlapping and duplicating programs and agencies. In the opinion of 
critics, tnis situation could be remedied by the application of "sound 
Business practices" which would, in turn, result in more economy and effi- 
ciency, and less government. 

At least publicly, the Commission was cniefly concerned with structural 
reorganization of the departments and agencies and with interagency relations 
Some 24 task forces were assembled and each given a field of inquiry. tacn 



36/ 61 Stat. 246. 



37 / Emmerich, Herbert. Federal Organization and Administrative Management. 
University, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1971, pp. 85-87 

38 / Arnold, Peri E. Executive Reorganization and Administrative Theory: 

Tne Origin of the Managerial Presidency. Paper delivered at tne 

Annual .Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
September 1976. 



CRS-20 



task force submitted findings and recommendations to the Commission. 
Eighteen of the task force reports were published separately. The Commission 
itself issued 18 concluding reports and one additional report as a summary. 39/ 

In tne summary report, the Com.Tiission stated that "...we must reorganize 
tne Executive Branch to give it simplicity of structure, the unity of 
purpose, and the clear line of executive authority that was originally 
intended under the Constitution." 40/ Its recommendations, therefore, 
were for a more orderly grouping of the functions of government into major 
departments and agencies. The Commission sought to insure clear lines of 
authority and control, and the provision of staff assistance for both the 
President and department heads. 

Recommendations were made to regroup departments and agencies by 
major purpose and reduce their number. Within departments, bureaus were 
regrouped. Budgets were to be made more flexible and subject to greater 
control Dy department heads and department-wide functions, such as 
procurement, were to be centralized. The field structure of the 
departments and agencies was also subjected to study and recommendations 
were made by tne Commission. 



39/ For a listing _of the reports by the full Hoover Commission and its task 
forces, see: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government 
Operations. Summary of the Objectives, Operations, and Results of 
of the Commissions on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government (First and Second Hoover Commissions). Appendix H. 
(Committee print), 88th Congress, 1st session, 1963. (Hereafter 
tnis Committee print will be referred to as: Summary of Results, 
Hoover Commissions.) 

40/ U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. 
General Management of the Executive Branch. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off. , 1949, p. viii. 



CRS-21 



Wnile the reshuffling of agencies to make them more "rationally" 

located in the Federal structure has a certain obvious appeal, there are 

critics. Harold Seidman, writing in the 1970s of the first Hoover 

Commission, asserts: 

The organizational commandments laid down by the first Hoover 
Commission constitute the hard core of the fundamentalist dogma. The 
devils to be exorcised are overlapping and duplication, and confused 
or broken lines of authority and responsibility. Entry into the 
Nirvana of Economy and Efficiency can be obtained only by strict 
adherence to sound principles of executive branch organization. Of 
these the most essential are the groupings of executive branch 
agencies as nearly as possible by major purposes so that 'by placing 
related functions cheek-by-jowl the overlaps can be eliminated, 
and of even greater importance coordinated policies can be developed'; 
and the establishment of a clear line of command and supervision from 
the President down through his department heads to every employee 
with no subordinate possessing authority independent from that of 
his superior. 41/ 

Irrespective of the validity of tne principles of administration 

Professor Seidman finds so intellectually stifling, their use resulted in 

an extraordinary numbers of changes in the Executive Brancn. Congress 

substantially followed the recommendations of the Commission when it passed 

the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, the Reorganization of the 

Department of State Act, the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, 

and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 which 

resulted in the establishment of the General Services Administration. Possibly 

of greatest importance was the passage of the Reorganization Act of 1949 



41 / Seidman. Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal 
Organization, 2d ed. p. 4. 



CRS-22 



wnicn renewed the President's authority to submit Reorgnanization Plans to 
Congress. 42 / President Truman, under authority of this Act, was subsequently 
to effect many of the Commission proposals through Reorganization Plan. 43/ 

There was an effort, mostly for media purposes in generating public 
support, to k.eep track of the number of recommendations which were affected 
Dy Congressional or Presidential action. While the utility of such a listing 
is open to question, the Citizens' Committee for the Hoover Report, in its 
final Report, stated that the Commission had made some 273 recommendations, 
of which 196, or 72 percent, had been adopted. The total number of legislative 
enactments, including Reorganization Plans, attributable to the first 
Hoover Commission, was seventy seven. 44 / 

A concentration on the reorganization of departments, agencies, and 
certain functions, while important, tends to obscure what to many was the 
principal achievement of tne first Hoover Commission, namely the enhancement 
of the the Presidential office as manager of the government. Peri Arnold, in 
a recent essay, observed: "It was the supreme political accomplishment of the 
first Hoover Commission that it masked the managerial Presidency with the older 
values of administrative orthodoxy and, to a significant degree, undercut the 



42/ Heady, Ferrel. The Reorganization Act of 1949. Public Administration 
Review, v, 9, Summer 1949: 165-174. 

43/ The literature on the first Hoover Commission is substantial. In addition 
to the sources cited herein, several essays are particularly helpful. 
Mansfield, Harvey. Reorganizing the Federal Executive Branch: The 
Limits of Institutionalization. Law and Contemporary Problems, v. 25, 
Summer 1970: 461-495. Heady, Ferrel. The Operation of a Mixed 
Commission. American Political Science Review, v. 43, October 1949: 
940-952. 

44/ Summary of Results, Hoover Commission, p. 6. 



CRS-23 



conservative and congressional opposition to the expansive executive.... In the 
end, Hoover and his Commission provided the bridge over which the congressional 
opponents of the Brownlow Committee recommendations and the old political enemies 
of Franklin Roosevelt could embrace the managerial Presidency." 45 / 

Second Hoover Commission 

In 1953, Congress established by statute a second Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, otherwise known as 
the second Hoover Commission. 46 / The Commission was organized as a mixed 
commission, much like its predecessor, with four members appointed by the 
President, four appointed by the President of the Senate, and four appointed 
by the Speaker of the House. Six members were to be from private life, two 
from the Executive Branch, two from the House and two from the Senate. 
While the enabling statute of the first Hoover Commission had required that 
the membership be divided equally between the two major parties, this re- 
quirement was absent from the statute creating the Seocnd Hoover Commission. 
When the Commission first met, former President Hoover was again selected as 
Chairman. The second Commission operated in a manner similar to that of the 
first Commission in that task forces were established and most published 



45 / Arnold, Peri. The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial Presidency, 
Journal of Politics, v. 38, February 1976: 48, 49-50. 

46/ 67 Stat. 184. 



CRS-24 



separate reports of their own with recommendations to the full Connnission. 
The Commission, in turn, published its own final report with recommenda- 
tions. 47/ 

While the first Hoover Commission was principally interested in 
improving the administrative management of the Executive Branch, the 
second Hoover Commission was primarily concerned with issues of policy 
and function. The underlying premise of the Commission's work was that 
the Federal Government ought to reduce its functions and "retrench," not 
only to save money but as a means to eliminate competition with private 
enterprise. 

The very nature of the Commission's task and philosophy insured 
that its results would not receive as favorable a reception as had those 
of the first Commission. Its terms of reference were too broad and 
ill-defined and the timing of its reports was miscalculated. Indeed, the 
mood of the country appeared to have shifted away from retrenchment and 
towards greater Government involvement in the economic sphere. 48 / 

Herbert Emmerich summarized the objectives of the second Commission: 

'The philosophy of the commission' was a phrase frequently 
used by Mr. Hoover, never with great precision, but it referred 
to the ultimate major premises of Hoover II. These were concerned 
with the reduction of governmental functions, not only to save 



47/ U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government. Final Report to the Congress, June 30, 1955, 
Printed as House Doc. 209. 84th Congress, 1st session. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1955. See: Divine, 
William R. The Second Hoover Commission: An Analysis. 
Public Administration Review, v. 15, Fall 1955: 263-269. 

48/ Fesler, James W. Administrative Literature and the Second Hoover 
Commission Reports. American Political Science Review, 
V. 51. March 1957: 135-157. 



CRS-25 



money and to reduce taxes, but primarily to eliminate competition 
with private enterprise — to restrict and abolish many of the 
programs which had been adopted to regulate, stabilize, supplement, 
and assist the private sector during World War II and when the 
years of the great depression of the 1930 's had revealed its 
deficiencies. The enormous scope of Hoover II and the remarkable 
labors of Mr. Hoover in his eightieth year, in once more personally 
supervising every detail of so large an effort, were predominantly 
concerned with what the government should not do rather than how 
it should be organized and managed. 49/ 

Possibly, the most important of the Commission reports was that 
of the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service. This panel, and 
subsequently the full Commission, recommended that a "Senior Civil 
Service "be established to consist "...of a group of career administrators 
carefully selected from all parts of the civil service and from all 
departments and agencies solely on the basis of demonstrated competence." 50 / 
They would have status, rank, and salary as individual civil servants and 
could be employed in positions throughout the Government. "They should keep 
clear of all political activity, preserve their neutrality in matters of 
politics, and serve each Chief Executive and his subordinates faithfully." 51/ 

Initially, the Senior Civil Service was planned to consist of some 
1500 persons to be expanded to 3000 at a later date. The supporiiers of this 
proposal, including Mr. Hoover, cited what they considered to be precedents 



49/ Emmerich, Federal Organization and Administrative Management p. 103. 

50 / U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of 
the Government. Report on Personnel and Civil Service. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1955. p. 38. 

51 / Ibid. p. 39. For a discussion of the career executive and 

political involvement which questions some of the assumptions 
of the second Hoover Commission, consult: Bernstein, Marver. 
The Job of the Political Executive. Washington, The Brookings 
Institution, 1958, chapter 3. 



23-836 O - 78 - 3 



CRS-26 



in the Armed Forces where promotions above a certain rank were based on 
competence and leadership and where a p>ool of generalists could be called 
upon for assignments to difficult positions. 52/ 

This proposal received a mixed response from scholars and political 
leaders. The principal criticisms were that it would tend to create an 
''elite corps" of administrators, a concept repugnant to many Americans, 
and that it ran counter to the thrust of specialization characteristic of 
the functions of agencies as well as their relationships with clientele 
groups. The career executives were, by and large, opposed to the idea. 53 / 
Although the proposal for a Senior Civil Service was never adopted, a 
number of subsidiary concepts have been accepted in recent years. 
Study Commissions on Executive Reorganization: 1953-1968 

In addition to the work undertaken by the second Hoover Commission 
(1953-1955), another group was established by President Eisenhower to 
review on a continuing basis the organization of the Executive Branch. 



52/ MacNeil, Neil and Metz, Harold W. The Hoover Report, 1953-1955: 
What It Means to You as Citizen and Taxpayer. New York, 
Macmillan Company, 1956, p. 38. 

53 / An explanation and defense of the Second Hoover Commission's 
proposal for a "senior civil service" may be found in: 
White, Leonard D. The Senior Civil Service. Public 
Administration Review, v. 15, Autumn 1955: 237-243. For a 
critique of the Commission's proposal, see: Reimer, Everett. 
The Case Against the Senior Civil Service. Personnel Administra- 
tion, V. 19, March/April 1956: 31-40. The concept of a Federal 
Executive Service has continued to enjoy fxjpularity and in 1971 
President Nixon proposed the establishment of a Federal Executive 
Service with not less than 75 percent of the executives to be 
career executives. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Post 
Office and Civil Service. Federal Executive Service. (S. Rept . 
no. 92-864) 92d Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off. , 1972. 



CRS-27 



This group, known as the President's Advisory Conmittee on Government 
Organization (PACGO), was chaired by Nelson Rockefeller in the years 
1953 through 1958. 54/ During these years 14 Reorganization Plan were 
drafted by this Committee, presented by the President and accepted by 
Congress. Although the Committee functioned with little publicity, its 
work and results have generally been accorded high marks. 55 / 

Other commissions, committees, and task forces would be established 
over the years and in many instances their recommendations carried 
organizational impact. Some of the reports of these bodies would be made 
public, others were never published. Some of the groups had broad mandates 
while others were directed towards rather narrow subject fields. 

One area of particular interest in the 1950s was intergovernmental 
relations, or federalism. In 1953, Congress established the Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations chaired by Meyer Kestnbaum. The objectives 



54 / U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary Analysis of the 
Philosophy and Public Record of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Nominee 
for Vice President of the United States. 93rd Congress, 2d 
session. (Committee print) Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off. , 1974. pp. 173-174. 

When Mr. Rockefeller resigned in 1958 co assume the 
Governorship of New York, he was succeeded by Don K. Price, 
Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration at 
Harvard, and the group continued in existence until 1961. 

55 / Herbert Emmerich concluded: 

"When the full record of PACGO becomes available to 
administrative analysts and historians, I predict that this 
small, close-knit, knowledgeable, continuous, diligent 
presidential commission will prove to have made more con- 
structive and durable contributions to federal organization 
and administrative management than was produced by all the 
massive forays of the task force and flying squadrons of 
the second Hoover Commission put together." In, Federal 
Organization and Administrative Management, p. 176. 



CRS-28 



of this Commission were both general and specific. The Commission was 
charged "...to study the power role of the Federal government in relation 
to the States and their political subdivisions ... to the end that these 
relations may be clearly defined and the functions concerned may be 
allocated to their proper jurisdiction...." Where functions performed by 
the Federal Government were to be transferred to the States, it was the 
responsibility of the Commission to recommend how tax revenue adjustments 
could be made to insure that States were able to fund their new functions. 
The assumptions behind the Commission's mandate were that most functions of 
government could be separated among jurisdictions and that a serious imbalance 
in favor of the Federal Government had occurred requiring a reassignment of 
some functions to the States. While the Report of this Commission in 1955 
received wide publicity, tangible organizational and program changes were to 
be few in number. 56/ 

in a further effort to "sort out functions," President Eisenhower 
establisned in 1937 the Joint Federal-State Action Committee (JFSAC). 
Like its predecessor group, the Kestnbaum Commission, the JFSAC was 
supposed to begin its deliberations witn the presumption that administra- 



56/ U.S. Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. A Report to the 
President For Transmittal to the Congress. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off. , 1955. 



CRS-29 



tive decision-making and implementation should be distributed between 
the Federal Government, the States, and the locatities with the emphasis 
being on separateness . 57/ 

Morton Grodzins, in evaluating the work of the JFSAC, commented 
that the ". . .committee initially devoted little attention to this 
problem [identifying functions to be 'returned' to the States]. Upon 
discovering the difficulty of making separatist recommendations, i.e., 
for turning over Federal functions and taxes to the States, it developed 
a series of proposals looking to greater effectiveness in intergovern- 
mental collaboration." 58 / 

One important result of the work and reports of the Kestnbaum 
Commission and the JFSAC was the establishment by Congress in 1959 of 
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). 59 / 
The purpose of the 26 member, bipartisan permanent body of representa- 
tives of the Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal, State 
and local governments, and representatives of the general public, is to 
maintain a continuing review of the operation of the Federal system and 
make recommendations for improvements. To this end, the Commission con- 



57 / U.S. Joint Federal-State Action Committee. Final Report to the 
President of the United States and to the Chairman of the 
Governor's Conference. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
1960. This document contains the working papers of the JFSAC. 

58 / Grodzins, Morton. The Federal System. In U.S. President's Commission 
on National Goals. Goals For Americans. Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960. p. 267. 

59/ 80 Stat. 915, as amended; 16 U.S.C. 470-470m. 



CRS-30 



ducts studies and investigations of specific intergovernmental conflict 
points and suggests legislation and administrative orders to carry out 
its recommendations. 60/ 

There were no major "mixed commissions" to review the organization 
of the Executive Branch established during the Kennedy and Johnson years 
There were, however, numerous policy oriented task forces appointed. 61 / 
Before he was inaugurated, Kennedy had commissioned some 29 task forces 
in various foreign and domestic policy fields. 62/ Their reports were 
to be used to set policy directions and provide a legislative program. 
Johnson was to rely even more heavily on the task force approach to 
develop policy positions. 63 / Some of the task forces were directed 
at immediate legislative needs while others were given a longer range 
perspeot i ve . 



6 / vJright, Deil S. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
Unique Features and Policy Orientation. Public Administration 
Review, v. 25, September 1965: 193-202. 

61 / The most complete discussion of recent Presidential advisory 

commissions is to be found in: Wolanin, Thomas R. Presidential 
Advisory Commissions: Truman to Nixon. Madison, University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1975. 

62/ Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the 

White House. New York, Fawcett World Library, 1967, pp. 148-155. 

63/ In 1967, there were a total of 50 separate task forces operating in 
various domestic policy areas. Thomas, Norman C. and Harold L. 
Wolman. Policy Formulation In the Institutionalized Presidency: 
The Johnson Task Force. In, Cronin, Thomas E. and Sanford D. 
Greenberg, eds. The Presidential Advisory System. New York, 
Harper and Row, 1969. p. 129. 



CRS-31 



In the field of Executive reorganization, two such task forces, to 
use the generic name popular at the time, were created during the 
Kennedy-Johnson Administration. The first was named by Kennedy and 
chaired by Don K. Price. It submitted its report privately to President 
Johnson in 1964. It recommended, among other things, the creation of 
five new executive departments: Transportation; Education; Natural 
Resources; Economic Development; and Housing and Community development. 64 / 
The second, the President's Task force on Government Organization, was 
an eleven member group chaired by Ben Heineman. The report of this 
Task force, like the earlier Price Committee report, was not made public 
at the time. In testimony before a House Committee in 1971, Mr. Heineman 
stated that there has been three reports submitted to the President. The 
first was on the organization of the Executive Office of the President. 
The other two were on the organization of various segments of the 
organization of the Great Society programs and a long-range look at what 
the organization of the Executive Branch might be like in the future. 65/ 



64/ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Executive 

Reorganization: A Summary Analysis. (H. Report no. 92-922) 

92d Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
1972. p. 16. 

65 / U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Sub- 
committee on Legislation and Military Operations. Reorganization 
of Executive Departments (Part 1-Overview). Hearings, 92d 
Congress, 1st session on H.R. 6959, H.R. 6960, H.R. 6961, and 
H.R. 6962. June 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, 16; July 7, 8, 11, and 27, 1971. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. pp. 233-257. In 
19 76, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library made available to the 
public the final report of the Task Force on the Organization 
and Management of Great Society Programs (June 15, 1967). 



CRS-32 



During the years 1953 through 1968, there were a number of bills 
introduced in Congress to establish a major commission patterned after the 
Hoover Commissions. The closest such legislation came to enactment was in 
1968 when the Senate passed a bill to establish an eight member commission 
with a two-year mandate to study the organization and operations of the 
Executive Branch. 66/ 
Ash Council 

Soon after taking office in 1969, President Nixon announced the 
appointment of a President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization 
to be chaired by Roy L. Ash, President of Litton Industries. The 
Council consisted of six private citizens, met monthly over a 14 month 
period, and eventually submitted some 13 memorandums to the President. 6 7 / 
Tnese memorandums served as the basis for the legislative proposals to 
reorganize iQuch of t^he Executive Branch which the President submitted to 
Congress on March 15, 1971. 68/ 



66/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Sub- 
committee on Executive Reorganization. Establish a Commission 
on the Organization and Management of the Executive Branch. 
Hearings, 90th Congress, 2d session. January 22, 23, 24, and 
31; February 1; April 4; and May 15, 1968. Washington, U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off. , 1968. 

67 / Of the thirteen memorandums submitted by the Council to the 

President in 1970, three would be made public. The Council 
printed the memorandums titled: Establishment of a Department 
of Natural Resources; and Organization for Social and Economic 
Programs. Later the Council published: A New Regulatory 
Framework: Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agency. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 

68 / U.S. Executive Office of the President. Office of Management and 
Budget. Papers Relating to the President's Departmental 
Reorganization Program. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
1971. 



CRS-33 



The Council concluded that the Executive Branch was too fragmented, 
resulting in a lack of effective coordination in meeting public problems. 
The attempts to overcome this fragmentation through the creation of 
interagency committees — they counted some 850 — were judged a 
failure. 69/ Not only did these interagency committees tend to establish 
another layer of decision-making, and hence more confusion and delay, 
but it tended to further undermine the already tenuous authority of 
elected officials. 

The concept underlying the Ash Council report to the President was 
that the achievement of more effective policy-making and administration 
would depend on the establishment of more centralized and politically 
responsible lines of authority within the Executive Branch. The Council 
advocated a "package" approach combining the various elements of the 
"New Federalism," e.g., revenue sharing, with Executive Branch reorgani- 
zation. As to restructuring the Executive Branch, the objective was to 
move away from the rather narrow, constituency oriented traditional 
departments towards broader, functional departments. 70/ 

In his legislative proposals to Congress, the President sought to 
abolish seven existing departments (i.e.. Agriculture; Interior; Commerce; 
Health, Education and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development; Labor; and 
Transportation) and create four new departments (i.e.. Human Resources; 



69/ Ibid. , p. 8 



70 / Dean, Alan. The Goals of Departmental Reorganization. The 
Bureaucrat, v. 1, Spring 1972: 23-30. 



CRS-34 



Community Development; Natural Resources; and Economic Affairs). Additionally, 
the functions of a number of independent agencies were to be absorbed within 
the new departments. 

A "model" department would be one where the Secretary would be assisted 
by a small number of staff officers having department-wide responsibilities. 
Specifically provided were a Deputy Secretary who would serve as an alter- 
ego and principal overseer of internal management for the Secretary, two 
Under Secretaries, a number of Assistant Secretaries, and a General Counsel. 

To provide means for a rational grouping of the large bureaus and 
programs to be inherited by the proposed new departments, the concept of 
the "Administration" was introduced as a first tier device for program 
direction. These organizations, patterned after the operating administra- 
tions in the Department of Transportation, were provided as management 
provided as management centers — each with a major segment of the depart- 
ment's administrative program. These Administrations would be headed by 
Administrators with a grade higher than the Assistant Secretaries. 

The combined use of cross-cutting staff officers concerned with 
functions affecting all elements of the department, and program 
administrators charged with directing important segments of the department's 
operating responsibilities, were expected to facilitate decentralized 
management while simultaneously providing for more effective secretarial 
control and department cohesion. The above changes, to be made in the 



CRS-35 



central office, would be accompanied by significant alteration in the 
field structure of the agencies. In most instances, it was anticipated 
that the regional directors would be comprehensive supervisors. 

Overview hearings of a general scope were held on those prosposals 
as well as hearings on the specific proposal for the Departments of 
Community Development and Natural Resources. 71/ No legislation was 
passed during the 92d and 93rd Congresses. The Ash Council was more 
successful, however, in promoting a plan to reorganize the Executive Office 
of the President. Specifically, they recommended to the President that he 
establish a Domestic Council to provide White House coordination of major 
policy initiatives and to reconstitute the Bureau of the Budget into the 



71 / U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Governmental Operations. Sub- 
committee on Legislation and Military Operations. Reorgani- 
zation of Executive Departments (Part 1 — Overview). 
Hearings, 92d Congress, 1st session on H.R. 6959, H.R. 6960, 
H.R. 6961, and H.R. 6962. June 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, 16; July 7, 

8, 22, and 27, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
1971. Also; U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government 
Operations. Subcommittee on Legislation and Military 
Operations. Reorganization of Executive Departments (Part 
2 — Department of Community Development). Hearings. 

92d Congress, 1st and 2d sessions on H.R. 6962. November 3, 

9, 11, 1971; January 25, 27; February 7, 8, 29; March 1,2, 
9, 13, 14, 27; and April 11, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1972. Also; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs. Establish a Department of 
Natural Resources. Hearings, pursuant to S. Res. 45. 92d 
Congress, 2d session. January 28, 1972. Washington, U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off. . 1972. 



CRS-36 



Office of Management and Budget. The President proposed both these 
recommendations by way of Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970; which Congress 
accepted after considerable debate. 72/ 



72 / U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Sub- 
committee on Legislation and Military Operations. Reorganization 
Plan No. 2 of 1970 (Office of Management and Budget; Domestic 
Council). Hearings. 91st Congress, 2d session. April 28, 30, 
and May 5, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 
Also; U.S. Congress. House. Disapproving Reorganization Plan 
No. 2 of 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 
(91st Congress, 2d session. House Report no. 91-1066). 

For a discussion of the objectives and accomplishments of 
the Ash Council ^$ they affected the Executive Office of the 
President, see: Schick, Allen. The Budget Bureau That Was: 
Thoughts on the Rise, Decline, and Future of a Presidential 
Agency. Lad and Contemporary Problems, v. 35, Summer 1970: 
519-539. "'Hecl.a.uJiugh. 0MB and the Presidency ~ The Problem 
of 'Neutral Competence.' Public Interest, Winter 1975: 80-98. 
Moe, Ronald C. The Domestic Council in Perspective. The 
Bureaucrat, v. 5, October 1976: 251-272. "German, Larry. The 
The Office of Management and Budget That Almost Wasn't. 
Political Science Quarterly, v. 92, Summer 1977: 281-304. 



CRS-37 



METHODS OF CHANGE 



How Reorganizations Happen 

There are four methods available for organizing and reorganizing the 
Executive Branch. The passage of the Reorganization Act of 1977 alters only 
one of these methods and should be considered within the limited context of 
its actual impact. There are some legal ground rules that limit the reorgani- 
zation options available to the President and Congress. Probably the most 
important ground rule to recognize is that the President is limited as to 
the reorganizations he can effect. To fully understand the President's role, 
it is necessary to survey the several methods used for organizing and re- 
organizing the units of the Executive Branch. 
Statutes 

Congress has the constitutional power to establish, reorganize, or 
abolish virtually any agency of Government by statute. The President may 
propose, of course, but it is the Congress that may or may not give its 
attention to fck^\ President 's proposal. New executive departments have 
traditiona\lly, with one exception, been established through the legislative 
process. It is common for agencies to be created as part of more general 
programmatic legislation. This is true even of agencies within the Executive 
Office of the President, as occurred when the Council of Economic Advisors 
was established under provisions of the Employment Act of 1946. 



CRS-38 



When President Nixon fowarded his comprehensive proposal in 1971 to 
reorganize and consolidate most domestic agencies and programs into four 
departments, he submitted four separate bills to Congress. More recently, 
President Carter fowarded his proposal to establish a Department of Energy 
in the form of a bill, thereby permitting Congressional amendments and 
requiring Congressional approval. 
Presidential Directives 

In his constitutional capacity as Chief Executive, Commander-in-Chief, 
or by delegation of discretion by Congress, the President has exercised 
authority to create or abolish agencies, or to delegate functions. 
Presidential actions on organizational matters are greatest, as might be 
expected, during periods of war and national emergencies. 73/ His normal 
method of action is by Executive Order although other procedures, to include 
Presidential Annoucement, Presidential Memorandum, and military orders, are 
often used. The President may, using his "Unanticipated Needs" budgetary 
account, fund small units, such as the Presidential Clemency Board, until such 
time as Congress is willing and able to pass authorization and appropriations 
bills. The President also may establish commissions and task forces using 
Presidential directives. 74/ 



73/ A general history of the development of the President's emergency 
powers may be found in: U.S. Congress. Senate. Special 
Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency 
Powers. A brief history of emergency powers in the United 
States. [Harold C. Relyea] Committee print. 93rd Congress, 
2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 

74/ Wolanin, Thomas. Presidential Advisory Commissions: Truman to 

Nixon. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1975. Chapter 4, 



CRS-39 



Internal Department Reorganization 

The Congress may vest discretion to realign units and functions within 
departments and agencies to the heads of those departments and agencies. The 
concept of giving considerable discretion to the department head for organizing 
the department or agency was championed by the reports of the first Hoover 
commission (1947-1949), and is reflected in much of the legislation of the 
period. While the degree of discretion permitted department heads varies 
considerably, in recent years Congress has been inclined to impose increasing 
restraints upon the ability of department heads to reorganize their units. 

A recent example of the extent to which reorganization authority 
is available to department heads may be found in a Reorganization Order 
issued by the Secretary of Health, Education and 'Welfare, Joseph Califano. 
On March 18, 1977, 75 / he issued a Reorganization Order realigning a 
substantial number of agencies and functions within the Department, 
especially in the health and income maintenance fields. While there were 
major shifts in tne lines of authority, no new functions were created 
nor were any statutory functions eliminated. The authority for the 
Secretary to issue this Reorganization Order is to be found in Section 6 
of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953 which established the Department. 
The pertinent section reads: "The Secretary may from time to time make 



75/ 42 Fed. Reg. March 9, 1977. pp. 13262-13263. 



CRS-40 



such provisions as the Secretary deems appropriate authorizing the 
performance of any of the functions of the Secretary by any other officer, 
or by any agency or employees, of the Department." 
Reorganization Plan 

The President may, under authority of the Reorganization Act of 1977, 
and previously under the Reorganization Act of 1949, submit Reorganization 
Plans for realigning agencies or agency authority, transferring administrative 
units or functions from one department or agency to another, or abolishing old 
agencies and creating new ones to administer the tranferred functions. Congress 
has imposed limitations on the types of reorganization that can occur and the 
procedures that must be followed. The critical aspect of the Reorganization 
Plan method remains, however, as it is the President who initiates a proposal 
and the Congress which reacts. This method of reorganizing existing depart- 
ments and agencies is useful under certain conditions as it permits direct 
action without the delays and compromises generally present in the legislative 
process. 



CRS-41 



REORGANIZATION ACT Of 1949 
Legislative Background 

The genesis of the President's reorganization authority is to be 
found in the economy measures of 1932 and 1933 when the concept of 
Presidential initiative and Congressional review of reorganization proposals 
was first written into law. IbJ The Reorganization Act of 1939 limited the 
authority of the President to submit Reorganization Plans to a period of 
2 years and provided for Congressional rejection by the adoption of a con- 
current resolution. 7 7 / The Act also contained a number of limitations in 
that it prohibited Reorganization Plans from being a vehicle for the 
abolition of departments or for the transfer of all functions thereof, and 
it exempted 11 agencies from the scope of the Act. 78 / 

During World War II, the President was given authority under Title I 
of the War Powers Act to make temporary, emergency wartime reorganizations 
for the duration of the war plus 6 months. 79/ 



76 / Technically, the so-called Economy Act of 1932 (47 Stat. 413) was 

actually Part II of the Legislative Appropriations Act for Fiscal 
Year 1933. Similarly, the so-called Economy Act of 1933 was a 
rider to the Treasury-Post Office Appropriations Act of March 3, 
1933 (47 Stat. 1517). 

77/ 53 Stat. 561 

78 / Millett and Rogers. The Legislative Veto and the 1939 Reorganization 
Act. pp. 176-189. 

79 / Gulick, Luther. War Organization of the Federal Government. American 
Political Science Review, v. 38, December 1944: 1166-1179. 



23-836 O - 78 - 4 



CRS-42 



In 1945, Congress again granted the President authority for 2 years 
to submit Reorganizations Plans. 80 / This Act was similar in most respects 
to the 1939 Act in that it provided for Congressional rejection of a Plan 
by a concurrent resolution and that abolishment or transfer of all functions 
of executive departments and enumerated agencies was expressly forbidden. 

While the Reorganization Act of 1949 was basically patterned after the 
Reorganization Acts of 1939 and 1945, there were several important 
differences. In both the 1939 and 1945 Reorganization Acts, certain 
stipulated agencies had been exempt from the provisions of the Act. The 
Hoover Commission had indicated its strong disapproval of agency exemptions. 81/ 
Both Chairman Hoover and President Truman issued statements supporting the view 
that no agencies ought to be exempted for the reorganization authority. The 
protection against unwise Plans, in their view, was the simple expedient 
of Congressional rejection. 

The Senate, particularly, was concerned about the fate of certain 
favored agencies e.g., the Army Corps of Engineers. It agreed to the 
elimination of the category of exempted agencies only if the procedure for 
disapproval or Reorganization Plans was amended to provide that a simple 



80/ 59 Stat. 613 " 



1/ "The Commission recommends that such authority should be given the 
President and that the power of the President to prepare and 
transmit plans of reorganization to the Congress should not 
be restricted by limitations or exemptions. Once the limiting 
and exempting process is begun it will end the possibility of 
achieving really substantial results." U.S. Commission on 
organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. The 
Hoover Commission Report, New York, McGraw-Hill Company, 1949, 
p. XV. 



CRS-43 



resolution of disapproval by either the House or Senate would be sufficient 
to reject any Reorganization Plan. The House bill had passed with the two- 
house veto provision intact. Negotiations between the two bodies were extended 
with the Senate conferees holding firm. The House conferees finally had to 
recede from their position as the price for the passage of any bill. The 
only concession the House could extract from the Senate was that the 
resolution of disapproval would have to be approved in either house by a 
majority of the authorized membership rather than a simple majority of those 
voting. 82/ 
Provisions of the Act 

The 1949 Reorganization Act (Section 901) charged the President with 
examining the organization of all agencies from time to time ". . .and 
shall determine what changes therein are necessary to accomplish the 
following purposes;" 

(1) to promote the better execution of the laws, the more 
effective management of the executive branch of the 
Government and of its agencies and functions, and the 
expeditious administration of the public business; 

(2) to reduce expenditures and promote economy, to the 
fullest extent consistent with the efficient operation 
of the Government; 

(3) to increase the efficiency of the operations of the 
Government to the fullest extent practicable; 

(4) to group, coordinate, and consolidate agencies and 
functions of the Government, as nearly as may be, 
according to major purposes; 



82/ Heady. Reorganization Act of 1949. pp. 170-174. 



CRS-44 



(5) to reduce the number of agencies by consolidating those 
having similar functions under a single head, and to 
abolish such agencies or functions thereof as may not 

be necessary for the efficient conduct of the Government; 
and 

(6) to eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort. 

Under Section 903 of the Act, the President could submit to Congress 
a Reorganization Plan which would transfer, abolish, or consolidate all or 
a part of an agency, or its functions. And such Plan could abolish the whole 
or part of any agency whose functions had been transferred, abolished, 
or consolidated with another agency. "The President, in his message trans- 
mitting a reorganization plan, shall specify with respect to each abolition of 
a function included in the plan the statutory authority for the exercise of such 
function, and shall specify the reduction of expenditures (itemized so far as 
practicable) which it is probable will be brought about by the taking effect 
of the reorganizations included in the plan." 

A Reorganization Plan transmitted under Section 903 could have certain 
enumerated provisions in addition to authority previously noted. For 
instance, Section 904(1) stated that a Reorganization Plan "...may change, 
in such cases as the President considers necessary, the name of an agency 
affected by a reorganization and the title of its head, and shall designate 
the name of an agency resulting from a reorganization and the title of its 
head." 

The legislation also contained limitations regarding what a 
Reorganization Plan might include: 



CRS-45 



Sec. 905 (a) No reorganization plan shall provide for, and no 
reorganization under this Act shall have the effect of — 

(1) abolishing or transferring an executive department or all 
the functions thereof or consolidating any two or more 
executive departments or all the functions thereof; or 

(2) continuing any agency beyond the period authorized by law 
for its existence or beyond the time when it would have 
terminated if the reorganization had not been made; or 

(3) continuing any function beyond the period authorized 
by law for it exercise, or beyond the time when it 
would have terminated if the reorganization had not 
been made; or 

(4) authorizing any agency to exercise any function whicn 
is not expressly authorized by law at the time the 
plan is transmitted to the Congress; or 

(5) increasing the term of any office beyond that provided 
by law for such office; or 

(6) transferring to or consolidating with any other 
agency the municipal government of the District of 
Columbia or all those functions thereof which are subject 
to this Act, or abolishing said government or all said 
functions. 

The authority for submitting Reorganization Plans was limited to 
approximately four years, until April 1, 1953. The Hoover Commission had 
favored a permanent Reorganization Plan authority, alttiough in committee 
testimony, former President Hoover had indicated that he could support a 
time limit if it coincided with a Presidential term. 

Title II of the Act outlined the procedures to be followed in both 
houses when reviewing a Reorganization Plan. A Reorganization Plan submitted 
to Congress by the President would become effective at the end of the first 
period of 60 calendar days of continuous session of Congress after the date 



CRS-46 



on which the Plan was submitted unless, between the date of transmittal and 
the end of the 60 day period, either chamber passed a resolution stating in 
substance that the house did not favor the Reorganization Plan. The 1949 
Act made no provision for amendments to a Plan once it was submitted by the 
President. The only affirmative action permitted was for either house to vote 
on a resolution of disapproval. 

Under the original 1949 Act, the President submitted 41 
Reorganization Plans, of which 29 became effective, 11 were rejected, 
and the substance of one Plan was incorporated in a statute which provided 
for the nullification of the Plan, prior to its effective date. 83/ 
Extensions and Amendments to the Act 

In the years following the passage of the Reorganization Act of 1949, 
Congress would renew this authority eight times, the last renewal being in 
19 71. The length of time extending Presidential reorganization authority 
varied. The original grant in the 1949 Act was for 4 years while in 7 of 
the 8 renewals the extension of the authority was for 2 years and 3 months 
or less. The only instances of a grant of authority extending beyond this 
length was the 1965 renewal for President Johnson which was for three and 



83 / A concise history of the authority of the President to submit 
Reorganization Plans is to be found in: U.S. Congress. 
Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Extending the 
Period Within Which the President May Transmit to the 
Congress Plans for the Reorganization of Agencies of the 
Executive Branch of the Government. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1971. (92d Congress, 1st session. S. Report 
No. 92-485). Included in this Senate Report is the text 
of the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended through 1971. 
See Appendix A. 



CRS-47 



a half years. On a number of occasions the reorganization authority was 
allowed to lapse. As a recent House Committee report noted: "The authority 
has not been continuous during this period [1949-1973], but has been dormant 
approximately 7 years of its 27 year existence." 84 / 

As renewals were sought and debated, there were amendments adopted 
altering the original Act. The thrust of these amendments were generally in 
the direction of limiting the President's discretion. 

In the 1957 extension (71 Stat. 611), the method of rejecting Reorgani- 
zation Plans was altered to provide that a simple majority of those Members 
present and voting in either chamber, rather than a majority of the author- 
ized membership, was sufficient to reject a Plan. 

In 1964, after extended debate, Congress amended the Act (78 Stat. 240) 
to specifically deny the President authority to submit a Reorganization Plan 
which proposed creating a new department. 

Section 903(b) of the Reorganization Act was amended in 1971 (85 Stat. 
574) to limit the President to submitting not more than one Reorganization 
Plan within a 30 day period. Further, Section 905(a) was amended to require 
that the President, in submitting a Reorganization Plan, limit its "effect" 
to dealing with not more than "one logically consistent subject matter." 



84/ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Exten- 
sion of Reorganization Authority of the President. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. 
House Report no. 95-105). p. 5. 



CRS-48 



For the period 1953 through 1973, that is through subsequent extensions 
of the 1949 Reorganization Act, some 52 Reorganization Plans were submitted, 
of which 44 became effective and 8 were rejected. Thus, the totals from 
1949 through 1973 were 93 Plans submitted, 73 accepted, 19 rejected, and one 
nullified . 

The President's authority to submit Reorganization Plans under the 
Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended, expired on April 1, 1973. Senator 
Charles Percy introduced S. 2003 on June 14, 1973, which would have extended 
the President's authority to submit Plans until April 1, 1977. No action was 
forthcoming on this bill. In April 1975, President Ford submitted a draft 
of proposed legislation to reinstitute for a four year period the authority 
of the President to submit Reorganization Plans. No bills, however, were 
introduced to this effect. In both instances, the proposals were for simple 
renewals of authority without amending the basic 1949 Act. When the authority 
expired in April 1973, the 1949 Act remained on the statute books, only the 
activating clause was inoperative. 

The expiration of the Reorganization Plan authority, however, did not end 
reorganizations within the Executive Branch. Reorganizations continued after 
1973, but they were limited to reorganizations internal to departments and 
agencies authorized under procedures outlined in their enabling laws and re- 
organizations approved by Congress through the normal legislative process. 
The Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission were examples of new organizations established after 1973 by statute, 



CRS-49 



REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1977 



Legislative Background 

As a Presidential candidate and as President-elect, Jinny Carter repeatedly 
pledged that a major emphasis of his Administration would be to reorganize the 
Executive Branch. He would seek to impose "sound principles of organization 
and management" upon the Federal bureaucracy. Following in the so-called 
"orthodox tradition" of public administration, the reorganizations to be sub- 
mitted would be designed to reduce the number of organizational units, eliminate 
overlapping, duplication, and fragmented programs, and increase the efficiency, 
economy, and accountability of governmental services. What Washington needed, 
in his view, was "tight, businesslike management and planning techniques" to 
bring the "horrible bureaucratic mess" under control. 85 / 

One of the new President's first legislative proposals was a request that 
Congress renew the President's authority to submit Reorganization Plans. 86 / 
The proposal (S. 626), introduced on February 4, 1977, by Senator Abraham Ribi- 
coff provided that the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended, be reactivated 
with five modifications as suggested in the President's message. 



85 / Marshall, Eliot. The Efficiency Expert: Carter's Plan to 
Shake Up the Bureaucracy. New Republic. August 21 and 
28, 1976: 15-17. 

86 / U.S. Executive Office of the President. Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents, v. 13, February 7, 1977: 147-149. 



CRS-50 



1. The President would be allowed to amend a Plan within 
30 days after sending it to Congress, unless a Reso- 
lution of Disapproval had been ordered reported in 
either House or the appropriate committee in either 
House had otherwise reported its recommendations. 

2. The requirement that only one Plan be submitted within 
a 30 day period would be eliminated. 

3. The requirement that each Reorganization Plan deal with 
a single logically consistent subject matter would be 
eliminated . 

4. The requirement that when a Plan is submitted it have 
attached a statement as to the amount of money to be 
saved would be eliminated. In its place would be 
included information on the improvements in management, 
efficiency, and the delivery of Federal services that 
the Plan would produce. 

5. A four year extension of the authority would be autho- 
rized in place of the customary two year extension. 

Senate Action 

The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held hearings on S. 626 on 

February 8, 1977. 87/ The reception was generally favorable although at least 

one Senator expressed serious misgivings regarding the constitutionality of the 

disapproval process and the delegation of authority given the President by the 

Congress in the bill. 



87 / U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. 
Reorganization Authority. Hearings on S. 626. 95th 
Congress, 1st session. February 8, 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 



CRS-51 



In its report to the Senate, 88 / the Cotmnittee reconmended that the 
reorganization authority be extended for three years from the date of enact- 
ment. The three year limit was a compromise between those seeking only a two 
year extension and those seeking a four year extension. The provision in the 
1949 Act, as amended in 1971, limiting the number of Reorganization Plans that 
could be submitted within a 30 day period to one, was eliminated. The Committee 
retained the provision that each Plan deal with no more than one logically con- 
sistent subject matter. The Committee approved the provision which would per- 
mit the President to submit amendments to his Plans up to 30 days after the 
Plan was originally submitted. The provision prohibiting the establishment 
of departments by Reorganization Plan was retained and expanded to also prohibit 
the elimination or merging of independent regulatory agencies. Furthermore, 
the abolition of substantive programs mandated by statute was prohibited. The 
Committee retained the requirement that the President estimate the savings in 
expenditures expected from the reorganization although the wording was altered 
so as to require an estimation of the Plan's impact on expenditures generally 
and on anticipated improvements in Executive Branch management and the delivery 
of services. 



88 / U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. 

Reorganization Act of 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. S. Report no. 
95-32.) 



CRS-52 



The Senate considered S. 626, as amended, on March 3, 1977. One 
amendment, introduced by Senator Ribicoff, was approved on the floor. 
This amendment permitted the President to submit Reorganization Plans 
abolishing all or a part of the functions of an agency, "except that no 
enforcement function, and no function conferring a substantial programmatic 
benefit on the public, shall be abolished by the plan." 89/ This amendment 
was approved by the Senate and was followed by a vote in the Senate approving 
S. 626, as amended, by a margin of 94 to 0. 
House Action 

Three bills were introduced in the House to reestablish the President's 
authority to submit Reorganization Plans. The bills were H.R. 3131, intro- 
duced by Representative Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Government Opera- 
tions Committee, and provided, among other things, for an affirmative vote by 
Congress on resolutions approving Reorganization Plans. The bill representing 
the President's position (H.R. 3401) was introduced by Representative Dante 
Fascell and others. In addition, the House Minority Leader, Representative 
John Rhodes, introduced H.R. 3442 with language identical to H.R. 3401. 



89 / The wording of this provision was subsequently altered to 

read: Any plan may provide for — "...the abolition of 
all or a part of the functions of an agency, except that 
no enforcement function or statutory program shall be 
abolished by the plan." Section 903(a)(2). 



CRS-53 



Hearings on these three bills were held by the Subcommittee on Legislation 
and National Security on March 1, and March 8, 1977. 90 / 

The critical difference between the bill introduced by Representative 
Brooks (H.R. 3131) and the Administration's bill (H.R. 3407) lay in the 
method by which Reorganization Plans were approved by Congress. Under 
provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended, a Reorganization 
Plan became effective at the end of the first period of 60 calendar days of 
continuous session of Congress unless either House passed a resolution stating 
in substance that it did not favor the Reorganization Plan. Representative 
Brooks, in his bill, provided that a Reorganization Plan would become effective 
only upon the approval by the President of a joint resolution of Congress which 
had been adopted within the first period of 60 calendar days of continuous ses- 
sion of Congress after the date on which the Plan was submitted. In short, 
under Broo! >' bill. Congress would be required to act in an affirmative manner 
before a Reorganization Plan could go into effect. 

Legislation with similar provisions had been proposed in the past by 
Representative Brooks. In 1971, during consideration of legislation to ex- 
tend the President's authority to submit Reorganization Plans, he had stated: 



90 / U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee 
on Legislation and National Security. Providing Reorganization Au- 
thority to the President. Hearings on H.R. 3131, H.R. 3407, and 
H.R. 3442. March 1 and March 8, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1977. 



CRS-54 



...as in the case of most Members of Congress who share 
a very deep concern over maintaining a proper balance between 
the legislative and executive branches of the Government, I 
have never been a strong supporter of this legislation. 

By the very concept of the statue, there is an abdication 
of legislative authority. Even if we assume that the act has 
some beneficial and affirmative value, I believe we can all 
agree that Congress, on a periodic basis, should examine its 
terras to assure that the reorganizations of the Federal Gov- 
ernment under the statute give Congress a meaningful oppor- 
tunity to exercise a legislative mandate. 91 / 

The Brooks' bill also contained a provision for the President to intro- 
duce amendments to Reorganization Plans already submitted to Congress. It 
was similar, in this regard, to the Senate passed measure. 

The basic concern of Representative Brooks, and others, was that the 
proocedure provided in the 1949 Reorganization Act, which was also to be 
found in the President's proposal, was, in their opinion, unconstitutional. 
It was an improper delegation of authority from Congress to the President 
and the process by which Congress approved a Reorganization Plan, which was 
to not act in an affirmative manner, is to legislate by default. Further- 
more, the general practice of providing a legislative veto for Executive 



91 / U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. 
Subcommittee on Legislation and Military Operations. 
Extending the President's Reorganization Authority. 
Hearings on H.R. 6283. March 25 and March 29, 1971. 
Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1971. p. 28. 



CRS-55 



Branch decisions is constitutionally questionable, most particularly as 
it applies to a one house veto or a committee veto. 92/ 



92 / In recent years, statutory provisions giving Congress the power 
to "veto" certain administrative proposals and regulations 
have not only increased in number but also have engendered 
considerable constitutional controversy. Arguing in sup- 
port of the constitutionality of this procedure is: 
Stewart, Geoffrey. Constitutionality of the Legislative 
Veto. Harvard Journal on Legislation, v. 13, April 1076: 
593-619. Arguing against the constitutionality of the 
legislative veto is: Bolton, John R. The Legislative 
Veto: Unseparating the Powers. Washington, American Enter- 
prise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 

In response to an inquiry from President Carter re- 
garding the constitutionality of the legislative veto 
provided for in what was to be S. 626, the Attorney General 
replied by letter on January 31, 1977, that in his opinion 
"... the procedures... are constitutionally valid." He 
went on further to comment: "I should emphasize at the 
outset that my opinion is limited to this particular sta- 
tute, as explained below, and is to be taken in no manner 
as appr'^ving the constitutionality of congressional ap- 
proval oi executive action by resolution in other statutes." 
Letter to be found in: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee 
on Governmental Affairs. To Renew the Reorganization 
Authority, pp. 11-12. 

Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel, during the Ford Administration, appeared 
before the House and Senate committees and challenged the 
interpretation offered by the Attorney General. In his 
opinion, the procedures outlined in the legislation under 
consideration, and in the Reorganization Act of 1949, did 
not meet the requirements of Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution and further that all forms of "legislative 
veto" were unconstitutional. Attempts by the Attorney 
General to distinguish between forms of legislative veto 
he approved and forms of which he disapproved were soph- 
istry. Ibid. pp. 47-52. 



CRS-56 



A full Committee on Government Operations markup session was held on 
March 17 from which emerged a "clean bill" (H.R. 5045) which represented a 
compromise between the supporters of the President's bill and supporters of 
the Brooks' bill. H.R. 5045 was titled the Reorganization Act of 1977 and 
constituted a replacement to the Reorganization Act of 1949 and did not 
merely amend this previous Act. 93 / 

The new bill, H.R. 5045, reflected the views of the President and the 
Senate regarding the precedural method for approving Reorganization Plans. 
As in the Reorganization Act of 1949, a Plan would become effective after 60 
days unless either House passed a resolution disapproving the Plan. The ma- 
jority of the Committee, as with the majority of the Senate, accepted the 
constitutionality of the process. There was an amendment to this process, 
however, which provided that when the President submitted a Plan to Congress, 
a resolution of disapproval be required to be introduced at the same time by 
the chairmen of the House Government Operations Committee and the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee. The two committees would be required to make 
recommendations to the House or the Senate respectively within 45 days or 
such committee shall be deemed as having discharged the resolution which 
shall be placed on the appropriate calendar. Since any Member can move for 
its consideration, it would be unlikely than any future Plan could go into 
effect without the Congress having had a chance to vote on it. 



93 / U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. 
Extension of Reorganization Authority of the President. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 
1st session. H. Report, no. 95-105.) See Annondix B. 



CRS-57 



There were several differences between the Senate bill and the bill 
as it emerged from the House Committee on Government Operations. As 
indicated above, the House Committee bill required that a resolution of 
disapproval be introduced at the same time a Reorganization Plan was 
introduced while the Senate bill required only that each committee make a 
recommendation on each Plan within 45 days, but report a resolution of dis- 
approval if they recommended against the Plan. The House Coinmittee bill 
provided that no more than three Reorganization Plans could be under consid- 
eration at one time while the Senate bill placed no restriction as to the 
number of Plans which could be introduced. 

The House Committee bill was similar to the Senate bill regarding the 
three year extension of authority, retention of the limitation that each 
Plan cover only one "logically consistent subject matter," and that no Plan 
could establish abolish or merge a department or independent regulatory 
agency nor eliminate any function of an agency mandated by statute. The 
House Committee heard Chairman Brooks announce: "This is the best unconsti- 
tutional bill you could draw up" and then approved the bill by a vote of 40-3. 

On March 29, 1977, H.R. 5045 was considered on the floor with Represen- 
tative Brooks as bill manager. In his opening remarks, Mr. Brooks stated 
both his reservations regarding the premise and procedures contained in the 
Reorganization Act and his reasons for supporting the Act as amended by the 
Committee . 



23-836 O - 78 - 5 



CRS-58 



It is a matter of concern, to me personally, that the 
vote will not be an affirmative one. The legislative veto 
provision of this bill presents a serious constitutional 
question as a number of witnesses at our hearings testified. 
I firmly believe it is possible to grant reorganization 
authority to a President that gives all the benefits of cer- 
tain and expedious congressional action, while at the same 
time preserving the legislative process prescribed by the 
Constitution. To allow a President to propose and, in 
effect, pass a law unless Congress vetoes it is to reverse 
that process and trample on the doctrine of separation of 
powers . 

I introduced a reorganization bill that would have 
met both the objectives of the President and the require- 
ments of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the bill before 
us today takes a slightly different approach. I have 
chosen to support it, however, because I believe the new 
voting procedures — which was taken from my bill — and 
the limitations on the use of reorganization authority 
to which the committee agreed, will provide Congress with 
far more control over reorganization than would have been 
the case if the President's proposals had gone through 
unchallenged. 94/ 

There was an attempt to reintroduce the original Brooks' bill by way 

of an amendment in the form of a substitute to H.R. 5045, but this was 

defeated by a 329-87 vote. Two other amendments were defeated followed by 

the defeat of a motion to recommit. The House then substituted the provis- 

sions of H.R. 5045 for those of S. 626 while retaining the latter designation 

and passed the bill. The bill, now S. 626, completed the legislative process 

when on March 31 , the Senate accepted the House version by voice vote without 

debate. 



94 / U.S. Congressional Record (daily edition). March 29, 1977. 
pp. H 2667-H 2668. 



CRS-59 



Presidential Signing 

President Carter signed the bill (P.L. 95-17) restoring the President's 
authority to submit Reorganization Plans on April 6, 1977, and the new law 
went into effect immediately. 95 / At the same time he signed the legisla- 
tion, the President announced the establishment of a President's Reorganiza- 
tion Project to be located within the Office of Management and Budget. 96/ 
The Reorganization Project would consist of various Groups to study policy 
fields and related institutions with the intention of submitting proposals 
for reorganization to the President. The President further indicated that 
the Project was not to produce a "comprehensive" reorganization proposal, 
such as that which emerged from the Ash Council efforts, but rather would 
provide "incremental" proposals over a four year period. 

The first Reorganization Group scheduled to report and the one with the 
most visibility concerned itself with reorganizing the Executive Office of 
the President. 97 / The report of this Group, along with options and recom- 
mendations, was forwarded to the President in late June, 1977. The President 
in turn, transmitted to the Congress his proposal for reorganizing the Execu- 
tive Office by way of Reorganization Plan No. 1 on July 15, 1977. 
9l7 91 Stat. 29; 5 U.S.C. 901-912. 

96 / U.S. Executive Office of the President. Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents, v. 13, April 11, 1977: 493-495. 

97/ The President sought to make the reorganization of the Executive Office 
a "model" for other departments and agencies to follow. Although 
the Executive Office is the President's "home territory" and was 
given high priority, the press was able to chronicle substantial 
problems encountered by the EOP Reorganization Group. See, for 
example: Farney, Dennis. Making Government Simpler Is Complex, 
Carter's Aides Find. Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1977. p. A-1. 



CRS-60 



REORGANIZATION IN PERSPECTIVE 

To Manage or Not to Manage? 

Much of the literature on the Presidency discusses the institution in 
terms of the roles the President must play. Some of these roles are expli- 
citly required by the Constitution, e.g., Commander in-Chief, while others are 
implicit to the office, e.g., ceremonial leader. The managerial responsibili- 
ties of the President, however, must be inferred from Article II, Sections 1 
and 3 which state, in part, that "...the executive power shall be vested in a 
President..." who "...shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.... 
Other provisions of the Constitution require that the President be responsi- 
ble for specific functions of government, e.g., appointments to office, which, 
in sura, constitute much of the President's administrative authority. 

In the broad sense of the term, all Presidents have performed managerial 
functions. It was not until the advent of the present century, however, that 
the concept of organizational management came to be associated with the Presi- 
dential office. There have been extensive, and often successful, efforts to 
enhance the President's managerial powers. Yet, it is fair to say that few 
Presidents in this century have been comfortable in the role of manager of 
the Executive Branch. None have directly abjured their responsibilities, but 
few have consistently relished the challenge of administrative leadership. 



CRS-61 



While there is wide agreement that most Presidents have been less than 
outstanding managers of the Executive Branch, there is disagreement as to the 
cause for this situation. Some suggest that the principal cause for the dis- 
appointing results is to be found in the sheer size and complexity of the task. 
Others believe that Congress, the bureaucracy, and the interest groups, are 
more persistent in their efforts to fragment the Executive Branch than is the 
President in his efforts to provide a unifying force. Still others believe 
that the qualities of an effective manager are not likely to be found in the 
personality of someone driven to be President. Whether any or all of these 
factors have influenced the President's managerial performance is beyond the 
scope of this study to determine. What is certain, however, is that Presidents 
rarely enter office with a well developed theory of how best to organize their 
own White House Office, much less the Executive Branch generally. 

Richard Nixon, like his predecessors, entered office without a clear under- 
standing of the relationship between policy and operations. He assumed that 
if policies were announced, his appointees and the agencies they headed would 
carry out those policies. The President was soon disabused of this view. His 
initial experience with Cabinet members as program managers was disappointing. 
The subsequent decision to rely on the White House and the Domestic Council 
staffs as a necessary "counter-bureaucracy" also proved to be costly in 
terms or resources expended because administrators were bringing more and 
more of their problems to the White House for resolution. The result was 
confirmation of the administrative dictum that operations tend to drive out 



CRS-62 



policy. Thus, the President concluded that during his second term he would 

actively seek to manage the Executive Branch through a different strategy. 

In planning for his second term, Nixon reassessed the 
utility of his executive office structure and found it wanting. 
He had sought more presidential direction over the bureaucracy, 
to advance his New Federalism, and the results had been dis- 
appointing. The conclusion he reached was that he should 
attempt to achieve the organizational goals set out by the 
Ash Council and presented in his 1971 executive branch re- 
organization proposals, but largely ignored by Congress, 
through administrative means rather than by legislation. 98 / 

The management strategy for the second administration called for, among 
other things, a small, integrated "Super Cabinet," a reduced Executive Office 
operation, and the careful placement of White House oriented individuals in 
agency policy positions. Whether President Nixon could have made this strat- 
egy work to the managerial advantage of the White House will not be known 
since the exercise was doomed by Watergate. 

In his assessment of this "Administrative Presidency" strategy, Richard 
Nathan notes that one of the consequences of Watergate is that, today, the 
notion of a politically responsible, integrated Executive Branch being supe- 
rior to a less politically responsible, less integrated Executive Branch, 
long a basic tenet of most literature on the Presidency, is presently out of 
favor. In Nathan's opinion: 



98 / Moe , Ronald C. The Domestic Council in Perspective. The 
Bureaucrat, v. 5, October 1976: 261. 



CRS-63 



Another view of the President's relationship to the 
bureaucracy that has gained momentum since Watergate em- 
bodies the concept of 'participatory bureaucracy,' a sort 
of 'moveable feast' of power rather than the traditional 
hierarchical model. This is what might be called the 
' democracy-inside-of-technocracy ' theory, or the 'blow- 
the-whistle' code of bureaucracy behavior, in which the 
President's role is comraensurately down-graded. According 
to this view, the career official should provide not just 
competent staff work, but also his judgments concerning 
the right decisions and proper course of action for his 
agency and program area, about which he presumably has 
much more expertise than his political superiors. 99 / 

The general thrust of much of the recent literature has been that the 
President himself ought to be less concerned with managing and more concerned 
that his key appointed officers manage better. In a 1976 report by the Na- 
tional Academy of Public Administration to both Presidential candidates, the 
theme was expressed that if the President was going to be an effective manager 
of the Executive Branch, he should rely more on his department and agency 
chiefs. "Lack of Presidential reliance on department and agency heads can 
lead to an overconcentration of power in the White House staff, which in turn 
weakens the capacity of agencies, leads to escalation of marginal issues to 
the White House, and makes the President more vulnerable to pressure from spe- 
cial interest groups." 100/ 



99 / Nathan, Richard P. The Administrative Presidency. Public Interest, 
Summer 1976. p. 46. By the same author, see: The Plot That 
Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency. New York, 
John Wiley and Sons, 1975. 

100 / National Academy of Public Administration. The President and Executive 
Management: Summary of a Symposium. Washington, October 1976. p. 
ii. 



CRS-64 



President-elect, Jitnny Carter indicated that he had been influenced in 
his thinking by a recent book, Organizing the Presidency , by Stephen Hess 
of the Brookings Institution. 101 / It is Hess' thesis that the President 
ought to give up his pretensions towards being the chief manager of the Exec- 
utive Branch and concentrate instead on being the "chief political officer 
of the United States." Further, his best interests would be served if he 
created a "more collegial administration" in which he relied on his Cabinet 
officers as the principal sources for advice and management. 102 / 

Richard Nathan, also proferring advice for the President to be elected 
in 1976, took a directly opposing position to that argued by Mr. Hess. To 
Nathan, management is policy. If a President turns over management of the 
Executive Branch to his natural bureaucratic enemies, a category which in- 
cludes his Cabinet officers, he will be locked into a defensive posture. 

There were many who believed that when Nixon resigned 
in 1974 that his plan for a managerial takeover of domes- 
tic government in his second term constituted a threat to 
our political system. Maybe so; but, as often happens 
after periods of great emotion, there is likely yet to be 
a revision of attitudes. When this happens, I predict 
that Nixon's strategy for his second term — not neces- 
sarily for the 'Administrative Presidency,' but for a 
more administrative Presidency in domestic affairs — 
will be seen to have raised basic questions for our poli- 
tical system. In more immediate terms, whoever is elected 
President in 1976, and whatever his major objectives for 
domestic affairs (decentralization, reduction of the 



101/ Hess, Stephen. Organizing the Presidency. Washington 
The Brookings Institution. 1976. 

102/ Ibid., p. 154. 



CRS-65 



bureaucracy, fiscal responsibility, full employment, equal 
opportunity), he would do well, at the outset of his term, 
to study carefully, the President's role as Chief Execu- 
tive, 103 / 

Each President has managerial responsibilities he cannot avoid. But 
beyond the minimal responsibilities, a President has some discretion regard- 
ing how aggressive he wants to be in managing the Executive Branch, If he 
decides to lead through administrative management, and it should be recog- 
nized that there is a substantial body of opinion which argues that manage- 
ment is routine and should be minimized if a President is to be a "leader," 
104 / then the strategies used to manage become crucial. Executive Branch 
reorganization is just one of several strategies available to a President 
to enhance his managerial capacities, 
Stategic Options For A New President 

In the twentieth century, the President has come to be expected to take 
the lead in most Executive Branch reorganization efforts, which is not to sug- 
gest that Congress is a passive partner. Given this expectation, however, a 
new President must decide whether reorganizing the Executive Branch, in whole 
or in parts, will be a major commitment of his Administration, Reorganizing, 
after all, can be a politically expensive activity. Before a decision is 
made to propose the creation, transfer, of abolition of a department or 



103 / Nathan, Richard P, The Administrative Presidency, pp, 52-53, 

104/ See, for example: Burns, James MacGregor, Presidential 

Leadership. Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1966, pp. 194-195, 



CRS-66 



agency it is prudent to calculate the potential costs involved as well as 
the potential benefits. Reorganizations are upsetting. Both interests and 
people are forced to adjust, move, and to establish new relationships. Pro- 
gram administration generally suffers during the reorganization process. 

Assuming that a new President has considered the costs involved in mak- 
ing Executive Branch reorganization a major commitment of his Administration, 
there appear to be four general strategic options available to achieve his 
objectives . 

INCREMENTAL STRATEGY: The usual strategy a President adopts towards 
Executive Branch reorganization is to try to make changes that further his 
policy objectives and enhance his position as manager of the Executive Branch. 
This strategy may involve realigning functions among agencies, changing the 
relative organizational standing among its units within a department, creating 
a new agency (with Congressional approval), and in some instances he may even 
propose the establishment of a new department. There is usually a conscious 
effort to seek the achievable, to be satisfied with successful compromises. 
There is little desire to "stir up a hornet's nest" over a proposal to make 
changes which are not likely to be acceptable by Congress. By selecting the 
incremental strategy, the president seeks to achieve his political and mana- 
gerial objectives without expending too much of his political capital. 

BACKDOOR STRATEGY: A President may decide to seek new or expanded pro- 
grams. If he is successful in his efforts, reorganization often follows as 
a natural consequence. The public debate will tend to focus, however, on the 



CRS-67 



policy issues rather than on the structural results. Potential interest group 
opposition to changes in the status of an agency can often be avoided or blunt- 
ed if certain favorable policy objectives are sought simultaneously. More 
recently, a new variation on the "backdoor strategy" has emerged, namely, in 
the introduction of "sunset legislation. "105/ Some of the supporters of the 



105 / Reorganization, as a concept, is generally associated with organizational 
change. It is difficult, however, to draw a line between organiza- 
tions, programs, and procedures. If major changes are made in pro- 
grams, this usually has an impact on the organization's structure. 
The same may be said of procedures. 

One approach to the problem of proliferating organizations, 
programs and regulations has become known as "sunset laws." This 
term originated in Colorado where the State legislature, in 1976, 
passed a law whereby the State's 43 boards and commissions having 
regulatory authority would be terminated at the end of 7 years un- 
less the legislature voted to continue them. This particular law, 
since it provided termination dates for agencies, is clearly a meth- 
od with the potential for reorganizing government. 

A less direct means of reorganizing the Executive Branch of the 
Federal Government may be found in a number of bills introduced in 
the 94th and 95th Congresses. Some bills have called for "self 
destruct" clauses in agency enabling statutes; others would 
provide for systemmatic review of legislation authorizing programs 
over a five year period with reauthorizations required for program 
continuance; while still other bills are interested in providing 
termination dates for economic regulations which would also require 
reauthorization if such regulations are to continue in force. 

What is particularly important about the "sunset" approach is 
that it appears to be aimed directly at regaining Congressional ini- 
tiative over budget priorities and the hundreds of on-going programs. 
Proponents of "sunset" legislation believe that any Executive Branch 
reorganization which ignores the twin problems of grant and entitle- 
ment programs and budget "uncontrollables" will become merely an 
exercise in "shuffling boxes" on an organization chart. 

The most complete discussion of the implications of the sunset 
concept may be found in: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on 
Governmental Affairs. Program Evaluation Act of 1977. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. S. Re- 
port no. 93-326.) 



CRS-68 



sunset concept believe that a major objective of reorganization ought to be 
to enhance the role of politically responsible officials over programs and 
budget priorities. When this occurs, in their opinion, the operations of 
Government will tend to bring about organizational change rather than having 
organizational structure superimposed over existing programs. 

ARCHITECTONIC STRATEGY: A President may reject the "incremental" or 
"backdoor" strategies and seek instead to attack the problem of Executive 
Branch organization straightaway. The two Presidents who have opted for this 
strategy, Franklin Roosevelt and Richard Nixon, both prepared for battle by 
creating a Presidentially oriented study group (the Brownlow Committee and the 
Ash Council, respectively) which published major studies and recommended that 
the President be made chief administrator of the Executive Branch in fact as 
well as in theory. Franklin Roosevelt was constrained by political circum- 
stances from making a comprehensive reorganization proposal so that his prin- 
cipal organizational legacy is the Executive Office of the President. Richard 
Nixon submitted a complete reorganization proposal to Congress which was stud- 
ied to some degree by several committees, but generally rejected. In both 
instances, the reports of the Presidential study groups have come to consti- 
tute major contributions to the literature on public organizations and will be 
the starting point for future comprehensive studies of the Executive Branch. 



CRS-69 



STUDY COMMISSION STRATEGY: Support is periodically voiced from various 
sources, especially among Members of Congress, for establishing a new Hoover 
Commission to study the organization of the Executive Branch. Proponents of 
the idea argue that while studies of parts of the system are fine, what is 
needed now is a comprehensive review of the whole system. Instead of having 
this study made by individuals selected by a President with his own interests 
in mind, why not have a mixed, national commission consisting of members ap- 
pointed by both the President and Congress and staffed by "outsiders." 

While there is a certain innate attraction to the idea of a "neutral" 
study commission, there are also several problems which confront any proposal 
for a new Hoover Commission. For one thing, there is no longer any working 
consensus as to the direction such a Commission ought to follow. Should it 
seek to make the President more, or less, a manager of the Executive Branch? 
Should the Commission seek to involve the Congress more, or less, in active 
oversight and administration of the Executive Branch? .How would such a 
Commission avoid duplicating or overlapping the work of other more narrowly 
focused study commissions and the ongoing administrative oversight activities 
of Congressional committees? 

The major argument in favor of establishing such a Commission, and it may 
ultimately prove persuasive, is that notwithstanding the absence of a consen- 
sus over philosophical direction and the possible duplication of effort, such 
a Commission would focus public attention on the issues. This result in it- 
self, according to proponents, is worth the efforts as it will assist the 



CRS-70 



President and Congress in making changes in the Executive Branch structure 
which both can agree upon as desirable. An additional attraction of this 
strategy is that it takes some of the immediate pressure off the President 
and Congress and "buys time" as the studying and subsequent reports may be 
expected to take one or two years to complete. 



CRS-71 



CONCLUSION 

The subject of Executive Branch reorganization has fascinated academi- 
cians and political reformers since the beginning of the century. It is seen 
by some as an answer to many of the social and political problems which face 
our society. Yet, insofar as there is a theory of public organizations, it 
tends to be an apolitical theory resting on "orthodox" values and the poli- 
tics-administration dichotomy. Politics is rejected as a justification for 
choosing a particular type of organizational structure to administer a pro- 
gram, or as a justification for reorganizing an agency. The orthodox theory 
requires that a reorganization be defended on the grounds that it will in- 
crease efficiency or result in economies. Even those who have academically 
challenged the orthodox theory, however, have failed to offer an alternative 
which incorporates both political and administrative elements into a reason- 
ably coherent whole, 106 / 

From the President's perspective. Executive Branch reorganizations have 
been a mixed blessing. While the majority of organizational changes in this 
century have tended to enhance his managerial capacities over the bureaucracy, 
this majority of instances is only slight and in recent years, since 1970, 
the President's managerial capacities have actually undergone some erosion. 
The causes for this erosion are numerous, but two deserve mention at this 



106/ Arnold, Peri E, Reorganization and Politics: A Reflection 
on the Adequacy of Administrative Theory, Public Ad- 
ministration Review, v, 34, May/June 1974: 205^211, 



CRS-72 



point. First, there is today no single administrative theory which unites 
administration and politics. Organizational theory tends to speak in a 
language which distorts rather than illuminates the problems inherent in 
administering an operation as vast as the Federal Government. And second, 
there is no longer a consensus that the President ought to be an active 
manager of the Executive Branch, Thus, proposals for change in the 
structure of the Executive Branch tend to encourage fragmentation rather 
than integration. There is less concern evident today as to the impact of 
these changes on the institutional Presidency than was true in the past. 

For the moment, President Carter has indicated both in words and deeds 
that he wants to reorganize the Executive Branch. What is not clear at this 
point, however, is how this desire to reorganize the Executive Branch fits 
in with any comprehensive theory he may have on how the Executive Branch 
as a whole ought to be organized, or to what degree the President ought to 
be an active manager of the Executive Branch. 

Reorganization cannot itself be a "value." It receives its normative 
content by absorption. A reorganization is "good" or "bad" depending upon 
the purposes the reorganization is designed to achieve. Presumably, in the 
hierarchy of purposes, a reorganization should be justified on the grounds 
that it is facilitating the achievement of a "higher purpose" than that 
which is the purpose of the current organizational structure. It is the 
task of President Carter, as it was of his predecessors and will be of his 



CRS-73 



successors, to develop a hierarchy of values so that the process of reorgani- 
zation will be neither random nor counterproductive, but will serve a purpose 
which is both consistent and visible. 



RCM:ga/pas/cjs 



23-836 O - 78 - 6 



CRS-7A 



Calendar No. 472 

92d Congress ) SENATE j Eepokt 

IH Se^uon f ] No. 92-485 



EXTENDING THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAY 
TRANSMIT TO THE CONGRESS PLANS FOR THE REORGANIZA- 
TION OF AGENCIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV- 
ERNMENT 



NoTCUBEK 17. 1971.— Ordered to be printed 



Mr. MkCi^ellan, from tho Committ^ on Government Operations, 
submitted the following 

REPORT 

[To acoompa.117 H.R. 6283] 

The Committee on Government Operations, to which was referred 
the bill (H.R. 6283) to extend the period within which the President 
mar transmit to the Congress plans for the reorganization of agencies 
of the executive branch of the Government, and for other purposes, 
haWng considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. 

The amendment is in the nature of a substitute. 

Purpose 

H.R. 6283, as amended, would (1) extend until April 1, 1973, the 
authority of the President, under chapter 9 of title 5, United States 
Code (executive reorganization), to submit reorganization plans to 
the Congress proposing reorganizations in the executive branch; (2) 
limit the number of plans which the Piesident may submit to the 
Congress to not more than one within any one period of 30 consecutive 
days: (3; prohibit th" submission of d pldu which deals with more 
than one logically consistent siibject mailer: (4) authorize the filing 
of a pelition to discharge a commitsee to which a resolution of dis- 
ap|)roval has Wen refoiT*»d from furtlier consideration thereof, if such 
committee has not rejioited it by the end of 20 calendar days, following 



CRS-75 



its introduction, instead of 10 calendar days as provided by existing 
law; (5) revise languas:e in the reorganization statute so as to simplify 
»nd clarify its provisions without effecting substantive changes; and 
<6) amend certain language in the statute to conform to changes 
previoush'' made. 

Chapter 9 of title 5, United States Code, contains the codification 
and reenactment aj? jiositive law of the Reorganization Act of 1949, aii 
amended. It authonzes the President to submit reorganization plans 
to accomplish c^itain stated purposes, subject to limitations specified 
therein. Such plans become effective at the end of 60 days of con- 
tinuous session following their submission, unless disapproved prior 
thereto by either House of the Congress by a majority of those present 
and voting. 

The authority of the Pi-esident to submit reorganization plans 
expired on April 1, 1971. H.R. 62S3, as amended, would extena this 
authority until April 1 , 1973, in response to a request for such extension 
transmitted by tne Director. OflSce of Management and Budget, to 
the President of the Senate, dated February' 1, 1071, a coi»y of which 
is set forth in appendix 1. The bill, as amended, would also amend 
and revise certain provisions of the reorganization statute, as sum- 
marized above and detailed in a later section of this report. 

Summary of Principal Provisions of the Statute 

The reorganization statute requires the President to examine, on a 
continuing basis, the organization of all agencies of the executive 
branch and to determine what changes therein are necesary to 
accompHsh the purposes of the statute, and authorizes the President 
to subn-it reorganization plans to the Congress in order to accomplish 
those purposes, which include (1) promoting better execution oi the 
laws and more effective management of the executive branch; (2) re- 
ducing expenditures and increasing efficiency and economy; (3) con- 
aolidating and coordinating agencies and functions according to major 
purposes ; (4) reducing the number of agencies by consolidating under 
a single head those naving similar functions and abolishing those 
which are unnecessary; and (5) eliminating duplication and over- 
lapping. These stated purposes are also the standards which guide 
the President in making his determinations as to what reorganiza- 
ions he will set forth in any plans which he transmits to the Congress. 

Reorganizations proposed by the President may include (1) trans- 
fers or consolidations of agencies and the functions thereof within 
agencies or to other agencies; (2) abolition of all or part of agencies 
and functions; and (3) authorizations to executive branch officers to 
delegate functions. Each such reorganization must be based upon a 
Presidential finding that the proposed action is necessary to accomplish 
one or more of the purposes of the statute and a statement to that 
effect must be included in his message transmitting the plan to the 
Congress. The message must also specify, with respect to each aboli- 
tion of a function included in a plan, the statutory authority for the 
exercise of such function and the reduction of expenditures (itemized 
so far as practicable) which is likely to result. 

Under the provisions of the reorganization statute, reorganization 
plans cannot (1) create a new executive department, aboUsh or trans- 
fer an executive department or all of its functions, or consolidate two 



CRS-76 



3 



or more executive departments or all of their functions; (2) continue 
an agency or function thereof beyond the period of time authorized 
by law for its existence or beyond the time when it would have ter- 
minated in the absence of the plan; (3) authorize any agency to exer- 
cise new functions not expressly authorized by law when the plan is 
transmitted; (4) increase the term of an office beyond that provided 
by law for that office; or (5) transfer or consolidate with any other 
agency the municipal government of the District of Columbia or its 
functions or abolish said government or its functions. Further, if a 
plan provides for the appointment and compensation of the head or 
other officers of any agency, the term of office may not be fixed at 
more than 4 years, the compensation may not exceed that applicable 
to comparable executive branch offices and, if the appointment is not 
in the competitive service, it must be made by the President, subject 
to Senate confirmation. 

Reoi^anization plans, submitted in accordance with the require- 
ments of the statute, become effective as law at the end of the first 
period of 60 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress after 
the date on which the plan is transmitted to it, unless, between the 
date of transmittal and the end of the 60-day period, either House, 
by a majority of those present and voting, adopts a resolution of 
disapproval. For the purpose of determining whether there has been 
a 60-day period of continuous session, continuity is considered broken 
by an adjournment of the Congress sine die However, if either House 
is not in session because of an adjournment to a day certain of more 
than 3 days, such period is excluded in the computation of the 60-day 
period. 

The reorganization statute provides further that a reorganization 
plan may pro\'ide for an effective date at a time later than the date 
on which tne plan would otherwise become effective ; and a plan which 
is effective must be printed in the Statutes at Large in the same volume 
as the public laws, and in the Federal Register. 

The reorganization statute makes no provision for the amendment 
of a plan, and the only affirmative action authorized is the adoption 
of a resolution of disapproval. Members of either House who desire 
to file a resolution of disapproval must use a prescribed form and, 
follounng introduction, the resolution is referred to the appropriate 
committee in each House, which, under their respective standing 
rules, is the Committee on Government Operations. 

In order to prevent a -reorganization plan from becoming effective 
because the committee to which a disapproval resolution has been 
referred failed to act upon it within the 60-day period, and to insure 
expeditious consideration of such resolutions, the statute provides 
special rules of procedure for their processing. Thus, if the committee 
to which such resolution has been referred has not reported it after 
10 calendar davb following its introduction, any Member favoring the 
resolution may move to discharge the committee from fiu"ther con- 
sideration. Debate on a motion t<^) discharge is limited to 1 hour, the 
time being di\nded equally between proponents and opponents of 
the resolution, and such motion may not be renewed with respect 
to anv other resolution concerning the same reorganization plan. It 
may Se noted that this provision docs not mean that the committee 
must act within the 10-aay period, it merely authorizes the filing of 
a discharge motion at any time after the lapse of the 10-day period. 



CRS-77 



When a committee has reported, oi has been discharged from 
further consideration of, a resolution of disapproval, at any time 
thereafter it is in order to move to proceed to the consideration of the 
resolution, and such motion is not debatable. Both the motion to 
discharge and the motion to proceed to the consideration of the 
resolution are highly privileged, not subject to amendment, and it is 
not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which such motions are 
agreed to or disagreed to. 

Debate on a resolution of disapproval is Umited to no mor3 than 10 
hours, equally divided between those favoring and those opposing 
the resolution, and a motion further to limit debate is not debatable. 
An amendment to, or a motion to recommit, the resolution is not in 
order; ncr is it in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the 
resolution was agreed to or disagreed to. 

Motions to postpone, made with respect to the discharge from com- 
mittee, or the consideration of, a-resolution of disapproval, motions to 
proceed to the consideration of other business, and appeals from de- 
cisions of the Chair relative to the application of the rules of the Senate 
or the House to the procedure relating to a disapproval resolution are 
decided without debate. 

Committee Amendmjent 

H.R. 6283, as amended by the committee, incorporates the provi- 
sions of that bill, as passed by the House of Representatives on May 
3, 1971, vdih the provisions of a companion bill, S. 878, as amended 
b\' the Subc -mmittee on Executive Reorganization and Government 
Research, w^ch held hearings on S. 878 on March 24, 1971. As intro- 
duced, both bills provided only for a 2-year extension of the President's 
authority to submit reorganization plans. The committee amendment 
retains this provision and incorporates certain revisions, substantive, 
and technical conforming amendments, which are explained below. 

BEVISION AND CLABIFICATION 

Portions of the reorganization statute have been revised and re- 
structured in an effort to clarif}- and simplify its language without 
effecting any changes in the procedures or the substantive law provided 
for therein (sections 901, 903, and 904). 

Section 901 purports to set forth the congressional policy and to 
define, in part, the subject, extent, and objectives of the delegation by 
the Congress of its authoritj- to prescribe the organization and 
structure of executive branch departments and agencies. However, its 
provisions do not state clearly that they are an expression of congres- 
sional policy. Accordingly, section 901(a) has been revised so as to 
eliminate any ambiguity. 

Section 903 states the tvpes of reorganizations which are authorized 
and provides for the required finding of facts and certification thereof 
b}' the President to the Congress before the delegated authority can 
become operative. However, in its present form, the language is cum- 
bersome and unnecessarily complex. Accordingly, this section has 
been restructured so as to clarify the requirements to be met. 

Section 904 specifies certain provisions which a reorganization plan 
mav, or must, contain, as well as certain limitations. However, it is 



CRS-78 



somewhat confusing and difficult to understand and interpret. Accord- 
ingly, this section has been revised so as to present its contents in 
an orderly, more concise manner. 

SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS 

As originally introduced, H.R. 6283 and S. 878 provided only for a 
simple two-year extension of the President's authority to submit 
reorganization plans. 

The House of Representatives added the following amendments: (1) 
a pro\Tsion, contained in section 2 of the committee amendment, which 
would amend section 903(b) of the statute by providing that the 
President shall not transmit more than one reoi^anization plan to the 
Congress within any period of 30 consecutive days; and (2) a provision, 
contained in section 3 of the committee amendment, which would 
amend section 905(a) of the statute by providing that a plan may not 
pro\'ide for, nor have the effect of, dealing with more than one logically 
consistent subject matter. In support of the first amendment, the House 
Committee on Government Operations stated that its purpose was '*to 
assure that the committee would not be overburdened with a super- 
abundance of plans at any one time." (H. Rept. 92-146, p. 3.). In 
sup|K)rt of the second amendment, the House committee stated that, 
on occasion, a plan has been submitted which contained a variety of 
miscellaneous actions, completely unrelated to one another, and that 
the submission of such plans is not believed to be within the intent of 
the Cotigress. (H. Rept. 92-146, p. 3). 

The Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization and Government 
Research ap])roved an amendment to section 911(a) of the statute, 
contained in section 5 of the committee amendment, relative to 
procedures to discharge a committee to which a resolution of dis- 
approval has been referred from further consideration thereof. Under 
existing law. if_such committee has not reported it after the passage 
of ten calendar days following its introduction, any Member favoring 
the resolution may move to discharge the committee. It should be 
noted that this provision does not req^nre the committee to report such 
resolution following 10 days of consideration; it merely authorizes a 
motion to discharge. 

Exj)erience has demonstrated that the period provided for — 10 
calendar days following the introduction of a resolution of disa])- 
proval — is not adequate to enable the committee to process the 
resohition, and the plan properly. If a reorganization plan is complex — 
and many of them have been — a reasonable time must be allowed 
for staff analysis, hearings, committee consideration and the prepara- 
tion of a rej)ort. Accordingly, the committee amendment would amend 
section 911 (a) to provide that a motion to discharge the committee will 
be in order after the passage of 20 calendar days following its intro- 
duction. 

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that although 
the administration would not oppose the House amendments, it 
preferred that they not be adoj)ted since they were believed un- 
necessary. 

CONFORMING AMENDMENT 

Section 904(2) of the statute contains a reference to the Board of 
Commissioners of the District of Columbia. Reorganization Plan No. 



CRS-79 



3 of 1967 abolished the Board of Commissioners and transferred the 
Board's executive powers and functions to the Commissioner. How- 
ever, since a reorganization plan does not amend substantive law, 
specifically, legislation is required to eliminate the obsolete reference. 
Accordingly, section 3 of the committee amendment would amend 
section 904 of the statute by deleting the reference therein to the 
Board of Commissioners and substituting therefor the Commissioner 
of the District of Columbia. 

HSIARINGS 

A hearing on S. 878, a companion bill, was held by the Subcommittee 
on Executive Reorganization and Government Research, to which ti.e 
bill had been referred, on March 24, 1971. The only witness was 
Dwight A. Ink, Assistant Director, OflBce of Management and Budget, 
accompanied by Howard Schnoor, Special Consultant, who testified 
in support of the bill. 

Dunng the hearing, in response to an inquiry- by Senator Abraham 
Ribicoff, chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Ink assured the subcom- 
mittee that the OflBce of Management and Budget, which was afforded 
an opportunity to examine the. conamittee amendment, had no objec- 
tion to its provisions. In view of the pending submission of Reorgani- 
zation Plan No. 1 of 1971, Senators Ribicoff and Javits raisied a 
question concerning the validity of transmitting a reorganization plan 
to the Congress when the reorganization authoritj' was likeh" to expire 
prior to the eflFective date of the plan, and suggested that, the Depart- 
ment of Justice should be requested to respond to this question. There- 
after, the subcommittee received a letter from the Department, which 
has beer inserted in the hearing record, advising that based upon the 
languagv of the reorganization statute and the precedents, there was 
no reason to doubt the validity of such submission. In further expla- 
nation, the letter noted that the statute imposed limitations only upon 
the date of submission, but imposed no requirement that reorganiza- 
tion authority remain in effect during the entire period that a plan is 
pending before the Congress. In addition, the letter cited a number of 
mstances in which plans were permitted to become effective under 
identical circumstances. 

Background 

PBIOR TO 1949 

Reorjganization authority was first given to the President in the 
Executive Reorganization Act of 1932 (title IV of the act of June 30, 
1932, 47 Stat. 413). As oiiginally enacted, it authorized the President, 
by Executive order, to consolidate, redistribute, and transfer various 
agencies and functions, but did not p)ermit him to abolish any execu- 
tive departmenti^ or agency created by statute, or to transfer or 
eUminate its functions. The 1932 act vested permanent authority in 
the President and authorized congressional rejection of reorganization 
proposals bv either House of the Congress by a majority of those 
present and voting. This was the only Reorganization Act which 
granted permanent authority, although President Truman requested 
it twice and Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson stated; 
that it ahould be granted. 



CRS-80 



The permanent authority, granted in 1932, was limited to a 2-year 
period less than a year later, by an amendment in an appropriation 
measure (act of Mar. 3, 1933, 47 Stat. 1517). While limiting the 
President's authority to a specified period, the 1933 act broadened the 
scope of that authority and made no provision for congressional 
disapproval. 

The Reorganization Act of 1939 (53 Stat. 561) limited the authority 
to submit reorganization plans, as they are known today, to a period 
of 2 years (until January 2, 1941), and provided for congressional 
rejection by the adoption of a concurrent resolution. The 1939 act con- 
tained numerous limitations, and only five plans were submitted 
under its authority, all of which became effective. 

Title I of the War Powers Act of 1941 (55 Stat. 838) authorized the 
President to make temporary-, emergency wartime reorganizations for 
the duration 'of the war plus 6 months. 

The Reorganization Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 613) again granted the 
President reorganization authority for a period of approximately 2 
years (until April 1, 1948), despite a request for permanent authority, 
and provided for congressional rejection by concurrent resolution. It 
was substantially similar to the 1939 act in that it prohibited the 
abolishment or transfer of an executive department or all of the func- 
tions thereof, and it exempted 1 1 agencies from the operation of the act. 
Under this act, seven plans were submitted, of which four became 
effective and three were rejected. 

THE 1949 ACT 

The Reorganization Act of 1949 (Public Law 109, 81st Cong., 63 
Stat. 203), was enacted originally as a means of expediting reorganiza- 
tions in the executive branch, following submission of its reports and 
recommendations bv the first Commission on Organization of the 
Executive Branch o^ the Government (Hoover Commission). Since it 
was designed primarily as a means of enabling the implementation of 
these recommendations, it gave the President much greater latitude 
than the 1939 or 1945 acts, by eliminating exemptions of specified 
agencies and authorizing him to submit reorganization plans providing 
for the creation of new departments at the Cabinet level. 

The committee rejected the President's request for permanent 
authority, approving, instead, a 4-year period (terminating on April 1, 
1953), rather than the 2-year period granted in the earlier acts. Under- 
lying this determination was the view that, although the President 
should be afforded a reasonable period of time to study the extensive 
work and the numerous recommendations of the Hoover Commission, 
and to prepare and submit reorganization i)lans based thereon, the 
C'ongress should retain sufficient control to enable periodic review of 
the use of the reorganization authority. 

The method of congressional rejection was also modified by pro- 
viding for such action by the adoption of a resolution of disapproval 
by a majority of the authorized membership of either House of the 
Congress, rather than by the earlier requirement of a concurrent 
resolution which necessitated action by both Houses. Under the 
original 1949 act, the President submitted 41 plans, of which 29 
became effective, 11 were rejected, and the substance of one })lan was 
incor|)orated in a statute which provided for the nullification of the 
plan, prior to its effective date. 



CRS-81 



EXTENSIONS AND AMENDMENTS OF 1949 ACT 

The President's authority to submit reorganization plans was sub- 
sequently extended for 2-year periods in 1953, 1955 1957, 1961, and 
1969. In 1959 this committee reported a bill extending the reorganiza- 
tion authority for 2 additional years, or to June 1, 1961. The House of 
Representatives approved an identical bill, but both measures died 
on the Senate calendar at the end of the 86th Congress. The 1949 act 
was extended again for 1 year in 1964, for approximately 3 years and 
7 months in 1965 (until December 31, 1968) and for 2 years in 1969. 
Thus, the President has had continuous authority under the 1949 act, 
as amended, except for lapses from June 1, 1959, to April 7, 1961, from 
June 1, 1963, to July 2, 1964, from December 31, 1968, to April 1, 1969, 
and since April 1, 1971. 

In the 1957 extension, the method of congressional rejection was 
amended to provide for disapproval of reorganization plans by either 
House of the Congress by a simple majority of those present and 
voting, and the 1964 extension eliminated the authority of the Presi- 
dent to submit plans proposing the creation of new Cabinet 
departments. 

Under the subsequent extensions, 49 plans were submitted, of 
which 41 became effective and eight were rejected. Thus between the 
effective date of the 1949 act and the effective date of the last plan 
submitted in the 91st Congress, 90 reorganization plans have been 
submitted, of which 70 became effective, 19 were rejected, and one 
was nullified. Between the effective date of the Reorganization Act of 
1939 and January 2, 1971, a total of 102 plans have been submitted, 
of which 79 became effective, 22 were rejected, and one was nullified. 

Set for ' in appendix 2 are: table I, listing the statutes which 
provided tne President with reorganization authority since the enact- 
ment of the Executive Reorganization Act of 1932, indicating the 
duration of such authority- and the methods provided for congressional 
disapproval; table II, containing a summary of actions on reorganiza- 
tion plans submitted between 1939 and 1970, pursuant to authority 
granted by the 1939, 1945 and 1949 acts, and subsequent extensions; 
and table III, sho^^ong the number of reorganization plans which have 
been submitted by each of the Presidents who have been granted 
reorganization authority since the Reorganization Act of 1939. An 
anah^sis of actions taken on all reorganization plans submitted under 
the authority of reorganization statutes, from the 81st through the 
^Ist Congresses appears in appendix 3 of this report. 

Conclusion 

The committee recognizes the President's need for flexibility in 
•organizing the executive branch to achieve the level of eflSciency 
necessary- to meet present and future requirements. The creation of 
sound machinery to administer our laws and programs is a diflScult 
task which is never fully completed. The committee firmly believes 
that the ever-increasing complexity of our society, coupled with the 
expenditure of vast amounts of taxpayers' money on numerous 
programs and activities undertaken by the Federal Government 
in recent years, make efficient governmental organization and admin- 
btration absolutely essential. 



CRS-82 



9 



The reorganization statute provides the necessary authority to 
enable the President, as Chief Executive and "general manager" of the 
executive branch, to engage in continuing studies of the organiza- 
tional and structural requirements of the Federal Government and to 
submit proposals for improvements. In recognizing the value of 
Presidential reorganization authority, however, the Committ-ee on 
Government Operations is ever mindful of the fact that responsi- 
bility for the organization and structure of the executive branch is 
vested by the Constitution in the Congress, and care must always be 
exercised to make certain that the Congress does not surrender its 
constitutional responsibilities. 

By pro\*iding legislative standards in the statute and by limiting 
the duration of the reorganization authority, the Congress is aflForded 
the opportunity periodically to assess and evaluate its use. Without 
these safeguards, the delegations provided for might well constitute 
an abdication of the authority and responsibility of the Congress in 
derogation of constitutional requirenaents. 

Experience over the years has demonstrated that the President's 
authority to submit reorganization proposals, designed to improve the 
organization and modernize the structure of the Government, is a 
valuable and effective device in the- achievement of these objectives. 
This committee has long recognized that the President should have this 
authority and the record demonstrates that this position has been 
fully supported by the Congress during a period of almost 40 years. 

The revisions and amendments contained in the committee amend- 
ment should serve to clarify and strengthen the reorganization statute 
so tlmt all Members of the Congress will have a clear understanding 
of the objectives of the statute and the procedures provided for there- 
under. 

Estimated Cost of the Legislation 

In response to a request by the committee, the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget advised that — 

* * * carr\nn^ out the bill to extend the reorganization 
autliority of the President will not require the direct expendi- 
ture of funds even though the preparation of plans may re- 
quire the investment of some time and effort in affected 
agencies and in OMB. On the other hand, extension of the 
authority will aflford the President the opportunity to take 
actions that will result in increasing the effectiveness of Exec- 
utive de])artments and agencies which may result in savings 
in the cost of government. 

Changes in Existing Law 

In comjiliance with subsection 4 of rule XXIX of the Standing Rules 
of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, 
aro shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed 
in brackets, now matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which 
no change is proposed is shown in roman) : 



CRS-83 



10 



Chapter 9. EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION 

§901. Parpose 

[(a) The President shall from time to time examine the organiza- 
tion of all agencies and shall determine what changes therein are 
necessan' to accomplish the following purposes; J 

(a) The Congress declares tluU it is the policy oj the United States— 

(1) to promote better execution of the laws, more effective 
management of the executive branch and of its agencies and 
functions, and expeditious administration of the public business; 

(2) to reduce expenditures and promote economy to the fullest 
extent consistent with the efficient operation of the Government; 

(3) to increase the efficiency of the operations of the Govern- 
ment to the fullest extent practicable ; 

(4) to group, coordinate, and consolidate agencies and func- 
tions of the Government, as nearly as may be, according to 
major purposes; 

(5) to reduce the number of agencies by consohdating those 
having similar functions under a single head, and to abolish 
such agencies functions as may not be necessary for the efficient 
conduct of the Government;. and 

(6) to eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort. 

(b) Congress declares that the pubhc interest demands the carrying 
out of the purposes of subsection (a) of this section and that the pur- 
poses may oe accomplished in great measure bj proceeding under this 
chapter, and can be accomplished more speedily thereby than by the 
enactment of specific legislation. 

(c) The President shall from time to time examine the organization of all 
agencies and shall determine what changes in such organization are 
necessary to carry out any policy set forth in subsection (a) of this section. 

§902. Definitions 

For the purpose of this chapter — 

(1) "agency" means — 

(A) an executive agency or part thereof; 

(B) an office or officer in the executive branch; and 

(C) anv and all parts of the government of the District 
of Columbia other tnan the courts thereof; 

but does not include the General Accounting Oi9&ce or the Comp- 
troller General of the United States; 

(2) "reorganization" means a transfer, consolidation, coordina- 
tion, authorization, or abolition, referred to in section 903 of this 
title; and 

(3) "officer" is not hmited by section 2104 of this title. 

§ 903. Reorganization plans 

t(a) When the President, after investigation, finds that — ] 
(a) Whenever the President, after investigation, finds that changes in 
the organization of agencies are necessary to carry out any policy set 
forth in section 901 (a) of this title, he shall prepare a reorganization plan 
specifying the reorganizations he finds are necessary. Any plan may 
provide for — 

(1) the transfer of the whole or a part of any agency, or of the 
whole or a part of the functions thereof, to the jurisdiction and 
control of another agency; 



CRS-84 



11 

(2) the abolition of all or a part of the functions of an agency; 

(3) the consolidation or coordination of the whole or a part of 
an agency, or of the whole or a part of the functions thereof, with 
the whole or a part of another agency or the functions thereof; 

(4) the consolidation or coordination of a part of an agency or 
the functions thereof with another part of the same agency or 
the functions thereof; 

(5) the authorization of an officer to delegate any of his func- 
tions; or 

(6) the abolition of the whole or a part of an agency which 
agency or part does not have, or on the taking effect oi the re- 
organization plan will not have, any functions^; is necessary 
to accomplish one or more of the purposes of section 901(a) of 
this title, he shall prepare a reorganization plan for the making 
of the reorganizations as to which he has made findings and which 
he includes in the plan, and transmit the plan (bearing an identi- 
fication number) to Congress, together with a declaration that, 
with respect to each reorganization included in the plan, he has 
found that the reorganization is necessary to accomplish one or 
more of the purposes of section -901 (a) of this titlej. 

The President shall transmit the plan (bearing an identijication nvmber) 
to the Congress together with a declaration thai, uith respect to each 
reorganization included in the plan, he has found that the reorganization 
is necesmry to carry out any policy set forth in section 901 (a) of this title. 

(b) The President shall have a reorganization plan delivered to both 
Houses on the same day and to each House while it is in session, and 
furthermore shall not transmit more than otu such plan to Congress 
within any period of thirty consecutive days. In his messae:e trans- 
mitting a reorganization plan, the President shall specify witn respect 
to each abolition of a function included in the plan the statutory au- 
thority for the exeicise of the function and the reduction of expendi- 
tures (itemized bo far as practicable) that it is probable will be brought 
about by the taking effect of the reorganization included in the plan. 

§ 904. Additional contents of rcorganizmtion plans 

A reorganization plan transmitted by the President under section 
903 of this title — 

(1) may change, in such cases as the President considers 
necessary, the name of an agency affected by a reorganization and 
the title of its head [;J, and shall designate the name of an agency 
resulting from a reorganization and the title of its head; 

(2) may provide for the appointment and pay of the head and 
one or more officers of an agency (including an agency resulting 
from a consolidation or other type of reorganization) if the 
President finds, and in his message transmitting the plan declares, 
that by reason of a reorganization made by the plan the provisions 
are necessary [. The head so provided may be an individual or 
ma}- be a commission or board with more than one member. In 
case of such an appointment, the term of office may not be fixed 
at more than 4 years, the pay may not be at a rate in excess of 
that found by the President to be appUcable to comparable 
officers in the executive branch, and, if the appointment is not to 
a position in the competitive service, it shall be by the President, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, except that, 



CRS-85 



12 



except that, in the case of an officer of the government of the 
District of Columbia, it may be by the Board of Commissioners 
or other body or officer of that government designated in the 
plan] ; 

(3) shall provide for the transfer or other disposition of the 
records, property, and personnel affected by a reorganization; 

(4) shall provide for the transfer of such unexpended balances 
of appropriations, and of other funds, available for use in con- 
nection \^-ith a function or agency affected by a reorganization, 
as the President considers necessary by reason of the reorganiza- 
tion for use in connection with the functions affected by the 
reorganization, or for the use of the agency which shall have the 
functions after the reorganization plan is effective [. However, 
the unexpended balances so transferred may be used only for the 
purposes for which the appropriation was originally made] ; and 

(5) shall provide for terminating the affairs of an agency 
abohshed. 

A reorganization plan transmitted by the President containing provi- 
sions authorized by paragraph (2) of this section may provide that the 
head of an agency be an individual or a commission or board with more 
than one member. In the case of an appointm^ent of the head of such agency, 
the term of office may not be fixed at more than A years, the pay may not 
be at a rate in excess of that found by the President to be applicable to 
comparable officers in the executive branch, and if the appointment is not 
to a position in the competitive service, it shall be by the President, by 
and with the advijce and consent of the. Senate, ex^cept that, in the ca-'^e of 
an officer of the government of the District of Columbia, it may be by the 
Commissioner or other body or officer of tfiat government designated in the 
plan. Any reorganization plan transmitted by the President containing 
provisions required by paragraph (4) of this section, shall provide for the 
transfer of unexpended balances only if such balances are used for the 
purposes for which the appropriation was originally made. 

§ 905. Limitation on powers 

(a) A reorganization plan may not provide for, and a reorganization 
under this chapter may not have the effect of — 

(1) creating a new executive department, abolishing or trans- 
ferring an executive department or all the functions thereof, or 
consolidating two or more executive departments or all the func- 
tions thereof: 

(2) continuing an agency beyond the period authorized by law 
for its existence or beyond the time when it would have terminated 
if the reorganization had not been made; 

(3) continuing a function beyond the period authorized by law 
for its exercise or beyond the time when it would have terminated 
if the reorganization had not been made; 

(4) authorizing an agency to exercise a function which is not 
expressly authorized by law at the time the plan is transmitted 
to Congress; 

(5) increasing the term of an office beyond that provided by 
law for the office; tor] 

(6) transferring to or consolidating \vith another agency the 
government of the District of Columbia or all the functions 
thereof which are subject to this chapter, or abolishing that 
government or all those functions^.]; or 



CRS-86 



13 



(7) dealing with more than one logically consistent subject matter. 
(b) A provision contained in a reorganization plan may take effect 
only if the plan is transmitted to the Congress before [April 1, 19713 
April 1, 1973. 

§ 906. EffectiTe date and publication of reorganization plans 

(a) Except as otherwise provided under subsection (c) of this 
section, a reorganization plan is effective at the end of the first period 
of 60 calendar days of continuous session of Congress after the date on 
which the plan is transmitted to it unless, between the date of trans- 
mittal and the end of the 60-day period, either House passes a resolu- 
tion stating in substance that the House does not favor the reorganiza- 
tion plan. 

(b) For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section — 

(1) continuitj^ of session is broken only by en adjournment of 
Congress sine die; and 

(2) the days on which either House is not in session because of 
an adjournment of more than '3 days to a day certain are excluded 
in the computation of the 60-day period. 

(c) Under provisions contained in a reoi^anization plan, a provision 
of the plan may be effective at a time later than the date on which the 
plan otherwise is effective. 

(d) A reorganization plan which is effective shall be printed (1) in 
the Statutes at Large in the same volume as the pubhc laws, and (2) 
in the Federal Register. 

§ 907. Effect on other laws pending legal proceedings, and nnex- 
pended appropriations 

(a) A statute enacted, and a regulation or other action made, pre- 
scribed, issued, granted, or performed in respect of or by an agency or 
function affected by a reorganization under this chapter, before the 
effective date of the reorganization, has, except to the extent rescinded, 
modiBed, superseded, or made inapphcable oy or under authority of 
law or by the abolition of a function, the same effect as if the reorgani- 
zation had not been made. However, if the statute, regulation or 
other action has vested the functions in the agency from which it is 
removed under the reorganization plan, the function, insofar as it is 
to be exercised after the plan becomes effective, shall be deemed as 
vested in the agency under which the function is placed by the plan. 

(b) For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section, "regulation or 
other action" means a regulation, rule, order, poUcy, determination, 
directive, authorization, permit, privilege, requirement, designation or 
other action. 

(c) A suit, action, or other proceeding lawfullv comnienced by or 
against the head of an agency or other officer of the United States, in 
his official capacity or in relation to the discharee of his official duties, 
does not abate by reason of the taking effect of a reorganization plan 
under this chapter. On motion or supplemental petition filed at any 
time within 12 months after the reorganization plan takes effect, 
showing a necessity for a survival of the suit, action, or other proceeding 
to obtain a settlement of the questions involved, the court may allow 
the suit, action, or other proceeding to be maintained by or against 
the successor of the head or officer under the reorganization effected 
by the plan or, if there is no successor, against sucn agency or officer 
as the President designates. 



CRS-87 



14 

(d) The appropriations or portions of appropriations unexpended 
by reason of the operation of this chapter may not be used for any 
purpose, but shall revert to the Treasury. 

§ 908. Rales of Senate and House of Representatives on reorgani- 
zation plans 

Sections 909-913 of this title are enacted by Congress — 

(1) as an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives, respectives, and as such they are 
deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but ap- 

glicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that 
[ouse in the case of resolutions described by section 909 of this 
title; and they supersede other rules only to the extent that they 
are inconsistent therewith; and 

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either 
House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of 
that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same 
extent as in the case of any other rules of that House. 

§ 909. Terms of resolation 

For the purpose of sections 908-913 of this title, "resolution" means 
only a resolution of either House of Congress, the matter after the 

resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the does not 

favor the reorganization plan numbered transmitted to Con- 

eress hj the President on , 19 — .", the first blank space therein 

being filled with the name of the resolving House and the other blank 
spaces therein being appropriately filled; but does not include a 
resolution which specifies more than one reorganization plan. 

§ 910. Reference of resolution to committee 

A resolution with respect to a reorganization plan shall be referred 
to a committee (and all resolutions with respect to the same plan shall 
be referred to the same committee) by the President of the Senate or 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be. 

§ 911. Discharge of committee considering resolution 

(a) If the committee to which a resolution with respect to a re- 
organization plan has been referred has not reported it at the end of 
[10 calendar daysj SO calendar days after its introduction, it is in 
order to move either to discharge the committee from further considera- 
tion of the resolution or to discharge the committee from further 
consideration of any other resolution with respect to the reorganization 
plan which has been referred to the committee. 

(b) A motion to discharge may be made only b}^ an individual 
favoring the resolution, is highly privileged (except that it may not be 
made after the committee has reported a resolution with respect to the 
same reorganization plan), and debate thereon shall be limited to not 
more than 1 hour, to be divided equally between those favoring and 
those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the motion is not in 
order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which 
the motion is agreed to or disagreed to. 

(c) If the motion to discharge is agreed to or disagreed to, the motion 
may not be renewed, nor may another motion to discharge the com- 
mittee be made with respect to any other resolution with respect to the 
same reorganization plan. 



CRS-88 



15 



§ 912. Procedure mfter report or discharge of committee; debate 

(a) When the committee has reported, or has been discharged from 
further consideration of, a resolution with respect to a reorganization 
plan, it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous 
motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed 
to the consideration of the resolution. The motion is highly privileged 
and is not debatable. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and 
it is not in ordei to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is 
agreed to or disagreed to. 

(b) Debate on the resolution shall be limited to not more than 10 
hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those 
opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate is not de- 
batable. An amendment to, or a motion to recomniit, the resolution 
is not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote 
by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to. 

§ 913. Decisions without debate on motion to postpone or proceed 

(a) Motions to postpone, made with respect to the discharge from 
committee, or the consideration of, a resolution with respect to a re- 
organization plan, and motions to proceed to the consideration of other 
business shall be decided without debate. 

(b) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the appUca- 
tion of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives as the 
case may be to the procedure relating to a resolution with respect to a 
reorganization plan shall be decided without debate 



CRS-89 



Appendix 1 

Executive Office of the President, 

Office of Management and Budget, 

Washington, D.C., February 1, 1971 . 
Hon. Spiro T. Agnew, 
President of the Senate, 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: On January 30, 1969, the President sent a 
special message to the Congress requesting an extension of his reor- 
ganization authority. At that time he said: 

"New times call for new ideas and fresh approaches. To meet the 
needs of today and tomorrow, and to achieve a new level of efficiency, 
the Executive Branch requires flexibility in its organization. Govern- 
ment organization is created to serve, not to exist; as functions change, 
the organization must be ready to adapt itself to those changes.'' 
That need continues today. 

In one of its first actions, the 9 1st Congress did extend the Presi- 
dent's authority until April 1, 197J. The President has made significant 
use of the power granted : 

— In 1969, he proposed a reorganization plan to strengthen the 
executive powers of the chairman of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, thus improving the day-to-day operations of that 
important agency. 
— In 1970, he proposed the creation of a new Ofl&cc of Telecom- 
munications Policy in the Executive Office of the President 
through the transfer of certain functions from the OflBce of 
Emergency Preparedness, thus enhancing our ability to deal with 
problems in this vital area. 
— To further strengthen the Exeeutive Office, he moved to create 
the Domestic Council to deal v^itb the overall question of what 
we do, and the Office of Management and Budget to better deal 
with the question of how we do it. 
— He also used his authority to create the new separate Environ- 
mental Protection Agency bringing together key programs for 
sotting environmental standards and abating pollution. 
— Finally, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
was estabhshed in the Department of Commerce assembling 
major programs for measuring and dealing with important as- 
pects of our environment. 
The Congress allowed all of these measures to become effective. 
This cooperative and time-tested executive-legislative approach to 
reorganization has shown itself to be sensible and effective, regardless 
of party aUgnments. It works to curtail ineffective organizational ar- 
rangements and to enable good managers to manage well. 

The reorganization authority expires on April 1, 1971. We urge that 
it be extended for two years to help the President continue with a 
neverending task of providing sound machinen,- to administer our 
laws. 

Sincerely , 

George P. Shultz, 

Director. 
(Enclosure.) 

(16) 



CRS-90 



17 



A BILL To extend the period within which the President may transmit to the 
Congress plans for reorganisation of agencies of the Executive Branch of the 
Government 

Be it enacted by the Senate and Hovse of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That section 905(b), title 5, 
United States Code, is amended by striking out "April 1, 1971", and 
inserting in lieu thereof "April 1, 1973". 



Appendix 2 
table l.-statutes providing reorganization authority 

Ounbon of authority 
Reorpntzation authority ■ and termination date Method of disapproval 

Reorganization Act of 1932 ; Title IV of the Legisia- Permanent Simple resolution of either 

tive Appropriations Act for fiacal year 1933, Public House. 

Law 212. 72d Cong. 

Acts of Mar. 3 and Mar. 20. 1933: Amending and 2 yaars (Mar. 20, 1935) No provision (enactment of 

superseding the act of June 20. 1932. law required). 

Reorganization Act of 1939; Public Law 19. 76th 2 years (Jan. 21. 1941) Concurrent resolution. 

Cong, (act of Apr. 3, 1939). 

Title I of War Powers Act of 1941 (act of Dec. 18. Ourahon of war. plus 6 months, or N« provision. 

1941). such earlier time as designated 

by.Congress. 

Reorganization Act of 1945' Public Law 263, 79th 2 years and 3 months (Apr. 1, Concurrent resolution 

Cong. (Kt of Dec. 20. 1945). 194«). 

Rtorpnization Act of 1949: Public Law 109. 81st 4 years (Apr. 1. 1953) Majority of authorized mem- 
Cong, (act of June 20. 1949). bership of either house: 

Senate, 49; House, 218. 

1953 amendment: Public Law 3, 83<] Cong, (act of 2years(Apr. 1, 1955) Same as 1949 act 

Feb. 11. 1953). 

1955 amendment: Public Uw 16. S4th Cong, (act 2 years(June 1. 1957) Do. 

of Mar. 25. 1955). 

1957 amendment: Public Law 86-286 (act of Sept 2 years (June 1. 1959) Simple resolution of either 

4, 1957). House. 

1961 amendmem: Public Law S7-18 (act of Apr. 7. 2 years(June 1, 1963) Do. 

1961). 

1964 amendment Public Law 8»-351 (act of July 2, 1 year (June 1. 1965) Do. 

1964) (no authority to creete new executive 
departments). 

1965 amendment: PublK Law 89-43 (Kt of June 18. 3 years. 6 months, and 13 days Do. 

1965) (no authority to creete now executive (Dec 31, 1968). 
departments). 

1969 amendment: Public Lew 91-5 (act o( Mar. 27, 2 years (Apr. 1. 1971) Do. 

1969) (no authority to aeate new executive 
departments). 

* The Reorpnuation Act of 1949. as amended, was codified and reenacted as posHive lew by Pubhc Law 89-554, SepL 
6, 1966 as amended by Public Law 90-83. SepL 11. 1967. It is now referred to as ch. 9 of title 5. Unitod States Code 
(eiecubve raorfanization). 

TABLE ll.-SUMMARY OF ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS SUBMIHEO BETWEEN 1939 AND 1970 



1939. 
1945. 
1949. 
1953. 
1955. 
1957. 
IMI. 
IIM. 
IKS. 

im. 



Reorpnizatien acts, extansrans and amendments aibmitted effective Reiocted 



5 


5 





7 


4 


3 


41 


29 


11 


12 


12 





S 


1 


2 


2 


1 


1 


10 


S 


4 


5 


5 





12 


11 


1 


5 


5 






TettI 102 «79 22 

> The subsUnce of Plan No. 8 of 1949 was incorporated in Pubic Lew 216. 81st Cong. (Aut 10. 1949). which provided 
that the plan Aall not take effect 



CRS-91 



18 

TABLE m.-NUMBER OF RE0R6ANIZATI0N PLANS SUBMITTED BY EACH PtESIOENT AND 
DURATION OF REORGANIZATION AUTHORITY 

[Thfl following table shows the numt>er cf reorganization plans which were submitted by etch of ttM Prvadents who haw 
b«en franted reorganization authority since 1939| 

nans 

Reoaavelt 5 

Truman 48 

Eisenhower 17 

Kennedy 10 

Johnson 17 

Nixon 5 



Appendix 3 

Action taken on reorganization plans under authority of reorganiza- 
tion statutes, 81st-91st Congresses: 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 81ST CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1949 

Plan Date presente<J Plan accepted or 

No. Title to Congress r«iected ERcctive date 

1 Department of Welfare ". June 20. 1949 Rejected 

2 Bureau of Employment Security do Accepted Aiig. 20. 1949 

3 Post Office Department.- do do Do. 

4 National Security Council and National Security Resources do do Do. 

Board. 

5 Civil Service Commission do do Do. 

6 Maritime Commiss»on do do Do. 

7 Public Roads Administration do do Do. 

8 National MiUtary Establishment. July 18,1949 "A»i|. 10.1949 

' REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1950 

1 Treasury Department. Ktar. 13, 1950 Reiectml 

2 Department of Justce do Acoeptad May 24.1950 

3 Department of the Interior do do Do. 

4 Department of Agrtcutture do Hejaeted 

5 Department of Commerce do Accepted Do. 

6 Department of Labor do do Do. 

7 Interstate Commerce Commisswn do Beia^d 

8 Federal Trade Commission do Aoeapted Do. 

9 Federal Power Commission do do Do. 

10 Securities and Eichange Commission do do Do. 

11 Federal Communicatons Commissiofl do Re)«cM 

12 National Labor Relations Board do do 

13 Civil Aeronautics Board do Accaptad Do. 

14 Department of Labor do do Do. 

15 Alaska and Virgin Islands public works do do Do. 

IC Assistance to Khool districts and water potlutjon control do do Do. 

17 Advance planning and war public works do do Oo. 

18 Building and space manaflwnent iuactMns do uto «July 1.1950 

19 Employees' compensation functions. do do May 24,1950 

W Statutes at large and other matters do do Do. 

21 Maritime Commission do do Do. 

22 Federal National Irtortgage Association May 9,1950 do »Sept 7.1950 

23 Loans for factory-built homes do do Do. 

24 RFC transfer to Department of Commerce do Raiactad 

25 National Security Resources Board do Accepted Joly 9,1940 

26 Treasury Department, funcbons of Secretary May 31,1950 do July 31,1950 

27 Creabon of Department of Health, Education, and Security do Rejected 

■The substance of Plan No. 8 of 1949 was incorporated in Public Law 216. 81st Cong.. (Aag. 10. 1949). whch provided 
llMt the plan shall not take effect 
> Effecbve date specified in the plan. 



CRS-92 



19 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PUNS, CD CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1951 



PUn Date presented Plan accepted or 
No. Title toConiress rejected 


Effective date 


1 Reconstruction Finance Corporation Fab. 19,1951 Aceeptad 


.-May 1.1951 


REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1952 



1 Bureau of Internal Revenue „ Jan. 14.1952 Accepted Mar. 14.1952 

2 Post Office Department Apt. 10,1952 Rejected 

3 Bureau of Customj in Treasury Department do do 

4 Department of Justice U.S. marshali do do 



5 District of Columbia government ' May 1,1952 Accepted 


Uthi 1.19S2 




ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 830 CONGRFSS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1953 


PUn Date presented PUn accepted or 
No. Title to Congress rejected 


Effective date 



1 Depirtment of Health. EducaUon, and Welfare Mar. 12, 1953 Accepted'^ Apr. 11,1953 

2 Department of Agricutture Mar. 25, 1953 do Jane 4,1953 

3 OflKe of Defense Mobiluation Apr. 2.1953 do June 12. 1953 

4 Department of Justice • Apr. 20.1953 do June 20, 1953 

5 Export-Import Bank of Washington Apr. 30.1953 do June 30, 1953 

6 Oepartmentof Defense do do Do. 

7 Foreign Operations Administration June 1,1953 do» Aug- 1.1953 

8 U.S. Information Agency do do Do. 

9 Council of Economic Advisers do do Do. 

10 Payments to air carriers do do* Oct 1,1953 

REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1954 

1 Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United Apr. 29.1954 Accepted July 1.19S4 

States 

2 Liquidation of certain affairs of tt>e R e eow t r uct ion Finance do do Oo. 

Corporation. 



■ Public Law 13. 83d Cone (Apr 1, 1953) was enacted to provide that plan take effect 10 days after approval, 
t Repealed by Public Law 89-195 (Sept 4. 1961). 
by Public Uw 8S-726 (Aug. 23. 1958). 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. S4TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1956 



Title to Congress rejected Effective tete 



1 Deoertment of Defense May 16. 1956 

2 Federal Savings and Loan Inaurance Corporation May 17,1956 do.. 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 85TN CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1957 



Plan Date presented Plen accaptad or 
No. Title to Congress rvjacted 


Effective date 


1 Abolition of the Reconstruction Fmanca Corporation Apr. 29, 1957 Aeeaptad 


.. JuM 10. 1957 




REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1951 


1 Consolidation of Federal Civil Defenae Administration wttli Apr. 24. 19S8 Aec«(»ted 

Oflke of Defense Mobiltxation. 


..'July 1.1958 



'Effective daU ipacMad In tbe plen. 



CRS-93 



20 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. KTH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1959 



Date 
Plan presented Plan acc«ptad or Effective 

No. Title to Congress rejected date 



1 Transfer of certain functions from the Secretary of the May 12.1959 Rejocted > 

Interior to the Secretary of Agriculture. 

> Basic provisiMis of the pten were enacted by PuMic Law 16-509 (June 11, 1960). 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 87TN CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1961 

Oite 

Plan presented Plan accepted or 

No. Title to Congress reiected Effective date 

1 Securities and Exchange Commission functions Apr. 27, 1961 Reiected 

2 Federal Communicatjons Commission functions do do 

3 Civil Aeronautics Board— Reorganization ..May3,1961 Accepted July 3,1961 

4 Federal Trade Commission ." do .do July 9, 1961 

5 National Labor Relations Board May 24,1961 Rejected 

6 Federal Home Loan Bank Board— Reorganization June 12,1961 Accepted Aug. 12,1961 

7 Reorganization of maritime functions do do Do. 



REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1962 


1 Department of Urban Affairs and Housing Jan. 30,1962 Rejected 

2 CerUm science agencies and functions Mar. 29, 1962 Accepted 


'.'."'. June 8.1962 







ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 88TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1963 



in Date presented Plan accepted or 

0. Title to Congress rejected Effective date 

1 Reorganization of certain functions relating to the Franklin May 27,1963 Accepted July 27.1963 

0. RooaeveH Library. 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 89TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PUNS OF 1965 



in Date presantod Plan aocaptad w 

0. Title to Congress rejected Effective date 

1 Bureau of Customs. Mar. 25.1965 Acceptad May 25.1965 

2 Department of Commerce: Weather Bureau and the Coast May 13.1965 do July 13.1965 

and Geodetic Survey. 

3 Interstate Commerce Commission, locomotive inspection.. May 27.1965 do July 27,1965 

4 Reorganization ot various committees and other similar do do Do. 

bodies. 

5 Certain reorganizations relating to the National Science do do Do. 



REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1966 



1 Community relations functions in civil rights araa f«b. 10.1966 Aocaptad Apr. 22.1966 

2 Water pollution control functions Feb. 28,1966 do May 10.1966 

3 Reorganization of health functions of the Department of Apr. 25,1966 do June 25,1966 

HEW. 

4 National Zoological Park in the district of Columbia June 13. 1966 do Aug. 23, 1966 

5 National CapiUl Regional Planning Council June 29,1966 do SepL 8.1966 



CRS-94 



21 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 90TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1967 



Plan Date prMcnt- 
No. Titit •dtoCongttss 


Plan aocaptad or 
rajacted 


Eflodivadata 


1 Ttanifer of fiindjons ratating to approval of aarrantfer of Fab. 27, 1967 

earUin ihip documanU. 

2 U S Tariff Commission , , Mar. 9, 1967 


Acetptad 

Raiadad . ... 


.Hay 9.1967 


3 Govcrnmtnt of tha District of Cohimbia Juna 1,1967 


Aecaptad 


. A«g. 11.1967 




REORGANIZATION PUNS OF 1968 



1 , Ciaatini a now Baraau of Narcotics and Oangarotis Druis. Fab. 7,1968 Aecaptad Apr. 1,1968 

2 TiansfarringeartainfundioflsoftlMDapartmentof Hous- Fab. 26. 1968 do May 7,1968 

in( and Urban Davatopmant to tha Dapartment of 
Transportation. 

3 Bringing racraation programs antfar tha authority of the Mar. 13, 1968 do Nlay 23, 1968 

District of ColumbM Commissioner. 

4 Transfer authority to appoint RLA board members from the do do Do. 

Prasidant to the O.C. Commissioner and give him author- 
ity to prescribe rales and regHlatians for the RLA. 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 91ST CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1969 



1 liitanUti Cuwiaaica Caiwiwiwion jHlyZ2 1969 Aecaptad 


tki.n itM 




REORGANIZATION PUNS OF 1970 


1 Tatecommunications manafament and policy Fab. 9.1970 Aecaptad- 

2 ORica of hUnigement and Budget Domestic CouicO Mar. 12.1970 do 

3 EnvironmenUl Protection AgetKy July 9,1970 do 

4 National Oceanic and Atmoapheric Administratiofi do .do 


. Apr. 15.1970 
.July 1.1970 
. Dec 2.1970 
.Oct 3,1970 



CRS-95 



95th Conoress ) HOUSE OF REPRESENT ATIVES ( Repoh; 

UtSessi(m f 1 No. 95-105 



EXTENSION OF REORGANIZATION AUTHORITY OF THE 
PRESIDENT 



March 22, 1977. — Committed to the Committee of the Whole Houae on the 
State of the Union and ordered to be printed 



Mr. Brooks, from the Committee on Govermnent Operations, 
submitted the following 

REPORT 

together with 

ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND DISSENTING 
VIEWS 

{To accompany H.R. 6046] 

The Committee on Government Operations, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 5045) to reestablish the period within which the Presi- 
dent may transmit to the Congress plans for the reorganization of 
agencies of the executive branch of tne Government, and for other 
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with 
amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass. 

The amendments are as follows : 

Page 13, line 3, strike out "903(d)" and insert in heu thereof 
"903(c)". 

Page 14, beginning on line 6, strike out "a resolution with respect 
to a reorganization plan has been referred has not reported it" and 
insert in lieu thereof the following : 

is referred a resolution introduced pursuant to subsection 
(a) of section 910 (or, in the absence of such a resolution, the 
first resolution introduced with respect to the same reorga- 
nization plan) has not reported such resolution or an identical 
resolution. 



CRS-96 



Explanation of Amendments 

The first amendment is purely technical. 

The second amendment relates to the discharge of the committee 
after 45 days. When more than one resolution of disapproval is filed 
on a plan, the amendment would make it clear that, as orderl}' pro- 
cedure would dictate, onl}' one of these resolutions would ^o on the 
House or Senate calendar when the committee is deemed to be dis- 
charped. The resolution selected would be the resolution required to 
be filed by the committee chairman or his designee or, in the event 
that for some reason such a resolution has not been filed, the first 
resolution introduced on the plan. The amendment does not affect the 
rieht of any member to move to bring up the resolution that is on the 
ctdendar. 

Summary and Purpose 

H.R. 5045, the Reorganization Act of 1977, will reestablish for a 
period of 3 years the Presidential authority contained in the Reorga- 
nization Act of 1949 (5 U.S.C. 901-913) to submit to Congress plans 
to make reorganizations in the executive branch of the Government. 
The bill makes a number of changes in the procedure under which 
such plans are considered and acted upon by the Congress, and also 
provides additional limitations in the contents of such plans. The 
plans will go into effect after 60 days unless either the House or the 
Senate passes a resolution of disapproval. 

Under the Reorganization Act of 1977, the President is directed 
to examine the organization of all agencies. When he finds that 
changes are necessarj' U> carry out the policy contained in the Act, 
he is authorized to prepare a reorganization plan that may transfer, 
consolidate, or abolish tne whole or parts of agencies or their functions. 
It will not, however, permit the abolition of enforcement fimctions 
or statutory programs, nor may a plan abolish or transfer an inde- 
pendent reguuitory agency nor create, abolish or transfer an executive 
department. 

Keorganizations, of course, may be made in the executive branch 
b\' legislation proposed by the President or originating within the 
Congress. This reorganization authority, however, is a cooperative 
effort by the President and the Congress to expedite needed reorga- 
nizations and to respond readily to changed requirements. 

Reorganization authority alonj^ the lines of this legislation has 
been given to Presidents from tune to time since 1932. The most 
recent extension of such authority expired in April of 1973. 

H.R. 5045 adds new features to the traditional procedure. One, 
proposed for some time by Chairman Brooks, enables the President 
to submit amendments to plans during the first 30 days after the 
plan is transmitted to Congress. Another enables him to withdraw 
a plan at anytime within the 60-day period Congress has to act. 
The Presidential changes are allowed in order to correct deficiencies 
in a plan which were unforseen at the time it was submitted or to 
allow for modification to the plan that may be suggested during the 
congressional review process. 

A major modification is made in the manner in which Congress 
considers and acts upon plans. To virtually ensure action by the 
Congress on all reorganization plans, the bill requires the Chairman 



CRS-97 



3 



of the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, or their designees, to introduce 
resolutions of disapproval in their respective Houses when the reorga- 
nizaiion plan is transmitted to the Congress. The resolutions will be 
referred to those committees and they are to make their recommenda- 
tions to their respective Houses within 45 days. If either conomittee 
has not reported the resolution after that period, the conmaittee will 
be deemed to be discharged (no motion or other procedure wiU be 
necessar\' for such discharge) and the resolution shall be placed v/n the 
appropriate calendar of the House involved. Afterwards, any Member 
01 the respective House may move for its consideration. This motion 
is hjghly privileged, not debatable and not subject to amendment. 
Debate on the resolution is allowed for not more than 10 hours (unless 
a shorter time is agreed to). A final vote on the resolution will occur 
immediately after this debate (preceded by a single quorum call, if 
requested). 

As explained later in this report, the one-house legislative veto 
provisions of this bill raise serious constitutional questions. The pro- 
cedural modifications made by this bill in the traditional reorganiza- 
tion legislation, however, strengthen the role of Congress and help 
allay, in part, those fears of unconstitutionality. It is the judgment of 
the committee that the risk is worth taking and that because of the 
expected results in cost reduction, improved management and better 
services to the pubUc this legislation should be enacted. 

Committee Action and Vote 

H.R. 5045 is a clean bill containing the language reported by the 
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security. The subcom- 
mittee had before it two different approaches. H.R. 3131, introduced 
by Chairman Brooks, would require the passage of a resolution by 
both Houses of Congress within 60 days before a reorganization plan 
could go into effect. H.R. 3407 (and identical bills), introducea by 
Representative Fascell and cosponsors, contained the request of the 
administration for a reenactment with some changes of the law already 
on the books. That bill would allow a reorganization to go into effect 
after 60 days unless either the House or Senate passed a lesolution of 
disapproval. A reorganization plan could become effective without any 
vote of either body. 

The reported bill is a compromise combining various provisions 
of the two proposals. 

H.R. 5045 was reported by the full committee at a duly called 
meeting on March 17 with a vote of 40 yeas and 3 nays, a quorum 
being present. 

Hearings 

Hearings ' on bills to reestablish the authority of the President to 
submit reorganization plans to Congress were held by the Subcom- 
mittee on Le^slation and National Security on March 1 and March 8, 
1977. The bills were H.R. 3131, introduced by Chairman Brooks, 
which provided for an aflSrmative vote by Congress on resolutions 

^ "Extension of Reor^nleatton Authority of the President." he«rlnf« before the Subcom- 
mittee on Le^slation and National Security of the Committee on Government Operation!, 
BouBC of Representatives, 95tb Cong., Ist seas., Mar. 1 and Mar. 8, 1977. 



CRS-98 



approving reorganization plans; and H.R. 3407, introduced by Honor- 
able Dante B. Fascell with cosponsors and an identical bill, H.R. 
3442, introduced by lion. John J. Rhodes and cos]ponsors, the latter 
bills containing language recommended by the Pr^>iuent. 

During the hearings witnesses included the Diicctor of the OflBce of 
Management and Buaget and a representative of the Department of 
Justice, both of whom supported the President's proposal and argued 
its constitutionality. Other witnesses included Memoers of Congress, 
legal scholars, representatives of Federal employee and veterans 
organizations, most of whom supported the bill introduced by Chair- 
man Brooks. 

Discussion 

a. need fob beoroanization authobit7 

We are living in a period of rapid chanee which inevitably affects 
the programs and responsibilities of the Federal Government. Orga- 
nizational structures should be modified to eflBciently carry out the 
laws which Congress enacts. Functions change, new methods are 
developed, bureaucratic structures become obsolete, new laws are 
passed. 

The committee recognizes that a mechanism may be needed which 
is speedier than the normal legislative process, and has historically 
supported efforts by the President to maKe the executive branch more 
responsive to the needs of the American public. As far back as 1949, 
the predecessor committee to our own (Committee on Expenditures 
in the Executive Departments) reported the Reorganization Act to 
the House with these words: 

There is an ever-present need for making such change in 
the oiganization of executive agencies as will make the 
executive branch of the Government more manageable, 
promote better coordination in the development and execu- 
tion of Government programs by removing sources of con- 
fusing and conflicting policies, minimize the confusion en- 
countered by a citizen in dealing with scattered and over- 
lapping agencies and facilitate tne conduct of his business 
witn the Government, and otherwise promote eflBciency and 
economy. For the last half a century one President after 
another has called the attention of the Congress to the need 
for reorganizing the executive branch. This need has in- 
creased as the role of the Government has been enlarged 
and as the number and size of Government programs and 
agencies have been correspondingly increased. Unanimity 
of opinion appears to have existed for many years that 
corrective measures with respect to executive organization 
are needed. 

At the present time, there is substantial support for a broad review 
of the Government's organizational structure. The President has made 
a commitment to undertake such a review and to take such action as 
IB necessar>' to reorganize the Government to operate in a more 
eflBcient manner. The committee supports that enaeavor and recom- 
mends enactment of H.R. 5045 as a vehicle for carrying out that 
objective in an expenditaous manner. 



CRS-99 



B. HISTORICAL BACKOBOUND 

President Hoover was the first President given reorganization 
authority. The Executive Reorganization Act of 1932 permanently 
authorized the President to consolidate, redistribute, and transfer 
agency functions. It did not permit the President to abolish agencies 
or executive departments. It provided for Congressional disapproval 
of the reorganization plans bj' either House of Congress. 

The 1932 act was the only Reorganization Act that has given a 
President permanent reorganization authority. Less than a year later, 
in a rider to an appropriation act, the reorganization authority was 
limited to 2 years duration. This amendment ako deleted the pro- 
vision allowing congressional disapproval. The reorganization autnor- 
ity lapsed in 1935 and was not renewed until 1939. 

The Reorganization Act of 1939 renewed the power of Congress to 
disapprove reorganization plans but required that both Houses pass 
a disapproval resolution. It limited the reorganization authority to 
approximately 2 years, contained manv exempted specified agencies 
and prohibited tne abolition or transfer of executive departments. 
Only limited war related reorganization authority existed from 1941 
to 1945. The Reorganization Act: of 1945 extended for approximately 
2 years, authority substantially identical to the 1939 act. This act 
lapsed in April, 1948 with no new authority enacted imtil June 1949. 

The Reorganization Act of 1949 contained the basic statutory 
authority for Presidential reorganization plans which H.R. 6045 
renews and amends. The 1949 act was enacted to expedite reorgani- 
zation of the executive branch as recommended by tne first Hoover 
Coi mission (The Conunission on Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government). Congress created the Hoover Commis- 
sion, was famUiar with it's recommendations and sought to imple- 
ment these specific recommendations through enactment of the 1949 
act. Hence, this act gave the President greater latitutde than the 
1939 or 1945 acts. It extended reorganization authority for 4 years, 
had no exemptions of specific agencies, and allowed creation of 
executive departments. However, it also made disapproval by Con- 
gress easier oy lessening the requirement for congressional rejection 
from a concurrent resolution to a resolution adopted by a majority 
of the authorized membership of either one of the two Houses of 
Congress. 

The 1949 act has been renewed, with occasional substantive and 
procedural changes, 8 times by Congress, the last renewal being 1971. 
The authority has not been continuous during this period, but has 
been dormant approximately 7 years of its 27-year existence. The 
authority of the President to submit reorganization plans expired on 
April 1, 1973. Of the 93 plans submitted under the 1949 act and its 
extensions, 73 became eflFective and 20 were vetoed by Congress. 

During the 45-year period from the passage of the first reorgani- 
zation authority to the present time. Congress has gradually restncted 
the Presidents authority to submit reorganization plans and increased 
its own control over the plans. Congress gave the President permanent 
reorganization authority, in the first statute. Authority was granted 
in the 1949 Act for a period of 4 years. Seven of the 8 subsequent 
renewals have only extended this authority for 2]^ years or less. 
President Johnson, in 1965, received a 3)<ryear grant of authority. 



CRS-100 



6 



Congress has allowed the authority to lapse for approximately 28 
percent of the period from the initial grant of authority in 1932 to 
the current time. 

In 1959, Congress amended the act to provide that a simple majority 
of those MemMrs present and voting m either House was sufficient 
to pass a resolution of disapproval. 

In 1964, Congress specifically took away the power the President 
previously had to create executive departments tnrough a reorganiza- 
tion plan. 

In 1971, Congress prohibited the President from transmitting to 
Congress more than one reorganization plan every 30 days and 
required that all reorganization plans deal with only one logically 
consistent subject matter. 

Appendix 1 contains a table prepared by the Library of Congress 
listing the statutes which provided the President with reorganization 
authority since the enactment of the Reorganization Act of 1932, 
indicating the duration of such' authority and methods provided for 
congressional disapproval. Appendix II contains a table prepared by 
the Library of Congress showmg an analysis of congressional action 
taken on reorganization plans from 1949 to 1973, when the reorga- 
nization authority expired. 

C. CHANOBS IN BBORGANIZATION ATTTHGRITT AND PROCEDURE 

H.R. 5045 is a new Reorganization Act which would replace the 
1949 act, although it retains a number of the provisions of that act. 
First, it renews for a period of 3 years the authority of the President 
to submit reorganization plans in a manner substantially the same as 
in the 1949 act. It continues the provision that the plan will become 
effective at tiie end of 60 calendar days of continuous session of 
Congress unless either House passes a resolution stating that the House 
does not favor the reorganization plan. 

Second, it makes a number of changes in the law: 

1. It adds a new congressional intention that appropriate means 
should be provided by the President for citizen advice and participa- 
tion in executive reorganization. This intention recognizes the vital 
role that citizens and the public (those ultimately most affected) 
ahould play in Government reorganization — heretofore generally 
confined to governmental authorities and other persons selected by 
them. 

2. The present reorganization act provides for the abolition of all 
or parts of the functions of an agency. The committee feels that this 
is too broad and could eliminate functions and programs which Con- 
gress in its considered judgment believes should oe continued and not 
be subject to this authority. Thus, the bill prohibits the abolition of 
enforcement functions or statutory programs. Examples of enforce- 
ment functions are law enforcement, civil rights protection, the collec- 
tion of tajces and duties and the variety of inspections performed by 
Government agencies. Statutory programs are those created by act 
of Congress directing the President or Government agencies to carry 
out activities for the well being and benefit of the public. A few 
ex&mples would include environmental protection, social security, 
veterans programs, health and welfare activities (including Public 



CRS-101 



Health Service hospitals), school lunch pro-ams, agricultural support 
programs, among many others. The comnuttee is not making a judg- 
ment on the merits of any pro-ams, but feels that if they were 
created by congressional legislation, they should only be abolished 
in the same way. 

3. The law presently states that the President should not traiismit 
more than one reorganization plan to Congress within anj period of 
30 days. This provision was changed by the bill to provide that no 
more than three plans may be pending before the Congress at one time. 
It is the considered ludgment of the committee that this is a more 
flexible procedure, ?ml enable a more frequent forwarding of reorgani- 
zation plans, but will protect the Congress from being mundated by 
such plans during any period. By "pending" before Congress, the 
committee intends that there be no more than three plans formally 
submitted and not finally disposed of bv both the House and the 
Senate. A final disposition would come either at the end of the 60-day 

geriod for a particular plan, on .the date that either the House or 
enate passes a disapproval resolution thereby defeating the plan, 
or on the date the latter of the two Houses has aefeated a oisapproyal 
resolution. The committee recognizes that even three major reorgani- 
zation plans presented for congressional consideration and action 
during the specified time period can create a burdensome condition on 
the Congress. We, therefore, expect that the administration will woi^ 
closely with the chairmen in both the House and the Senate on the 
timing of such submissions so that there will be opportunity for full 
hearings and careful deliberation in all cases prior to the end of the 
45-day period fo- reporting disapproval resolutions to the floor. 



4. The presen. act requires the rresident to estimate any reduction 
of expenditures that may be brought about by a reorganization plan. 
The committee considers this an important objective that all plans 
should have. It has added, however, a requirement that the President 
not only estimate any reduction, but also any increase in expenditures 
which may result. He is likewise to describe any improvements in 
management, delivery of services, execution of the laws and increases 
in eflBciency of Government operations which may result. The com- 
mittee does not expect that all of these objectives necessarily can be 
realized in any one plan, but feels that such estimates will assist it 
in judging the vedue of the plan and whether or not it should be 
approved. 

5. TraditionaUy, when a reorganization plan was submitted to 
Congress, no changes could be made by the President or the Congress. 
The plan had to stand on its contents when submitted and be accepted 
or rejected without modification. Chairman Brooks had long con- 
sidered this a weakness in the reorganization procedure and, as early 
as 1971, recommended that the President be allowed to make changes 
before final action was taken by the Congress. This bill provides that 
for 30 days after a plan has been submitted to Congress, but before a 
resolution of disapproval has been reported by the committee to the 
House or Senate, the President may make amendments or modifica- 
tions which then would be treated as a part of the original plan but not 
affect the time limits provided in the legislation. Such modifications 
should help avoid a situation which has occurred at times in the past 
when deficiencies in a plan were revealed after it has been transmitted 
and there was no way to correct those deficiencies before final action 



CRS-102 



8 



was taken by the Congress. Congress was, therefor, placed in the 
position where it would be forced to reiect a plan otherwise feasible 
except for some deficiency or to adopt a plan containing such a revealed 
defiaency. In addition, the amendment process will permit the Presi- 
dent to add or delete matters that may arise in tne course of the 
congressional hearing process. The bill also permits the President to 
withdraw a plan any time prior to the conclusion of the 60-day period. 

6. Under the expired reorganization authority, independent regu- 
latory agencies were treated as other agencies in the executive branch, 
and they were subject to reorganization in the same manner. The 
bill recognizes the unique status of independent regulatory agencies 
and their special relationship to the Congress by providing t£at the 
whole of independent regulatory agencies or all of tiieir functions may 
not be abolished or transferred nor m^ two or more such agencies or 
all their functions be consolidated. This does not mean that such 
agencies are totaUy exempt from reorganization authority, but such 
authority is limited as described heretofore. 

7. The law now provides that a reorganization plan may contain a 
provision making the plan (or a part thereof) effective at a time sub- 
sequent to the end of the 60-day period. The committee has noted, 
however, that there have been occasions when the Congress has 
approved a plan well before the expiration of the CO-day period, and 
there is no logical reason why ihe plan should not be effective upon 
that action. Tne bill, therefore, provides that if it so provides, a plan 
may be effective at a time earher than the expiration of the 60-day 
penod if both Houses of Congress hav'> defeated a resolution of dis- 
approval. 

8. A major objective of the sponsors of this legislation was to 
develop a procedure under which an opportunity for a vote by Congress 
will be assured on each plan. Such an opportunity was not available 
under the traditional reorganization procedure. Indeed, is was possible 
that no resolution would be filed on which a vote could be taken. 
Accordingly, H,.R. 5045 makes certain that a resolution of disapproval 
will be filed and makes it nearly certcdn that it will be acted upon. 

This is accomplished by the following procedure: To assure the 
filing of a resolution of disapproval, the chairman of the Committee on 
Government Operations of the House and the chairman of the Com- 
mittee on Governmental Affairs in the Senate, or any Member desig- 
nated by the chairman, shall introduce a resolution of disapproval of a 
reorganization plan (by request) when it is transmitted to the Congress 
but no later than the first day of session following such transmittal. 
This does not foreclose any member from introducing a resolution 
and the committee anticipates that on many plans other members will 
file additional resolutions. The resolutions introduced by the chairman 
and/or any other Members shall be referred to the designated com- 
mittees which shall make their recommendations to theu" respective 
Houses within 45 days following the introduction of the first resolution. 
If the committee does not report a resolution by the end of the 45-day 
period, it will be deemed to be discharged and no other action or 
procedure is necessar>' to discharge the committee. The resolution shall 
then be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved. 

After the committee has reported a resolution or has been deemed 
to be discharged from further consideration of the resolution, it is at 



CRS-103 



9 



any time thereafter in order for any Member of the respective House 
to move to the consideration of the resolution. This motion is highly 
privileged, is not debatable and is protected against dilatory and 
evasive tactics. If agreed to, the resolution will remain the unfinished 
business of the respective House until disposed of. Up to ten hours of 
debate is provided on the resolution unless the respective House a^ees 
to limit debate to a lesser time. At the conclusion of debate and follow- 
ing a single quorum call, if requested, a final vote on the resolution will 
occur. 

The conmaittee believes that this procedure will virtually guarantee 
a vote within the 60-day period in all cases and that Congress will have 
the opportunity to consider and act upon reorganization plans in a 
reasonable and expeditious manner. 

9. The biU deletes all reference to the Government of the District of 
Columbia inasmuch as the home rule lerislation changed its status as 
an agency of the Federal Govempient. Thus, the Government of the 
District of Colimibia is no longer subject to reorganization under this 
authority 

10. Other changes made by the bill are technical, conforming and 
clarifying. 

D. CONSTITUTIONAL IBSUES 

At its hearings on March 1 and 8, the subcommittee received con- 
flicting testimony on the constitutionality of the legislative veto 
procedure contained in section 906(a) of the executive reorganization 
statute. This procedure allows a reorganization plan to become effec- 
tive 60 day. after its transmittal to Congress by the President unless 
during that bO-day period either House passes a resolution disapprov- 
ing the reorganization plan. 

H.R. 3407 contains such a legislative veto provision. H.R. 3131 does 
not contain a le^slative veto. H.R. 3131 follows the usual legislative 
process by requiring that both Houses of Congress affirmatively act on 
a resolution approving a reorganization plan and that the resolution be 
presented to the President for signature or veto before such plan 
oecomes law. 

Chairman Brooks held the position that the legislative veto provi- 
sion raised serious constitutional problems involving the principles of 
separation of powers and delegation of authority. He cnaracterized 
this procedure as "standing the Constitution on its head." In opening 
the subcommittee hearings, Brooks said: 

As times change, as new programs are enacted, and as 
old programs end, it is necessary to revise the structure of 
our Federal Government. Ours is a dynamic Government 
and it is to our credit that we can and do make the adjust- 
ments needed to keep our Government in tune with the 
needs of our people. 

Through most of our history, the reorganization of the 
Federal Government has been determined by legislation, but 
since the early 1930's, reorganization authority has been 
delegated in varying amounts to the President. The basic 
delegation was first enacted in 1949, but has been dormant 
since early 1973. 



CRS-104 



10 



Every 2 or 3 years since 1949, Congress has had to decide 
whether the authority should be continued. It has never been 
an easy decision to make. It raises serious constitutional 
questions — questions involving the separation of powers 
between the legislative and executive branches. It also 
raises practical questions about how much of its authority 
Congress should delegate to a President. 

• « • « « 

The tendency in recent years has been to put limitations 
on the authority in various ways. At times, Congress has 
been overly generous in giving some of our powers away, and 
we have had to take them back. For the last two years of 
his Administration, President Nixon didn't have reorganiza- 
tion authority at all, and President Ford never had it. 

No President should assume that this authority is his 
automatically because other Presidents had it. And no 
Congress should automatically surrender this substantial 
legislative authority because other Congresses have done so. 

• • . * • • 

I have tried, in mv bill, to preserve all the authority past 
Presidents have had to reorganize the Government, but I 
have tried to keep it clearly within the constitutional confines 
of our legislative process. The Constitution, after all, says all 
legislative power shall be vested in Congress. If a plan cannot 
survive a vote in Congress, it simply should not become law. 

Mr. Bert Lance, Director of the OflBce of Management and Budget 
and Mr. John Harmon, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel, testified in support of H.R. 3407. Mr. Harmon re- 
viewed a letter from the Attorney General to the President which 
contained the Attorney General's opinion that the legislative veto 
contained in the executive reorganization statute was constitutionally 
valid. 

The Attorney General stated in his opinion: 

Congressional action outside the check of the Presidential 
veto should be constitutionally suspect as it carries the poten- 
tial for shifting the balance of jpower to Congress and thus 
permitting the legislative brancn to dominate the executive. 
If a statute authorizing control by Congress over executive 
action by later resolution has the effect of evading the consti- 
tutional safeguards of concurrence of both Houses and Presi- 
dential veto, then it violates article I, section 7 of the 
Constitution. 

However, if the procedures provided in a given statute have 
no effect on the constitutional distribution of power between 
the legislative and the executive — that is, the jwwer of 
Presidential veto is effectively preserved and the principle 
of bicameralism is respected — the fact that the procedure is 
not explicitly authorized by the language of article I is not 
enough to render the statute unconstitutional. I am of the 
opinion that the procedure provided in the reorganization 
statute for congressional disapproval of a reorganization plan 
submitted by Uie President satisfies this test and, therefore, 
is constitutional. 



CRS-105 



n 



Under the reorganization statute procedure the two Houses 
of Congress and the President possess the same relative power 
as under the normal article I legislative process. First, the 
President has ultimate veto power in his lormulation of the 
reorganization plan. The President will submit to Congress 
only plans which he approves and rather than be forced to 
accommodate the demands of Congress as to the shape of 
the plan, he can decide to submit no plan at all. 

Tnis power to take no action with respect to reorganiza- 
tion plans should be carefully distinguished from the situation 
created by statutes which provide lor subsequent resolutions 
disapproving presidential actions in the administration of 
continuing programs. The pressures of an ongoing program 
with prior commitments force the President to act. And he 
must take action acceptable to Congress if the action is to 
stand. This urgency for action which pervade^ the administra- 
tion of continuing substantive programs subjects presidential 
decisions to increased congressional influence and effectively 
compromises the President's control over his actions. Such 
statutes frustrate the constitutional check of the presidential 
veto in violation of article I and infringe on the doctrine of 
separation of powers. 

Second, the principle of bicameralism, that each House of 
Congress has the ri^ht that there be no change in the law 
without its consent, is respected by the reorganization statute 
a.' Qo reorganization plan can take effect if opposed by either 
H^use. Both Houses have equal power witn respect to the 
congressional decision to accept or reject the reorganization 
plan. 

Third, in contrast to statutes which authorize subsequent 
congressional resolutions disapproving executive action in 
continuing programs, under the reorganization statute there 
is no assumption by Congress of discretionary control over 
the administration of the law, and, consequently, no invasion 
of the traditional role of the executive branch. The reorga- 
nization statute does not involve creation of a new substantive 
program or congressional interference with authorized ad- 
ministrative discretion in an ongoing program. The doctrine 
of separation of powers is not violated. 

In conclusion, I reiterate that my opinion as to the con- 
stitutionality of the legislative veto device is limited to the 
narrow context of the reorgan zation statute. This procedure 
is uniquely appropriate to executive reorganization. The 
reorganization statutes does not affect the rights of citizens 
or subject them to any ^eater governmental authority than 
before. It deals onl}- with the internal organization of the 
executive branch, a matter in which the President has a pecu- 
liar interest and special responsibility. 

Mr. Antonin Scalia, former Assistant Attorney General, OflBce of 
Legal Counsel, disagreed with the Attorney General's opinion. Mr. 
Scalia believes that the legislative veto violates the constitutional 
requirements of a presidential veto and legislative action by both 



23-836 O - 78 - 



CRS-106 



12 



Houses. Mr. Scalia, in discussing this procedure with the committee, 
reasoned that : 

• • « • • 

It (the legislative veto) institutes an arrangement whereby 
laws are, in effect^ adopted by the President subject to an 
absolute veto by either House of the Congress. The Congress 
need not consider them at all, unless it finds it convenient to 
do so. Really, what could possibly be wrong with this system? 
As the Attorney General's opinion to the President makes 
clear, neither the Executive nor the Congress loses any of 
its power. The provision for congressional veto does not 
really reduce the prerogatives of the President, for without 
this law he would not nave any power to undo statutorily 
prescribed organizational arrangements; and there is no 
realistic jwssibility of his being accorded such power free of 
all congressional control. Nor does the arrangement reduce 
the power of Confess, since either House may, if it wishes, 
prevent any presidentially proposed change from taking 
effect. Everybody wins; everyone is happy. 

There is, I suggest, one incidental loser: the people who 
are entitled to have changes in the law positively considered 
and approved by their representatives — not merely if the 
representatives wish to do so, but whether they wish to do 
80 or not. The very impediments to prompt action which this 
legislation is de^gnea to eliminate are the impediments 
which the Constitution prescribes to protect our citizens 
against the adoption of oppressive or ill-considered laws: 
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient 
[of equal State representation] in the Constitution of 
the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove 
against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolu- 
tion can now be passed without the concurrence, first, 
of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority 
of the States. It must be acknowledged that this com- 
plicated check on legislation may in some instances be 
mjurious as well as beneficial. But ... as the facilitv 
and excess of lawmaking seem to be the diseases to which 
our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that 
this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in 
practice than it appears to many in contemplation. 
(The Federalist No. 62.) 
In other words, the delay inherent in the bicameral legislative 
process; the lobbying pressure from groups proximately af- 
fected; the political cost of casting a vote one way or 
another on controversial substantive issues; all these are 
not incidental obstructions to the governmental process 
which the Founding Fathers simply did not envision, or were 
not clever enough to eliminate. They are an essential and 
indispensable part of our representative democracy. Their 
elimination is an abdication by the Congress of its consti- 
tutionally assigned responsibilities; and a usurpation, by the 
Congress and the Executive acting in concert, of a legislative 
power not accorded to them by the people. 



CRS-107 



13 



Because, as I have said, the basic constitutioii»»l infirmity 
here is clear, I will discuss only briefly the particular text 
which is violated by the proposed arrangement. There is no 
passage in the Constitution which says that "all laws must be 
affirmatively enacted by the Congress," but the effort in the 
present case to retain congressional control while avoiding 
affirmative congressional responsibility does run afoul of 
another explicit provision. Article I, section 7, in addition to 
providing that all "bills" must be passed by both Houses, and 
presented to the President for nis approval or veto, also 
envisions a category- of "orderfs] resolution[s] [and] vote[s]" 
which are subject to precisely the same requirements. The 
nature of that category' is not explicitly described, but unless 
the provision is to be rendered meaningless it must consist of 
those orders, resolutions and votes which have the "character 
and effect" of legislation. This is the conclusion which was 
reached in the only extensive congressional consideration of 
this issue, conducted in 1897. by the Senate Judiciary Com- 
mittee. Senate Report No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d sess. 8 (1897). 
The one-house vetoes established by the present legislation 
surely have the character and effect of law. They render null 
and void what would otherwise be fully effective and binding 
presidential action. They are therefore not constitutionall}- 
valid unless passed by both houses and presented to the 
President for his approval or veto. In other words, the Con- 
gress must either delegate to the President the authority to 
reorganize the Executive branch, subject to their undoing his 
work through the normal process of legislation, or else they 
must themselves adopt such reorganization through the 
constitutionally prescnbed legislative process. 

Professor Phillip Kurland, distinguished service professor at the 
University of Chicago Law School, chief consultant to the Senate's 
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, founder of "The Supreme 
Court Review," and author of respected texts on the Supreme Court, 
also took the position the le^slative veto is unconstitutional. Professor 
Kurland told the subconmiittee : 

• *••*•« 

The question that I have been asked to address is whether 
Congress can authorize the President to write legislation 
which shall have the effect of law unless a majority of either 
House of Congress votes against accepting it as law. 

The plain and simple answer is that the Constitution does 
not provide for such a lawmaking procedure. It specifies a 
different process for the writing of laws. It is for Congress, 
the legislative branch, to write the laws. A President is 
authorized to veto laws enacted bv Confess and Congress 
is enpowered to override any such Presidential veto by a 
two-thirds majoritv of each House. The proposed executive 
reorganization bill would stand the Constitution on its 



CRS-108 



14 



he&d by puttinj^ the lawmakiiig power in the President and 
the veto power in Congress. I know of no way constitutionally 
to justify such a process. 

• • • • • 

The Attorney General recognizes that the basic problem 
here is one of the maintenance of the constitutional system of 
separation of powers and checks and balances. He tells us 
that these concepts are violated where a statute "shifts the 
balance of power to Congress — thus permitting the legisla- 
tive branch to dominate the executive." He fails to suggest 
why a proposal such as the one under inquiry, which "sSfts 
the balance of power to [the President] thus permitting the 
(executive branch] to dominate the [legislative]" is not 
equally violative of the constitutional principles. The At- 
torney General asserts that if a statute were to "frustrate 
the constitutional check of the Presidential veto in violation 
of article I," it woidd "infringe on the doctrine of separation 
of powers." He does not sav why does a statute that would 
give the President the legislative power, as it does here, not 
also infringe the doctrine of separation of powers? 

He suggests that the principle of bicameralism is main- 
tained by reducingthe power of both Houses equallv to the 
exercise of a veto. The principle of bicameralism is addressed 
to the performance of the legislative function, not the veto 
power. 

Finally, he tells us that the proposed statute "deals only 
with the internal organization of the executive branch, a 
matter in which the President has a peculiar interest and 
special responsibility." Certainly that is too broad a principle. 
The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, for 
example, are each concerned with legislation in which each 
"has a peculiar interest and special responsibility." I do 
not believe that the Attorney General would suggest that 
the legislative power could be delegated to those branches of 
government because of their specialized interest and 
responsibility. 

The Attorney General tells us that: "The reorganization 
statute does not affect the rights of citizens or subject them 
to any greater governmental authority than before." To 
accept tfis as a statement of fact is to ignore our most recent 
history, a history that culminated in the awesome and awful 
effects of what we have come to know as the Watergate 
episode. 

Rebecca West wrote in her book, "The Meaning of Trea- 
son," in 1947, "the trouble with man is twofold. He cannot 
learn truths which are too complicated; he forgets truths 
which are too simple." The trutn of Watergate is that the 
distribution of governmental authority within the executive 
branch of government vitally affects the rights of citizens. 

The only justification for the proposed statute is not a 



CRS-109 



15 



constitutional one. It is the argument that there is precedent 
for such distortion of the Constitution in reorganization acts 
that goes back to the Roosevelt reorganization plan of 1939. 
Anyone reading the debates over that initiative of expanded 
Presidential authority must recognize that its opponents fore- 
told the occurrence of Watergate, if this power were to be 
utilized by the President. The existence of these statutory 
precedents ended in the Watergate era. There is no reason 
suggested why this political transvestism, by which the 
legislature assumes the power of veto and the executive the 
power of legislation, should be restored. 
* * • • • • • 

Professor Lawrence Tribe of Harvard Law School, a constitutional 
scholar and respected legal commentator, also found the legislative 
veto procedure to be unconstitutional. Professor Tribe told the 
subcommittee: 

m m m m 

Its constitutional infirmity^ in my judgment, is that it 
delegates excessively broad and open-ended le^slative 
authority to the President, in derogation of the Constitution's 
express command in article I. section 1, that "All legislative 
powers herein granted shall oe vested in a Congress of the 
United States.'^ 

The Constitution's plan is of course that the lawmaking 
role be exercised by Congress. No one could doubt that this 
plan would be transgressed if Congress, wishing to pass the 
Duck in a substantive area like federal criminal law or nuclear 
energy policy, authorized the President to submit legislation 
comprehensively covering these fields, to become effective 
imless vetoed within 60 days by the House or Senate. The 
unconstitutionality of so sweeping a delegation would be 
plain. (See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 
(1935).) Reorganizing the government is said to be different 
because it involves no "substantive power through which the 
government affects the substantive rights and interests of the 
governed." (Letter of Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Harmon, Feb. 14, 1977, p. 4.) If the proposed statute were 
very substantially narrowed, that might well be true. As 
currently written, however, the statute enables the President 
to decree, among other things, "the abolition of all or a part 
of the functions of an agency." 5 U.S.C, section 903(a)(2), 
or "the consolidation of the whole or a part of an agency, or 
of the whole or a part of the functions thereof, with the whole 
or a part of another agency or the functions thereof," 5 U.S.C. 
section 903(a)(3). Now it takes little imagination to realize 
that abolishing, say, certain civil rights enforcement func- 
tions of the Justice Department, or consolidating, for 
instance, the regulatory functions of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission with the research and development functions of 
the Energy Resources and Development Administration 
(thereby undoing the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974), or 
transferring the functions of an independent agency or com- 
mission like the Securities and Exchange Commission to an 



CRS-110 



16 



agency located within one of the executive departments, 
could dramatically aflPect "the substantive rights and interests 
of the governed," Under our system, such basic substantive 
consequences are the responsibility of Congress to consider 
and either approve or disapprove, in a legislative process 
that gives all affected groups an appropriate voice. Entrusting 
such consequences under a blank cneck to the executive — any 
executive — offends our most fundamental axioms of legis- 
lative accountability. 

There is a strong case for the view that badly needed 
reorganization plans of more limited compass, in which the 
President indeed "has a peculiar interest and special respon- 
sibiUty," Getter of Attorney General Griffin Bell, Jan. 31, 
1977, p. 4), should not invariably have to move through the 
full process of specific approval by both Houses of Congress. 
Nor is the Constitution so constricting or inflexible as to 
preclude arrangements giving Congress a more passive role 
m acceding to changes of sufficiently limited scope. But the 
proposed statute, based on a model drafted in times less 
sensitive to these matters, takes too little care to assure that 
the changes promulgated under its a^;is are indeed limited 
ones. 

Short of moving all the way to an obviously constitutional 
solution like that of H.R. 3131, which would make reorgani- 
zation plans effective only upon affirmative approval by 
both Houses within 60 days of submission, intermediate 
steps may be available to eliminate tbe constitutional in- 
firmity of virtually unbounded delegation that characterizes 
the statute proposed by the President. 

First, the statute could be written to provide that no 
reorganization plan submitted under its authority may 
abohsh, separate, or consolidate functions in such a way as 
to create a significant risk that any existing act of Congress 
would be rendered substantively less effective or more 
difficult to enforce. 

Second, one particular way to reduce such risks would be 
to specify that no reorganization plan submitted under the 
statute's authority may transfer a function from an inde- 
pendent agency or commission to an agency or branch of an 
executive department. 

Third, the statute could provide that no reorganization 
plan may take effect until a Special Select Committee on 
Keorganization, or the existing Government Operations 
Committee, in each House has reported to the full chamber 
its specific findings on the question of the reorganization 
plan's compliance with the two requirements suggested here. 

Fourth, the statute could somehow link the effective date 
of a reorganization plan to the congressional budget process, 
so as to assure legislative attention to the reorganization 
plan's impact on how federal functions are in fact discharged. 

Whether safeguards along these or similar lines could in 
fact be drafted with sufficient sensitivity both to the Ad- 
ministration's reasonable desire for flexibility and to the 



CRS-111 



17 

Constitution's mandatory concern with le^slative account- 
ability remains to be seen. But the effort is certainly worth 
making, since the price of ignoring the Constitution when its 
strictures seem inconvenient would be even higher than the 
price of making do with the Government's present organi- 
zation, imperfect though it plainly is. 



In H.R. 5045, the committee sought to alleviate these constitutional 
defects by retaining in Congress a considerable degree of participation 
in the reorganization process. H.R. 5045 seeks to guarantee that every 
reorganization plan will be put to a vote in both the House and the 
Senate. It requires that at the time of submission of the plan, resolu- 
tions of disapproval be introduced in the House and the Senate and 
referred to the House Government Operations Committee and the 
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, respectively. It requires 
these committees to make recommendations on the plan to their 
respective houses. If, after 45 d,ays, the committee has not voted out 
a resolution, the committee is automatically discharged. The resolu- 
tion is on the calendar and can be called up by any member. The 
motion to take it up is highly privileged and is not debatable or amend- 
able. The committee beheves that this procedure will virtually Eissure 
a vote by both the House and the Senate on every plan. 

H.R. 5045 also contains other provisions reflecting the concern of 
the committee about the constitutional roles of the executive and 
legislative branches. It prohibits a reorganization plan from abolishing 
or transferring an independent regulatory agency and it prohibits the 
abolition of any enforcement function or statutory program. 

Conclusion 

The committee recommends that the President be delegated 
limited authority to reorganize the Federal Govenlment. Under the 
authority, the President would submit reorganization plans to the 
Congress which would become effective after 60 days unless either 
House of Congress has adopted a resolution disapproving such plan. 
Procedures assuring a vote on each plan, if any Member of Congress 
asks for it, are incorporated in the bill. 

In the course of the hearings on this legislation, the constitutionality 
of the key provision of this bill was questioned. It was contended that 
the bill makes too broad a delegation of legislative authority to the 
President by permitting plans submitted by the President to become 
law without the approval of Congress. 

The question remains unresolved, but it is the position of the com- 
mittee that the risk of an unfavorable ruling by the courts, whDe still 
remaining, may have been lessened by the adoption of the new voting 
procedure and the added limitations on the use of the reorganization 
authority. 

It is the intention of the committee to examine carefully each 
reorganization plan submitted under this authority and to assure the 
participation by Congress in the reorganization process to the fullest 
extent possible. 



CRS-112 



18 

Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 5045 

H.R. 5045 reestablishes with amendments the provisions of Chapter 
9 of the United States Code (sections 901-913) entitled executive 
reorganization, which is a codification of the Reorganization Act of 
1949, as it has been amended by the Congress to date. The bill rewrites 
chapter 9 in its entirety. This analysis will, therefore, follow the 
affected sections of the dode. 

SECTION 901. PURPOSE 

(a) The section declares it to be the policy of the United States — 

"(1) to promote the better execution of the laws, the more 
effective management of the executive branch and of its agencies 
and functions, and the ex]>editious administration of the public 
business ; 

"(2) to reduce expenditures and promote economy to the 
fullest extent consistent with the efficient operation of the 
Government; 

"(3) to increase the efficiency of the o[>erations of the Govern- 
ment to the fullest extent practicable; 

"(4) to group, coordinate, and consolidate agencies and func- 
tions of the Government, as nearly as may be, according to 
major purposes; 

"(5) to reduce the number of agencies by consolidating those 
having similar functions under a single head, and to abolish 
such agencies or functions thereof as may not be necessary for 
the efficient conduct of the Government; and 

"(6) to eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort." 

(b) Declares the further policy that the public interest demands 
the carrying out of the above purposes and that they can be accom- 
plished more speedily by proceeding under this Act than by the 
enactment of specific legislation. 

(c) Congress intends that the President provide appropriate means 
for broad citizen advice and participation in restructuring and reorga- 
nizing the executive branch. 

(d) The President shall examine the organization of all agencies 
and determine what changes are necessary to carry out this policy. 

SECTION 902. DEFINFTIONS 

This section defines the terms "agency", "oflfice or officer" and 
"reorganization". 

SECTION 90S. SEOROANIZATION PLANS 

(a) Directs the President to prepare a reorganization plan when, 
after investigation, he finds that organizational changes are necessary 
to carry out the policy set forth above. It states the contents of plans 
may provide for — 

"(1) the transfer of the whole or a part of an agency, or of the 
whole or a part of the functions thereof, to the jurisdiction and 
control of another agency; 



CRS-113 



19 

"(2) the abolition of all or a part of the functions of an agency, 
except that no enforcement function or statutory' program shall 
be aoolished by the plan; 

"(3) the consolidation or coordination of the whole or a part 
of an agency, or of the whole or a part of the functions thereof, 
with the whole or a part of anotner agency or the functions 
thereof ; 

"(4) the consolidation or coordination of a part of an agency 
or the functions thereof with another part of the same agency 
or the functions thereof; 

"(5) the authorization of an oflBcer to delegate any of his func- 
tions; or 

"(6) the abolition of the whole or a part of an agency which 

agency or part does not have, or on the taking effect of the 

reorganization plan will not have, any functions." 

The President is to transmit the plan to Congress with a declaration 

that he has found the reorganization necessary to carry out the above 

policy. 

(b) The President shall have the plan delivered to both Houses on 
the same day but no more than three plans may be pending before 
Congress at one time. His message shall state the statutory basis for 
each function abolished and estimate any reduction or increase in 
expenditures (itemized so far as practicable) and describe any im- 
provements in management, delivery of Federal services, execution 
of the laws, and increases in efficiency of Government operations 
which may be reahzed. 

(c) The President is allowed to make amendments to a plan any 
time during the first 30 days of continuous session of Congress after 
transmittalbut before a resolution of disapproval is reported in either 
House. The amendments shall be treated as a part of tne original plan 
but shall not affect any of the time limits in the act. The President 
may also withdraw a plan at any time before the end of 60 days of 
continuous session. 

SECTION 904. ADDITIONAL CONTENTS OF REORGANIZATION PLAN 

A plan may (1) change or designate the name of an agency or its 
head who may be an individual or a board but the terms of office 
may not be fixed at more than 4 years; (2) provide for the appoint- 
ment and pay of officers of agencies; (3) provide for the disposition of 
property and personnel; (4) provide for the transfer of imexpended 
balances of appropriations or other funds if they are to be used for 
the same purposes; and (5) provide for terminating the affairs of an 
agency abolisned. 

SECTION 905. LIMITATION ON POWERS 

(a) A reorganization plan may not provide for nor have the effect 
of — 

"(1) creating a new executive department, abolishing or 
transferring an executive department or independent regulator}' 
agency, or all the functions thereof, or consolidating two or more 
executive departments or two or more independent regulatory 
agencies, or all the functions thereof ; 



CRS-114 



20 



"(2) continuing an agency beyond the period authorized by 
law for its existence or beyond the time when it would have 
terminated if the reorganization had not been made ; 

"(3) continuing a function beyond the period authorized by 
law for its exercise or beyond the time when it would have ter- 
minated if the reorganization had not been made ; 

"(4) authorizing an agency to exercise a function which is not 
expressly authorized by law at the time the plan is transmitted 
to Congress; 

"(5) increasing the term of an oflBce beyond that provided by 
law for the oflBce ; or 

"(6) dealing with more than one logically consistent subject 
matter." Logically consistent subject matter could include: a 
broad purpose of government, such as Economic Development or 
Natural Kesources; a series of similar programs in different 
agencies, such as Income Maintenance; all functions of a single 
agency; or crosscutting but identical functions, such as Admin- 
istration, Budget, legal counsel, et cetera. 
(b) A provision in a reorganization plan may take effect only if 
the plan is transmitted to Congress witnin 3 years from the date of 
enactment of H.R. 5045. Thus, authority under the act terminates in 
3 years. 

SECTION 906. EFFECTIVE DATE AND PUBLICATION OF BEOROANIZATIOK 

PLANS 

(a) A reorganization plan becomes effective after 60 days of con- 
tinuous session of Congress unless between the date of transmittal and 
the end of the 60-day period, either the House or the Senate passes a 
resolution of disapproval. 

(b) The section specifies when continuity is broken. 

(c) The plan may become effective at a later date under a provision 
which it may contain. A provision may also make it effective at an 
earUer time if both Houses have defeated resolutions of disapproval. 

(d) When effective, plans are to be printed in the Statutes at Large 
and the Federal Register. 

SECTION 907. EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS, PENDING LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, 
AND UNEXPENDED APPROPRIATIONS 

This section provides that any statute, regulation or other action 
affected by a reorganization which was effective before the date of the 
reorganization will have the same effect as if the reorganization had not 
been made, unless rescinded or made inapplicable. The section 
permits a reorganization plan to transfer a vested function to an agency 
other than that specifiea by statute, regulation or rule. The section 
defines the meaning of "regulation or other action." It also states that 
a pending suit does not abate by reason of the taking effect of a re- 
organization plan. A court may allow a suit or other proceeding against 
the successor of the head or officer of an agency under a reorganization 
if a motion or supplemental petition is filed within 12 months after the 
reorganization plan takes effect. It provides that appropriations or 
portions thereol unexpended by reason of a reorganization may not 
be used for any purpose, but shall revert to the TYeasury. 



CRS-115 



21 

SECTION 908. RULES OF SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON 
REORGANIZATION FLANS 

This section states that the succeeding sections in the bill are enacted 
as an exercise of the rule making power of the Senate and the House 
and are deemed a part of the rules with full recognition of the con- 
stitutional right of either House to change the rules of that House at 
any time. 

SECTION 909. TERMS OF RESOLUTION 

The form and terms of a disapproval resolution are set forth with 
a condition that a resolution may not specify more than one re- 
organization plan. 

SECTION 910. INTRODUCTION AND REFERENCE OF RESOLUTION 

(a) The chairman of the Government Operations Committee of the 
House and the chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee of 
the Senate or a Member designated by such chairman is required to 
introduce a disapproval resolution (by request) on a reorganization 
plan no later than the first day of session following the transmittal of 
the plan. 

(b) The resolution just referred to and any other resolutions which 
may be introduced shall be referred to the committees named above 
in their respective Houses. The committee shall make is recommenda- 
tions to the House or the Senate respectively within 45 days of con- 
tinuous session of Congress following the introduction of the resolution. 

SECTION 911. DISCHARGE OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERING RESOLUTION 

If the committee to which a resolution has been referred has not 
reported it by 45 days following its introduction, such committee shall 
be deemed to be discharged of such resolution and it shall be placed 
on the appropriate calendar of the House involved. No other motion 
or procedure is needed to discharge the committee. 

section 912. procedure after report or discharge of committee; 
debate; vote on final disapproval 

(a) When the committee has reported, or has been deemed to be 
discharged, it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous 
motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member 
of the House or the Senate, as the case may be, to move to proceed 
to the consideration of the disapproval resolution. The motion is 
highly privileged and is not debatable, nor subject to amendment 
or any dilatory or evasive tactics. It shall remain the unfinished 
business of the respective House until disposed of. 

(b) The debate on the resolution may extend to 10 hours, divided 
equally between those in favor and those opposed to the resolution, 
but a motion to limit such debate is not in order. 

(c) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on the dis- 
approval resolution and a single q lonim call (if requested), the final 
vote on the resolution shall occur. The provision for a single quorum 
call at the conclusion of debate does not preclude a quorum caU during 



CRS-116 



22 

the debate on the resolution in accordance with the rules of the House 
or Senate. 

(d) Appeals from decisions of the Chair shall be decided without 
debate. 

ESTIMATES OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 

The following estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget 
Office in accordance with section 403 of the Congressional Budget 
Act is submitted as required by subdivision (c) of caluse 2(1) (3) of 
House Rule XI: 

Congressional Budget Office, 

Washington, D.C., March S, 1977. 
Hon. Jack Brooks, 

Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Repre- 
sentatives, Room 2157, Raybum House Office Building, Washington, 
B.C. 
Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congres- 
sional Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has 
reviewed H.R. 3131 ("Reorganization Act Amendments of 1977"), 
H.R. 3407, and H.R. 3442, bills to reesUblish the period within 
which the President may transmit to the Congress plans for the re- 
organization of agencies of the executive branch of the government. 

Based on this review, it appears that no additional costs to the 
government would be incurred as a direct result of any of these bills. 
However, the actual implementation of any reorganization could 
result in either costs or savmgs to the government. 

While not mandated by any of these bills, there will be some costs 
associated with the planning process. For the initial planning stages, 
0MB is estimating additional costs in fiscal year 1977 of $1.6 million, 
including salaries and expenses for 32 additional staflf members. 

Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide 
additional analysis on this legislation. 
Sincerely, 

Alice M. Rivlin, Director. 

Estimate of Cost 

The committee agrees that no additional costs to the Government 
would be incurred as a direct result of this legislation and, therefore, 
makes no estimate as required by House Rule XIH, clause 7. 

Review of Existing Law 

In compliance with subdivision (A) of clause 2(1) (3) of House 
Rule XI, the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of 
this committee reviewed the application and administration of the 
laws relating to Government reorganization and determined that 
legislation should be enacted in the manner set forth in the bill. 

Inflationabt Support 

In compliance with clause 2(1) (4) of House Rule XI, it is the opinion 
of this committee that the provisions of this bill will have no infla- 
tionary' impact on prices and costs in the operation of the national 
economy. 



CRS-117 

23 

Oversight Findings 

No oversight findings and recommendations were made inasmuch 
as this legislation has been inoperable since April 1, 1973. 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures 

No new budget authority or tax expenditures are required by this 
legislation. 

Changes in Existing Law Made bt the Bill, As Reported 

In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as re- 
ported, are shown as foUows (existing law proposed to be omitted is 
enclosed in biack brackets, new matter is printed in ital.cs, existing 
law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman) : 

Chapter 9 of Title 5, United States Code 
CHAPTER 9~EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION 

Bxc 

901. Purpose. 

902. Definitions. 

903 . Reorgani z ati on pl&na . 

904. Additional contents of reorganization [plans.] plan. 

905. Limitations on powers. 

906. Effective date and publication of reorganisation plans. 

907. Effect on other laws, pending legal proceedings, and unexpended appro- 

priations. 

908. Rules of Senate and House of Representatives on reorganisation plans. 

909. Terms of resolution. 

910. [Reference of resolution to committee.] Introduction and rtferenee of 

retolution. 

911. Discharge of committee considering resolution. 

912. Procedure after report or discharge of committee; debate[.]; vote on final 

duapproval. 
[913. Decisions without debate on motion to i>oetpone or proceed.] 

§901. Purpose 

(a) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States — 

(1) to promote the better execution of the laws, the more ef- 
fective management of the executive branch and of its agencies 
and functions, and the expeditious administration of the public 
business; 

(2) to reduce expenditures and promote economy to the fullest 
extent consistent with the eflBcient operation of the Government ; 

(3) to increase the eflBciency of the operations of the Govern- 
ment to the fullest extent practicable; 

(4) to group, coordinate, and consolidate agencies and func- 
tions of the Government, as nearly as may be, according to major 
purposes; 

(5) to reduce the number of agencies by consolidating those 
having similar functions under a smgle head, and to abolish such 
agencies or functions thereof as may not be necessary for the 
efficient conduct of the Government; and 

(6) to eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort. 



CRS-118 



24 

(b) Congress declares that the public interest demands the carrying 
out of the purposes of subsection (a) of this section and that the pur- 
poses may be accomplished in great measure by proceeding under this 
chapter, and can be accomplished more speedily thereby than b}^ the 
enactment of specific legislation. 

(c) It is the intent of Congress that the President should provide ap- 
propriate means for broad citizen advice and participation in restructur- 
ing and reorganizing the executive branch. 

C(c)] {d) The President shall from time to time examine the 
organization of all agencies and shall determine what changes in such 
organization are necessary to carry- out any policy set forth in sub- 
section (a) of this section. 

§902. Definitions 

For the purpose of this chapter — 

(1) "agency" means — 

(A) an E.xecutive agency or part thereof; and 

(B) an office or officer in the executive branch; [and] 
t(C) any and all parts of the government of the District 

of Columbia other than the courts thereof;] 
but does include the General Accounting Office or the Comp- 
troller General of the United States; 

(2) "reorganization" means a transfer, consolidation, coordi- 
nation, authorization, or abolition, referred to in section 903 of 
this title ; and 

(3) "officer" is not limited by section 2104 of this title. 

§903. Reorganization plans 

(a) Whenever the President, after investigation, finds that changes 
in the organization of agencies are necessar>' to carry out any policy 
set forth in section 901(a) of this title, he shall prepare a reorganiza- 
tion plan specifying the reorganizations he finds are necessary. Any 
plan may provide for — 

(1) the transfer of the whole or a part of an agency, or of the 
whole or a part of the functions thereof, to the jurisdiction and 
control of another agency ; 

(2) the abolition of all or a part of the functions of an agency, 
except that nx) enforcement function or statutory program shaU be 
abolished by the plan ; 

(3) the consolidation or coordination of the whole or a part 
of an agency, or of the whole or a part of the functions thereof 
with the whole or a part of another agency or the functions 
thereof ; 

(4) the consolidation or coordination of a part of an agency 
or the functions thereof with another part of the same agency or 
the functions thereof; 

(5) the authorization of an officer to delegate any of his func- 
tions ; or 

(6) the abolition of the whole or a part of an agency which 
agency or part does not have, or on the taking efi'ect of the reor- 
ganization plan will not have, any functions. 

The President shall transmit the plan (bearing an identification num- 
ber) to the Congress together witn a declaration that, with respect to 



CRS-119 



25 



each reorganization included in the plan, he has found that the re- 
organization is necessary to carry out any policy set forth in section 
901(a) of this title. _ - 

(b) The President shall have a reorganization plan delivered to 
both Houses on the same day and to each House while it is in session 
[and furthermore shall not transmit more than one such plan to Con- 
gress within any period of thirty consecutive days], except thai no 
more than three plans may be pending before the Congress at one time. 
In his message transmitting a reorganization plan, the President shall 
specify with respect to each abolition of a function included in the 
plan the statutory authority for the exercise of the function [and the 
reduction of expenditures (itemized so far as practicable) that it is 
probable will be brought about by the taking effect of the reorganiza- 
tions included in the plan! . The message shSi also estimate any reduc- 
tion or increase in expenditures (itemized so Jar as pra/^ticable) , and 
describe any improvements in mxinagement, delivery oj Federal services, 
execution of the laws, and increases in efficiency oj Govemmeni operations, 
which it is expected will be realized as a result of the reorganizations in- 
cluded in the plan. 

(c) Any time during the per od of thirty calendar days of continuous 
session of Congress after the date on which the plan is transmitted to it, 
but before any resolution described in section 909 has been ordered 
reported in either House, the President may make amendments or modifi- 
cations to the plan, consistent with sections 903-905 of this title, which 
modifications or revisions shall thereafter be treated as a part of the reor- 
ganization plan originally ransm'tted and sha I not affiect in any way the 
tirr ", limits otherwise provided for in this chapter. The President may 
WL draw the plan any time prior to the conclusion of sixty calendar days 
of continuous session of Congress following the date on which the plan is 
submitted to Congress. 

§904. Additional contents of reorganization [plans] plan 

A reorganization plan transmitted by the President under section 
903 of this title— 

(1) may change, in such cases as the President considers neces- 
sary, the name of an agency affected by a reorganization and the 
title of its head, and shall designate the name of an agency re- 
sulting from a reorganization and the title of its head ; 

(2) may provide for the appointment and pay of the head 
and one or more officers of an agency (including an agency re- 
sulting from a consohdation or other type of reoi^anization) if 
the President finds, and in his message transmitting the plan 
declares, that by reason of a reorganization made by the plan 
the provisions are necessary; 

(3) shall provide for the transfer or other disposition of the 
records, property, and personnel affected by a reorganization; 

(4) shall provide for the transfer of such unexpended balances 
of appropriations, and of other funds, available for use in con- 
nection with a function or agency affected by a reorganization, as 
the President considers necessary by reason of the reorganization 
for use in connection with the functions affected by the reorgani- 
zation, or for the use of the agency which shall have the functions 
after the reorganization plan is effective ; and 

(5) shall provide for terminating the affairs of an agency 
abolished. 



CRS-120 



26 



A reorganization plan transmitted by the President containing provi- 
sions authorized by paragraph (2) of this section may provide that 
the head of an agency be an individual or a commission or board with 
more than one member. In the case of an appointment of the head of 
such an agency, the term of oflBce may not be fixed at more than four 
years, the pay may not be at a rate in excess of that found by the Presi- 
dent to be applicable to comparable officers in the executive branch, and 
if the appointment is not to a position in the competitive service, it 
shall be by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate[, except that, in the case of an officer of the government of the 
District of Columbia, it may be by the Commissioner or other body or 
officer of that government designated in the plan]. Any reorganization 
plan transmitted by the President containing provisions required by 
paragraph (4) of this section[,J shall provide for the transfer of un- 
expended balances only if such balances are used for the purposes for 
which the appropriation was originally made. 

§ 905. Limitations on powers 

(a) A reorganization plan may not provide for, and a reorganization 
under this chapter may not have the effect of — 

(1) creating a new [Executive! executive department, abolishing 
or transferring an [Executivej executive department or inde- 
pendent regulatory agency, or all the functions thereof, or con- 
sohdating two or more [Executive] executive departments or two 
or more independent regulatory agencies, or all the functions thereof; 

(2) continuing an agency beyond the period authorized by law 
for its existence or beyond the time when it would have terminated 
if the reorganization had not been made . 

(3) continuing a function beyond the period authorized by law 
for its exercise or beyond the time when it would have terminated 
if the reorganization had not been made; 

(4) authorizing an agency to exercise a function which is not 
expressly authorized by law at the time the plan is transmitted 
to Congress; 

(5) increasing the term of an office beyond that provided by 
law for the office; or 

[f6) transferring to or consolidating with another agenc}' the 
government of the District of Columbia or all the functions thereof 
which are subject to this chapter, or abolishing that government 
or all those functions; or] 

|[(7)](6') dealing with more than one logically consistent 
subject matter. 

(b) A provision contained in a reorganization plan may take eflfect 
only if tne j)lan is transmitted to Congress [before April I, 1973] 
unthiii three yearn of the date of ena^ctment of the Reorganization Act 
oj 1977. 

§906. Effective date and publication of reorganization plans 

(a) Except as othen^'ise provided under subsection (c) of this sec- 
tion, a reorganization plan is effective at the end of the first period 
of [60] ^/i-fy calendar days of continuous session of Congress after the 
date onwhich the plan is transmitted to it unless, between the date of 
transmittal and the end of the [60-day] sixty-day Vienod , either House 
passes a resolution stating in substance that [that] the House does not 
favor the reorganization plan. 



CRS-121 



27 



(b) For the purpose of [subsection (a) of this section] this chapter — 

(1) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of 
Congress sine die ; and 

(2) the days on which either House is not in session because 
of an adjournment of more than [3] three days to a day certain 
are excluded in the computation of [the 60-day period] hny 
period of time in which Congress is in continuous session. 

(c) Under provisions contained in a reorganization plan, [a pro- 
vision of the plan] any provision thereof may -be effective at a time 
later than the date on which the plan otherwise is effective or, if both 
Houses of Congress have defeated a resolution of disapproval, may be 
elective at a time earlier than the expiration of the sixty-day period re- 
quired by subsection (a). 

(d) A reorganization plan which is effective shall be printed (1) in 
the Statutes at Large n the same volume as the public laws and (2) 
in the Federal Register. 

§ 907. Effects on other laws, pending legal proceedings, and un- 
ei^pended appropriations 

(a) A statute enacted, and a regulation or other action made, pre- 
scribed, issued, granted, or performed in respect of or by an agency 
or function affected by a reorganization under this chapter, before 
the effective date of the reorganization, has, except to the extent 
rescinded, modified, superseded, or made inapplicable by or under 
authority of law or by the abolition of a function, the same effect as 
if the reorganization had not been made. However, if the statute, 
regulation, or other action has vested the functions n the agency 
from which it is removed under the reorganization plan, the function, 
insofar as it is to be exercised after the plan becomes effective, shall 
b e deem ed as vested in the agency under which the function is placed 
by the plan. 

(b) For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section, "regulation 
or other action" means a regulation, rule, order, policy, determination, 
directive, authorization, permit, privilege, requirement, designation, 
or other action. 

(c) A suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or 
against the head of an agency or other oflBcer of the United States, 
in his oflBcial capacity or in relation to the discharge of his oflBcial 
duties, does not abate by reason of the taking effect of a reorganiza- 
tion plan under this chapter. On motion or supplemental petition 
filed at any time within [12] tv^elve months after the reorganization plan 
takes effect, showing a necessity for a survival of the suit, action, or 
other proceeding to obtain a settlement of the questions involved, the 
court may allow the suit, action, or other proceeding to be maintained 
by or against the successor of the head or oflBcer under the reorganiza- 
tion effected by the plan or, if there is no successor, against such agency 
or oflBcer as the President designates. 

(d) The appropriations or portions of appropriations unexpended 
by reason of tne operation of [this] the chapter may not be used for 
any purpose, but snail revert to the Treasury. 



23-836 O - 78 - 9 



CRS-122 



28 



§908. Rules of Senate and House of Representatives on reorga- 
nization plans 

Sections [909-913] 909 through 912 of this title are enacted by 
Congress — 

(1) as an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such the}^ are 
deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but 
applicable only with respect to the procedure to oe followed in 
that House in the case of resolutions described by section 909 of 
this title ; and they supersede other rules only to the extent that 
they are inconsistent therewith ; and 

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either 
House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure 
of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same 
extent as in the case of any other rule of that House. 

§909. Terms of resolution 

For the purpose of sections [908-9133 908 through 912 of this title, 
"resolution" means only a resolution of either House of Congress, the 

matter after the resoh-ing clause of which is as follows: "That the 

does not favor the reoi^anization plan numbered trans- 
mitted to the Congress by the President on , 19 — .", [the 

first blank space therein being filled with the name of the resolving 
House and the other blank spaces therein being appropriately filled; 
but does not include a resolution which specifies more than one re- 
organization plan] and includes such modifications and revisions as are 
submitted by the President under section 903 {c) of this chapter. The 
blank spaces therein are to be fiUed appropriately. The term does TWt 
include a resolution which specifies more than one reorganization plan. 

[§ 910. Reference of resolution to committee 

[A resolution with respect to a reorganization plan shall be referred 
to a committee (and all resolutions with respect to the same plan shall 
be referred to the same committee) by the President of the Senate 
or the Speaker of the House of Representatives as the case may be.] 

%910. Introduction and reference of resolution 

(a) No lat£r than the first day of session following the day on which a 
reorganization plan is transmitted to the House of Representatives and the 
Senate under section 90S, a resolution, as defined in section 909, shall be 
introduced (by request) in the House by the chairman of the Government 
Operations Committee of th^e House, or by a Member or Members of the 
House designated by such chairman; and shall be introduced (by request) 
in the Senate by the chairman of the Governmental Afairs Committee of 
the Senate, or by a Member or Members of the Senate designated by such 
chairman . 

(6) A resolution with respect to a reorganization plan shall be referred 
to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee 
on Government Operations of the House (and all resolutions with respect 
to tfu same plan shall be referred to the same committee) by the Presi- 
dent of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the 
case may be. The committee shall make its recommenaations to the House 
of Representatives or the Senate, respectively, within JfS calendar days of 
continuous session of Congress following the date of such resolution's 
introduction. 



CRS-123 



29 



§911. Discharge of committee considering resolution 

[(a) If the committee to which a resolution with respect to a re- 
organization plan has been referred has not reported it at the end of 
20 calendar days after its introduction, it is m order to move either 
to discharge the committee from further consideration of the reso- 
lution or to discharge the conmiittee from further consideration of 
any other resolution with respect to the reorganization plan which 
has been referred to the committee.! 

// the committee to which is referreaa resolviion introduced pursuant 
to subsection (a) of section 910 {or, in the absence oj such a resolution, 
the first resolution introduced with respect to the same reorganization 
plan) has not reported such resolution or an identical resolution at the 
end oj 1^5 calendar days oj continuous session oj Congress ajter its intro- 
duction, such committee shall be deemed to be discharged from jurther 
consideration of such resolution and such resolution shall be placed on 
the appropriate calendar oj the House involved. 

£(b) A motion to discharge may be made only by an individual 
favoring the resolution, is highly privileged (except that it may not 
be made after the committee has reported a resolution with respect 
to the same reorganization plan) , ana debate thereon shall be limited 
to not more than 1 hour, to be divided equally between those favoring 
and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the motion is 
not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by 
which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to. 

[(c) If the motion to discharge is agreed to or disagreed to, the 
motion may not be renewed, nor may another motion to discharge 
thi committee be made with respect to any other resolution with 
respect to the same reorganization plan.] 

§912. Procedure after report or discharge of committee; debater- 
rote on final disapproval 

(a) When the committee has reported, or has been deemed to be 
discharged {under section 91 1 ) from further consideration of, a resolu- 
tion with respect to a reorganization plan, it is at any time thereafter 
in order (even though a previous motion to the same eflFect has been 
disagreed to) jor any Member oj the respective House to move to proceed 
to the consideration of the resolution. The motion is highly pnvileged 
and is not debatable. [An amendment to the motion is not in order, 
and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vouc by which the 
motion is agreed to or disagreed to.] Tlve motion shall not be subject to 
amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the 
consideration oj other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which 
the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. Ij a motion to 
proceed to the consideration of tlve resolution is agreed to, the resolution 
shall remain the unfinished business oj the respective House until disposed 

(b) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals 
in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than [lOj ten 
hours, which shall be divided equally between [those] individuals 
favoring and [those] individuals opj)Osing the resolution. A motion 
further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. [An auiendiiier.: 
to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is not in order, and it is not 
in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution i«- 
agreed to or disagreed to. J An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, 



CRS-124 



30 



or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion 
to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote 
by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. 

(c) Immediately foUowirig the conclusion oj the debate on the resolution 
vrith respect to a reorganization plan, and a single quorum call at the 
conclusion oj the debate ij requested in accordance witfi the rules oj the 
appropriate House, the vote onjinal approval oj the resolution shall occur. 

(d) Appeals jrom the decisions of the Chair relating to the application 
oj the rules oj the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case 
may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution with respect to a reorgani- 
zation plan shall be decided vriihout debate. 

g 913. Decisions without debate on motion to postpone or proceed 

[(a) Motions to postpone, made with respect to the discharge from 
committee, or the consideration of a resolution with respect to a re- 
oreanization plan, and motions to proceed to the consideration of 
other business, shall be decided without debate. 

[(b) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the apph- 
cation of toe rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as 
the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution with respect 
to a reorganization plan shall be decided without debate.] 



CRS-125 



APPENDIXES 



AppEiMDix 1. — ^Statutes Providing Reoroanizatiok Authoriot 

Ayproximata duration of tu- 
•lortMHZation autttority ■ tftonty and tannination date Mttliod of diupproval 

ftMrfanizatioa Act of 1932: Tittt IVof Itia Lafisiative Appro- PtrmaiMtit SMnpia rtsolvtron of 

priattons Act for fiscal yur 1933, PuWic Law 212, 72d Cong. mOm House. 

Acts of Mar. 3 and Mar. 20, 1933: Amendinc and sup«rs«din| 1 yr, 10 mo (Mar. 20. 1935)... No provision (enactment 

the act of June 20 1932. of law required). 

Reorpnization Act of 1939: PuWic Law 19, 79th Cone (act of 2yT(iM-21. IMl) OaKurrent resolution 

Apr. 3, 1939). 

Trtlo I of War fotmn Act of 1941 (act of Dec 18, 1941) Duration of war. plus 6 mo. or No prwition. 

such earlier time as dauf- 
Mted by Confress. 
Reornnization Act of 1945: Public Law 263 79th Cont. (act 2 yr and 3 mo (Apr. 1, 194S).. Concunant raaolution. 

of Dae 20. 1945). 
Raorpniration Act of 1949: Public Law 109, 81st Cont (act 3 r. 10 mo (Apr. 1, 19S3).... Majoritv of authorized 

of June 20, 1949). mafflbarship of either 

Hesse: Senate, 49; 
HMse, 218. 
1953 amandmant: PuMw Law 3, S3d Con«. (act of Fab. 11, 2yr(Apr. 1, IKS) S«m as 1M9 act 

1953). 
1955 amendment: PuUk Law 16. 84th Cont (act of Mar. 25, 2 yr, 2 mo (iwia 1, 1957) Do. 

1955) 

1957 amandmant: Public Law 86-216 (act of SapL 4, 1957)... 1 yr. 9 mo (Jww 1, 1959) S«mp4e raadotiaii a( 

aittwr House. 
1961 amandmant: PuUk Law 87-18 (act of Apr. 7. 1961).... 2 vr, 2 mo(Juaa 1, 1963).... Do. 

1964 endment: Public Law 88-351(act of July 2, 1964) (no 11 mo(JuM 1, 1965) Do. 

aut >ty to create new executive departments). 
1965amendmentPuMic Law 89-43 (act of June 18, 1965) (no 3yr. 6 mo(Oac 31, 19(1).... Do. 

authonty to create new executive oepartments). 
1969 amendment: PuWic Law 91-5 (act of Mir. 27, 1969) (no 2 r (Apr. 1, 1971) Do. 

authority to crwtt new executive departments). 
1971amendment:PuWicLaw92-179(actofDec 10,1971)(no 1 yr, 4 mo (Apr. 1, »73) Do. 

authority to create new executive departments, only 1 plan 

can be submrtted every 30 days, plan must deal with Wfi- 

caMy ooRsittent subject matter). 

> The Reorianization Act at 1949, amandad was eadifiad and raanacM as positive law by Public Law M-554. Sapt 6, 
1966. amandad by PublK Law 90-83, Sapt 11, 1967. It is aow rafarrad to as ch. 9 of titta 5, Unitad Stales Coda (aiaciitive 
raorpnizatiofl). 

(81) 



CRS-126 



Appendix 2. — Action- Taken on Reorganization Plans Under 
Authority of Reorganization Statutes, 81st-93d Congresses 

action on reorganization plans, 81st cong, 
reorganization plans of 1949 

flan Date present- Plin accepted or Effective 

No. Title ad to Congress rejected date 

1 Oepartmenl of Welfare June 20, 1949 Bejected 

2 Bureau of Employment Security do Accepted Aug. 20, 1949 

3 Post Office Department do do.. Do. 

4 National Security CouiKil and National Saoirity Rcsouien do do... Do. 

Board. 

5 Ci*il Service Commission do do Do. 

6 Maritime Commission do do Do. 

7 PuNic Roads Administration do do Do. 

8 National Mihury Estal>«iJ»»inent iuly 18.1949 "Aug. 10.1949 

REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1950 

1 Treasury Department Mar. 13,1950 Rejected 

2 Department of Justice do Accepted May 24,1950 

3 Department of the Interior do do .__ Do. 

4 Department of Agriculture do Rejected 

5 Department of Commerce do Aeoepted Do. 

6 Department of Labor do do Do. 

7 Intarsute Commerce Commiuion do Rejected 

8 Federal Trade Commission do Accepted Do. 

9 Feder»l Power Commission... do do Do. 

10 Securities and Euhenge Commission do do Do. 

11 Federal Communications Commission do Rejected 

12 National Labor Relations Board do do 

13 Civil Atronautics Board do Accepted Do. 

14 Department of Labor do do Do. 

15 Alaska and Virgin Islands puWic works do do Do. 

16 Assistance to school districts and water pollution control do do Do. 

17 Advance planning and war public works do do Do. 

18 Building and space management functions do do »Joly 1, 1950 

19 Employees' compensation functions do do May 24, 1950 

20 SUIutes It large and other matters do do Do 

21 Maritime Commijjion . do do Do. 

22 Federal National Mortgage Association May 9,1950 do »Sept. 7. 1950 

23 Loans for factory built homes do do Do. 

24 RFC transfer to Department of Commerce do Rejected 

25 National Security Resources Board do Accepted July 9,1950 

26 Treesury Department functions of Secretary May 31,1950 do July 31,1950 

27 Creation of Department of Health. Education, and Security do Rejected 

I The substance of Plan No 8 of 1949 was incorporated in Public Law 216, 8Ut Cong., (Aug. 10, 1949), which provided 
tfiat the plan shall not take effect. 
' Effective date specihed in the plan. 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. I2D CONG. 

REORGANIZATION PUN OF 1951 



Han Date proMnt- Plan accepted or 
No. Title ed to Congress rejected 


Effective 
date 


1 Reconstruction Finan^ Corporation Feb 19 1951 Accepted 


Mav 1 1951 




REORGANIZATION PUNS OF 1952 



1 Bureau of Internal Revenue Jan. 14,1952 Rejected Mar. 14, 19S2 

2 Poit Office Department Apr. 10,1952 Refected 

3 Bureau of Cuitomi in Treasury Dopartimnt do do 

4 Department of Justice U.S marinals do do 

5 District of Columbia government May 1.1952 Accepted Jyly 1,1952 

(82) 



CRS-127 



ACTION OM RCORCANIZATION PLANS. S30 CONG. 
K0I6ANIZATI0N PUNS Of 1K3 



Plin Date prauni- Plin tccaptMl w ERactivt 

No. THI* •dtoCoficrau r«)«ct»d teta 

1 Dtpirtment o« Hwrni, Edueatwn, md Wilfire Mar. 12, 1953 Aocaptad > Apr. 11.1953 

2 Dapirtmtnt of Ajncubtre »Ur. 25. 1953 do Juna 4,1953 

3 Oiifca of Deftrja MotNlization Apr. 2. 1953 do Jmm 12. 1953 

4 Dapirlment of Juitice Apr. 20.1953 do Jana 20. 1953 

5 Expon-ln.yort Bank of Wathii«ton.. Apr. 30.1953 do Jana 30. J "53 

6 Oapjrtment o' C)«f«fiie do do Do. 

7 Foreign Operitioni Adminiitretion Juno 1,1953 do.> Aug. 1.1953 

8 U.S. Information A^ncv do do Do. 

9 Council of £cor»cfltic AdViiars do do Do. 

10 Paymanb to air carriari do do.» Oct. 1,1953 

KOUGAHIZATION PUNS OF 1954 

1 Foreign CIrtnj SattJement Conrmiuion of the United Apr. 29.1954 Accaptad July 1.1954 

States. 

2 liauidition of certainiftiiri of W^eRaconrtrMCtion Finance do do Do. 

Corporation. 

< PuMic Law 13. 83d Cong. (Apr. 1, 1953) was enacted to provide that plan take affect 10 days fflar approval. 
> Repealed by Public Law 89-195 (Sept 4, 1961). 
* Repealed by PuMic Law 85-726 (Aug. 23, 1958). 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PUNS. S4TH CONG. 
REORGANIZATION PUNS OF 1956 



PUn 
No. Titte 


Data present- Ptan aocaptad or 
•itoC<Mr«n reacted 


Effective 
data 


1 tv^rtment of Defense 

2 Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.... 


.... May 16,1956 Rajactad 

.... May 17.1956 do 





ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PUNS, CTH CONG. 
REORGANIZATION PUN 1957 



Plan _ Data present- Plan accaptad or Elfactiqe 

(Cooerass 



Titte edtsi 



1 Abolition of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Apr. 29, 1957 Aeeaptad Mtm 30, 1957 



REORGANIZATION PUN OF 19S8 



1 Consolidation of Federal Civil Defense Adroinistratioa with Apr. 24, igsi Aeeaptad > July 1, 1958 

Office of Defense Mobtlization. 



■ Effective date specified in the plan. 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PUNS, 86TH CONG. 
REORGANIZATION PUN OF 1959 



Date present- Plan accaptad or 
adtoCofltrau redacted 



1 Transfer of certain functions from the Secretary of the May 12, 1959 
Interior to the Secretary of Agricufture. 

Basic provisions of the plan ware enacted by Pubiic Law 86-509 (June 11. 1960). 



CRS-128 



34 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 97TH CONG. 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF li61 



Date present- Ptan accepted or 
ad to Congress rejected 



1 Sacuritiet and Lichanie Commisston functions Apr. 27, 1961 Rejected 

2 Federal Communications Commission (unctions do do 

3 C^vil Aeronautics Board— Reorianiation May 3,1961 Accepted July 3,1961 

4 Federal Trade Comminton do do July 9,1961 

5 National Labor ReUtionj Board May 24,1961 Rejected 

6 Federal Home Loan Bank Board— Reorianiiation June 12, 1961 Accepted Auf. 12,1961 

7 Raorfanization o( marttime (unctions do do Do. 



REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1962 


1 Department of Urben Affairs and Housini Jan. 30. 1962 Rejected 


2 Certain science aiencies and (unctions Mar. 29, 1962 Accepted 


.. June 8,1962 




ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. MTH CONG. 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1963 


PUn Date present Plan accepted or 
No. Title edtoConfress rejected 


Effective 
date 


1 Reorianiution ol certain (unctions reUtini to the Franklin May 27.1963 Accepted 

D. Roosevelt Library. 


.. July 27.1963 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 89TH CONG. 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1965 



Ian Date present- Plan accepted or Effective 

No. Title edtoCongreu rejected date 

1 Bureau of Customs Mar. 25. 1965 Accepted May 25, 1965 

2 Depertment of Commerce: Weather Buroeu and May Ij, 1965 do July 13,1965 

the Coast aid Geodetic Survey. 

3 Interstate Commerce Commission locomotive in- May 27,1965 do July 27,1965 

SPOCtion. 

4 Raoriamzation of various csmmittees and otiter do do Do. 

similar bodies 

5 Certain reorfanizatjon reiatinf to ttie National Sci- do do Do. 

once Fowndetion. 

REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1966 

1 Community relations functions in civil riffrb area.. Feb. 10.1966 Accepted Apr. 22,1966 

2 Water poJIulion control funetioni Feb. 28,1966 do May 10,1966 

3 Reor|snizat>on of heeltf) functions of tt)e Depart- Apr. 25,1966 do June 25.1966 

mtnt of HEW 

4 National ZooJofical Park in tt»e District of Columbia. . June 13,1966 do Aug. 23.1966 

5 National Capital Regional Planning Council June 29, 1966 do Sept 8.1966 



CRS-129 



35 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 90TH CONG. 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1967 



Plan Date present- Plan acMptod or Effective 

Ho. Title ad to Congrats rejected date 

1 Transfer of functions relating to approval of turraadar of Fab. Z7, 1967 Accepted May 9,1967 

certain ship docun.enti. 

2 U.S. Tariff Commission Mar. 9,1967 Rejected 

3 Goyarnmmt of ttta District of Columbta June 1,1967 Accepted Aa(. II, 1967 



REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1968 



1 Creating a iMw Bureau of Narcotics and Dancerout Drugs. Fab. 7,1968 Aecaptad .Apr. 8,1968 

2 Transferring certain functions of the Department of Hous- Fab. 26, 1968 do May 7,1968 

inf and Urt>an Oavatopmant to ttia Dapartmant o' 
Transportation. 

3 Brin«in? recre?tion o'ofTtm^ under the authority of the Mar. 13,1968 do May 23,1968 

District of Columbia Commissioner. 

4 Transfer autho. I ly to J f point f?LA board mamtwrs from the do do Do. 

Presidant tp the D.C. Commissioner and givt him aathor- 
ity to prescribe rules and regulations for the RLA. 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 91ST CONG. 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1968 


PUn Dataprasmt- Plan accaptwl or 
No. Titta •dtoCoqrass r*)«ctad 


Effactiva 
dita 


1 iaterttflta ConMMfca CoMwiaaioa J«ly 22,1989 Aoc^rtMt 


..Oct II, l»6» 


R£0R6ANi2ATI0(( PUNS Of 1970 



1 Totacommunications mananmerrt and policy Fab. 9,1970 Aoctpted Apr. 15,1970 

2 Olficeof Management and Budget, Oomajtc Council Mar. 12,1970 do July 1,1970 

3 Envi I on mental Protection Agency July 9,1970 do Doc. 2,1970 

4 National OcMoic and AhBOspharic Administration do do Oct 3, 1970 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PUNS, 920 CONG. 
tEORGANIZATION PUN OF 1971 

an Dtta praaant- Plan accapttd or Effacbve 

lo. Titta adtaCoNras* 

1 ACTION _ _ Itor. 24.1971 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PUNS. 130 CONG. 
REORGANIZATION PUNS OF 1973 



Plan 
No. TWO 


Dttaprasant- Plan wxAptad or 
■dtDConrMs raiacM 


Ellactivo 
dMa 


1 Eiacutiva Oflka of the Praaidant 


ttn K 1971 AeotrOd 


. Apr 7, 1973 


2 Oruc Enforcamaat Adminiatratioa 


Mar. 2t,1973 do.' 


.. July 1, 1973 









t Amandwl by PuMic Law 93-2S3 (Mar. 16, 1974) «4iicti milHiad ttoaa pro*itlo«s of Iha ptan which tramfarrad cwtain 
inai(r*tioa iMpadon to ttta Trannry D a p a rti na n t 



O - 78 - 10 



CRS-130 



ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. JACK BROOKS 

It has been my position in the consideration of his lepslation that it 
is possible to grant a President authority to reorganize the government, 
while retaining in CJongress the legislative authority given to it by the 
Constitution. 

That was the basis on which my bill, H.R. 3131 , was drafted. It gave 
the President full authority to submit reorganization plans that could 
not be amended by Congress. It set a strict, 60-day limit for action by 
Congress and provided a means to assure that Congress would have to 
act. Where it differed from existing law and other proposals was in 
providing that before those plans could go into effect, a majority of the 
House and Senate would have to approve them. 

That is my understanding of the manner in which laws are made 
under our system of government. To allow a President's proposals to 
become law without any action by Congress, as H.R. 5045 does, is more 
in keeping with a system that permits a ruler to govern by decree. Just 
how far removed from our normal legislative process this legislation is 
can be seen by applying its approach to other presidential prop>osals. If 
it should be suggested that a President's proposals on taxes should 
become law after 60 days unless Congress rejected them, few Members 
of the House or Senate, I trust, would agree. 

Nevertheless, it became clear that H.R. 3131 did not conmiand suffi- 
cient support to prevail over the administration's proposal. While a 
constitutional issue cannot be compromised, H.R. 5045 attempts to 
reach an accommodation between the two approaches that preserves 
as much of Congress' legislative authority as possible. 

To the basic authority that allows a President's plans to go into effect 
automatically unless rejected by the House or Senate, has been 
attached the voting procedure from H.R. 3131, which means that 
every plan should come to a vote in both the House and Senate. This 
meets one of my major objections to the original proposal. Although 
Congress will now have to vote "no" when it is in favor of a plan, and 
"yes" when it wants to reject one, it still will be voting, and presiden- 
tial proposals should not become law by default. 

Tne bill also contains several Umitations on the use of reorganization 
authority by a President that were not in the proposal submitted by the 
administration. They are spelled out in the report and their net effect 
is to narrow substantially the delegation of legislative power Congress 
is turning over to the President. 

As far as I am concerned, the legislative veto procedure as used in 
this act is unconstitutional, unwise, and unnecessary. I hope that this 
flaw in what is otherwise good legislation will be corrected at an early 
date 

Jack Brooks. 
(86) 



CRS-131 



SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON. BENJAMIN S. 
ROSENTHAL 

The American people, as well as an overwhelming majority of our 
conCTCssional coUeagues, are committed to reformmg the structure 
of the Federal Government. I deeply share this resolve. 

As a member of the House Government Operations Committee for 
14 years, I have learned the extent to wmch organization affects 
policy. Unwieldy lines of authority, overlapping jurisdictions, mis- 
directed personnel — these not only lead to inefficiency and waste 
but they also inhibit new policy initiatives. 

The need for reorganization authority is indisputable. The exact 
nature of the authority, however, presents difficult political and 
constitutional problems. 

The threshold question is the extent to which the public and the 
Congress should Uke part in the reorganization process. Fuller par- 
ticipation means a wider discussion of the important policy decisions 
implicit in any reorganization plan. It also insures that, once adopted, 
a plan will have greater legitimacy and acceptance. On the other 
hand, such participation could make the process marginally more 
cumbersome and complicated. 

But this pragmatic political issue troubles me less than the weighty 
constitutional problem in delegating to the President broad legislative 
authority subject to limited Cx)ngressionaJ review. 

The constitutionality of any reorganization process requires a judg- 
ment as to the meaning of article 1. In article I, section 1, the Con- 
stitution commands that "All legislative powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States." In article I, section 7, 
the Constitution requires that every vote to which the Senate and 
House must concur be presented to the President for his approval or 
veto. 

These dictates may not be altered by any agreement between the 
Congress and the President. They stand as independent checks upon 
the conduct of all Government officers. 

I am deeply concerned that the reorganization procedure of H.R. 
5045 could run afoul of these constitutional prescriptions. First, the 
bill would reverse the normal legislative order of events. The President 
would be asked to propose while the Congress, through a one-house 
veto, would be entitled to dispose. 

Second, the bill could also be defective in its broad delegation of 
authority. It would authorize the President to merge agencies with 
cabinet departments and to eliminate certain Government functions 
altogether. Such actions have substantive legislative consequences. 
I am not wholly convinced that a one-house veto preserves for the 
Congress sufficient control and oversight to surx-ive the improper 
delegation argument. 

The seriousness of these questions cannot be overemphasized. I 
voted for H.R. 5045 as a means to expedite the process of reorganiza- 
tion and to meet the interest of the President in having the process 
tailored to his special concerns. I feel an obligation, however, to reiter- 
ate here my constitutional reservations. 

Benjamin S. Rosenthal. 
_(87) 



CRS-132 



DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. JOHN CX)NYERS, JR. 

The decisions that we must make today regarding the reorganiza- 
tion of the executive branch are elementary enough. The organization 
of the executive is a matter of law, and therefore cannot be changed 
unless subsequent laws are passed by both Houses of Congress. These 
subsequent laws must be approved by the two Houses of Congress, 
except where otherwise expressly stated in the Constitution, and 
either signed by the President or vetoed and returned for an overriding 
vote of two-thirds in both Houses. This procedure is explained in 
article I, section 1 of the Constitution, which states that ''all legislative 
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States", and article I, section 7, which states that bills are passed bv 
the Congress and sent to the President for his approval or disapproval. 

This method is presently in disuse with respect to the reorganization 
plan. The alternative proposal that has been advanced is in effect an 
arrangement in which the laws are adapted by the President and 
become operative in the absence of a veto by either House of Congress. 
Indeed, if Congress remains silent, then the President's submissions 
become law without the Congress having acted at all. This proposal 
stands traditional procedure upside down, and may quite possibly be 
unconstitutional, by giving the Executive legislative powers reserved 
for Congress. 

The bicameral legislative process ought not be shunted aside with 
regard to the reorganization of the executive branch. The advantage 
of the compromise proposal, and the proposal that eminated from the 
executive, is that of expeditiousness. let it is difficult to are^ue that 
serious delays would ensue, because of the empathies the Congress 
has for tiie Executive, which would insure a quick passage of re- 
organization legislation. 

What has been proposed today is an unnecessarv and unseemly 
abdication of legislative responsibility — a usurpation by the executive 
with the cooperation of the Congress of legislative powers not afforded 
to it by the Constitution. Thelawmaking role should be more fully 
exercised by Congress, not less so. 

John Contvbs. 

(18) 



CRS-133 



ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. ROBERT F. DRINAN 

Executive reorganization of Federal agencies is a matter of great 
public interest and of great constitutional concern. Were it not infected 
with serious questions of the highest moment, I would unhesitatingly 
and without reservation join the majority report. Because of these 
important issues, however, I add a few words so that my vote in favor 
of H.R. 5045 is not misunderstood. 

It should be noted initially that I share with President Carter a 
desire to make Federal agencies operate more eflBciently to prevent 
needless waste of taxpayers' money and to deliver essential services 
more effectively. To t^e extent those equally important goals are 
achieved by reorganization, I support this legislation wholeheartedly 
as one means to accomplish those desirable ends. 

I would add, though, a note of -caution to those who believe reor- 
ganization is the ultimate solution to "bureaucratically" run Federal 
agencies. A good, sound reorganization plan may well produce a more 
logical and coordinated administrative structure which saves funds 
and dehvers greater services. But we should not be blind to other 
factors which hinder a more eflBcient and responsive bureacracy. In 
my judgment the compulsion to concentrate decisionmaking at or near 
the top of agencies is a great deterrent to effective government. The 
inability or unwillingness of key officials to delegate authority "down 
the line" frequently produces a leaden-footed administrative process, 
inhibiting the performance of the simplest functions. Unless a reor- 
ganization plan contains express provisions commanding such delega- 
tion, we should not expect it to resolve that problem. 

Furthermore, reorganization will not at all eliminate the need for 
new or expanded services at the Federal level. Many problems of our 
Nation, such as those involving consumers, the pKJor, older Americans, 
minorities, and myriad others, will not go away simply by the stroke 
of a Presidential pen on a document called a "reorganization plan." 
That plan may result in more efficient use of resources by an agenc}% 
but if that agency does not have adequate funds and personnel to 
administer its programs, the impact of the reorganization plan may be 
very marginal. In view of these limitations, I fear that cynical sup- 
porters of this bill secretly believe that President Carter will fail to 
achieve the goals he has promised through reorganization. 

But the reservations I entertain extend beyond the efficacy of H.R. 
5045 to accomplish more efficient government. Indeed to some degree 
the desire for more "efficiency" has encouraged many to overlook the 
serious constitutional problems this legislation raises. It is not very 
fashionable these days to object to proposals which delegate legislative 
authority to executive officials and agencies. The constitutional crisis 
of the 1930's and the exigencies of modem government have largely 
disabused most observers of any lingering notions they may still 
harbor in that regard. 



CRS-13A 



40 



The question persists, however, because the Constitution pives to 
the Congress all legislative powers. The area of dispute has, to be sure, 
shifted. We no longer inquire whether any legislative authority has 
been delegated from the legislative branch to the executive branch, 
but rather how much and under what standards. It is from this con- 
cededly more limited perspective that a challenge may properly be 
made to the reorganization statute. Let no one be misled: granting 
such powers to the President is indeed a very broad delegation of 
legislative prerogative. 

Congress by law establishes each agency after careful consideration 
of its need, its resources, its personnel, and in part its organization. 
At every step along the way, the legislative branch, through hearings, 
deliberations, authorizations, and appropriations, makes important 
judgments about the structure and operation of executive agencies. 
Frequently the result is a product of spirited debate and hard judg- 
ment arising out of a complex of public opinion, personal conviction, 
input from other branches, and political compromise. Unless the 
development of reorganization plans duplicates that miHeu, the whole 
range of values, which we call the legislative process, will be signifi- 
cantly eroded. 

It is the breadth of reorganization power, together with its inherent 
undermining of the con^ssional function, that should give us all a 
great deal of pause. It is the purpose of H.R. 5045 to prevent that 
erosion as much as possible. Section 901(c) of the bill states: "It is 
the intent of Congress that the President should provide appropriate 
means for broad citizen advice and participation m restructuring and 
reorganizing the executive branch." I voted for this bill with the fuU 
expectation that the President of the United States will implement 
that directive to the fullest extent possible. Any deviation from its 
salutoiy command will be grounds for immediate revocation of the 
authority conferred on him by the law. 

To be sure the bill contains other safeguards which seek to arrest 
a diminution of the legislative role in the structure of the executive 
branch. Each House of Congress is given 45 days to allow its com- 
mittees to evaluate a proposed reorganization plan. The President 
may amend any plan withiD the first 30 days after submission to the 
Congress and the Chief Executive may withdraw a plan entirely 
within 60 days. In addition no more than three plans may be pending 
before the Congress at any one time. Furthermore the bill places 
certain substantive restraints on the exercise of reorganization au- 
thority. For example, the President is not permitted to create, abolish, 
or transfer executive departments or indep>endent regulatory agencies. 
Nor may the President abolish an "enforcement function or statutory 
program." Each of these devices places some limitation on the re- 
organization authority, and the extent of their effectiveness will 
ultimately determine the degree to which congressional power is 
diminished. 

Advocates of H.R. 5045 point to another provision which they 
contend preserves the prerogatives of the legislative branch: the one- 
House veto. Through this device, the Senate or the House of Repre- 
sentatives, acting done, may disapprove a reorganization plan and 
Erevent it from taking legal effect. It is somewhat ironic that tnis "hold 
armless clause," which the executive branch now, with some fervor. 



CRS-135 



41 

presses upon us, should be called a "veto," the word historically 
reserved to identify the most potent of presidential checks. The 
reversal of terms accurately describes the reversal of constitutional 
roles embodied in this bill : the President "legislates" first by presenting 
his plan to the Congress, which may then "veto" the proposal. These 
are mdeed strange times. 

The reversal of roles highlights the objection to the provision allowing 
the action of only one House of Congress to disapprove a presidential 
proposal. I am advised that every President and every Attorney 
General, save one, who has ever commented on such provisions 
have uniformly disputed their constitutionality. This unbroken line 
of precedent ended with Attorney General BeU, who wrote to Presi- 
dent Carter on January 31, 1977, that the one House veto clause in 
the reorganization statute is constitutional. That letter seeks to dis- 
tinguish the use of such a provision in reorganization from its use in 
other contexts. I have studied carefully Attorney General Bell's 
opinion, as well as other analyses. I cannot agree that the line is so 
clearly drawn between its proper use in H.R. 5045 and its improj)er 
use in all other circumstances. Let me share my concerns. 

The Constitution requires that everj' bill which passes both houses 
of Congress be presented to the President for approval or rejection. 
During the deli Derations at the Constitutional Convention, it was 
feared that Congress could, by simply passing a resolution or taking 
some other kind of vote, evade the constitutional command to present 
every bill to the President. To allay those fears, the drafters added a 
second "presentment" clause which requires that every "Order, 
Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House 
of Representatives may be necessary" be presented similarly (as 
with a bUl) to the President for his approval or rejection. The purpose 
of this addition was to prevent the Congress (or either house) from 
taking legislative action without giving the Chief Executive the 
opportimity to exercise the constitutionally conferred power of the 
veto. That much is clear. 

What is more opaque is the question: which orders, resolutions, or 
votes must receive the concurrence of both houses and be presented 
to the President for action? Examining that issue in 1897, tne Senate 
Judiciarj' Committee concluded that every resolution which contains 
"matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character 
and eflFect" must oe so presented. Thus if one concludes that a resolu- 
tion dealing with reorganization contains "matter which is properl}^ 
to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect," then it 
becomes constitutionally necessary that both houses act upon it and 
concurring thereon, submit it to the President for consideration. 

Attorney General Bell, in his letter to President Carter, does not 
dispute the assertion that a resolution dealing with reorganization 
embodies something of a legislative nature, nor that such resolutions 
need the concurrence of both houses. Rather he argues that "the 
question is whether the provision in the reorganization statute author- 
izing single House disapproval of an executive reorganization plan 
respects the constitutional checks on legislative power provided by 
the Framers of the Constitution in the presidential veto and the 
principle of bicameralism." Mr. Bell then refines that issue into the 
question whether the "constitutional distribution of power between 



CRS-136 



42 

the legislative and executive" is altered. "With all deference to the 
Attorney General, I submit that the alteration of that distribution 
is not the only relationship at stake in the "principle of bicameralism." 

The doctrine of bicameralism involves not merely the relationship 
between the executive and the legislative branches, it also implicates 
directly the relationship between the Federal legrislature and the 
State governments, and the relationship ultimately between the 
Congress and the people. It is grammar school civics that the House 
of Representatives is designed to give the people a direct voice in 
their government through a system of representation based on one 
vote for each person of voting age. The Senate is designed to provide 
the State with equal representation so that the larger States would 
not overwhelm the smaller ones by their superior strength in the House. 

This great compromise of 1787 is undermined by the one House 
veto because it allows one House to act without the concurrence of 
the other in a matter of a legislative nature. The Attorney General 
argues that bicameralism is preserved because each House has the 
opportunity to act upon the matter. That facile assertion would 
appear to negate the clear procedural mandate of the clause in the 
Constitution requiring affirmative votes in both Houses on matters 
involving legislative action. That assertion should also be suspect in 
light of the public outcry over the congressional pay raise whicn went 
into effect under a similar procedure. I read the public's reaction as 
expressing a strong sentiment for each member to be required to vote 
on each legislative matter. 

It is said that H.R. 5045, unlike the pay raise statute, removes this 
objection because it allows any member to call up a resolution of 
disapproval after the expiration of 45 days from the date the plan is 
submitted to the Congress. That provision, contained in sections 
909-912 of the bill will not ^[uarantee a vote in both Houses. If one 
House disapproves the resolution, that is the end of the matter. 
Second, the Dili only authorizes a Member to call up the resolution 
for a vote on its consideration, not on the merits of approval or dis- 
approval. It is similar in effect to a resolution from the Rules Com- 
mittee. Failure to secure a majority on the motion to call up the 
resolution would mean that no vote could be taken on the resolution 
itself. 

The zeal with which proponents urge us to enact swiftly this statute, 
with its thin safeguards and constitutionally doubtful provisions, 
should cause us to wonder whether it is really that important. Why 
is it not possible or practical or wise to undertake reorganization 
through the normal legislative process? Why is it necessary to take 
all these constitutional short-cuts when the reg:ular procedures are 
in place and available? And why would the administration want to 
risk that the courts might hold the act unconstitutional and thus 
upset administrative action taken pursuant to reorganization plans? 
It must be remembered that H.R. 5045 intentionally does not contain 
a severability clause. The one House veto provision is deemed to be 
an integral and necessary part of the lenslative scheme for reorgani- 
zation. That is a proposition to which all agree. Yet that unanimous 
concurrence jeopardizes the plans developjed under the statute, and 
all agency authority exercised pursuant to them. With so much at 
stake, the unabated support is rather mystifying. 1 would have thought 



CRS-137 



43 

that the safer course would be to proceed through normal legisl'tive 
channel^, perhaps under expedited procedures similar to those con- 
tained in sections 909-912 of H.R. 5045. 

As with nearly all legislation, it may be that the true test for H.R. 
6045 will come after the President has acted under it. Many members 
of the 95th Congress have never seen a reorganization plan, which, 
hopefully, will be clearly identified when submitted to us. It may be 
too that H.R. 5045 is "the best unconstitutional bill you could ciraw 
up," as Chairman Brooks noted at the meeting of the full committee. 
I would have thought we could do better. The Congress should ever 
be vigilant against anj^ incursion into the commands of the Great 
Charter, and the letter of the Constitution, as well as its spirit, should 
be observed. 

Robert F. Drinan. 



Calendar No. 28 



95th Congress ) SENATE ( REPOirr 

Ist Session f | No. 95-32 



REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1977 



Makch 1 (legislative day February 21), 1977. — Ordered to be printed 



Mr. RiBicoFF, from the Committee on Government Operations, 
submitted the following 

REPORT 

together with 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany S. 626] 

The Committee on Governmental Affairs, to which was referred the 
bill (S. 626) to extend the period within which the President may 
transmit to the Congress plans for the reorganization of agencies of the 
executive branch of the government, and for other purposes, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute and recommends that the bill as amended 
do pass. 

Purpose and Need of Legislation 

S. 626, as amended, extends for 3 years from the date of enactment 
the authority of the President under chapter 9 of title 5, United States 
Code, to submit reorganization plans to Congress proposing the reor- 
ganization of agencies in the executive branch. 

The Federal Government now consists of a multitude of divei-se 
agencies employing over 2.8 millioji civilian workers with an annual 
payroll of over $40.7 billion. There is now significant duplication and 
overlap among the hundreds of agencies, conunissions, offices and the 
like created by statutes. The government must be reorganized in a 
meaningful way if it is to remain responsive to the changing concerns 
of government, and the changing needs of the people. The conunittee 
strongly believes that enactment of S. 626 represents the first essential 
step Congress nuist take in order to assure that there is meaningful 
improvement in the ability of the governtnent to serve the needs of the 
people. 

(1) 



CRS-139 
2 

Under the reorganization authority that this bill would renew, the 
President may propose to create or eliminate agencies, and transfer 
functions between agencies. The act spex^ifically prohibits the use of 
the reorganization authority, however, to create or abolish cabinet- 
level departments of the government or transfer it in its entirety 
to another agency. For that, regular legislation will continue to be 
required. The plans take effect unless one House or the other within 
60 days adopts a resolution of disapproval. 

In recommending renewal of the Reorganization Act is is the 
intent and expectation of the committee that the President will use 
this authority to propose to the Congress important, far-reaching 
reform of the way the executive branch is organized to conduct its 
business. The public expects Congress and the President, together, 
to take action which really serves to rationalize the way the govern- 
ment is organized. Concentrating specific responsibilities for specific 
functions in specific agencies can make the agencies of the executive 
branch more accountable for their preformance to the President, Con- 
gress, and the public. Eliminating excessive diffusion of responsibili- 
ties can avoid unnecessary delays, and broaden the scope of views 
considered by agencies in reaching their decisions. Combining over- 
lapping functions can eliminate unnecessary expenditures. Improving 
coordination between different parts of the government can help avoid 
conflicting policies which bewilder the public, and prevent effective 
action. Finally, reorganization can help create conditions which 
motivate the millions of government civil servants to do the best job 
they can in serving the needs of the public. 

In the end reorganization should help the government deliver serv- 
ices to the public in a more efficient, effective manner. 

The present size and complexity of the Federal Government makes 
it imperative that in reorganizing the government Congress and the 
President be able to utilize the expedited procedures established in 
the Reorganization Act. There are too many agencies performing 
too many diverse tasks to make it practicable to reorganize each 
agency through separate legislation. 

It is difficult even to establish the total number of departments, 
agencies, offices, boards, committees, commissions, and other organiza- 
tional entities established by statute that exist today in the Federal 
Government. According to initial estimates, the U.S. Government 
Manual alone lists approximately 600 such organizational entities, 
but this list is not fully complete. It does not include, for example, 
a number of advisory committees. There are over 1,200 advisory com- 
mittees alone, including about 237 whose continued existence is 
currently mandated by statute. 

Agencies and other organizational units continue to be created 
by statute at a far faster rate than they are eliminated. According 
to an annual compilation by the General Services Administration, 
from 1949 to 1976, 345 organizational entities were created by statute, 
with 75 percent of them being created just since 1970. Only 31 orga- 
nizational entities were aibolished in the same period of time. 

Reorganization authority has proven over the years to be an effec- 
tive way to balance and reconcile the need for quick and flexible ac- 
tions by the executive branch, and the need for meaningful review of 



CRS-140 

a 

the proposals by Congress. Included among past plans designed to 
improve government organization, were those that combined related 
functions in ACTION, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad- 
ministration, and the Environmental Protection Agency. In all, since 
1949 some 93 proposed reorganization plans have been submitted to 
Congress. Congress allowed 73 of them to go into effect. Appendix 2 
summarizes all reorganization plans proposed since 1949, and the ac- 
tion Congress took on them. 

At the same time, the procedures have assured, in practice, careful 
congressional review of all important reorganization proposals. A sub- 
stantial number of the reorganization plans submitted since 1949 have 
consisted of relatively minor, noncontroversial proposals for organiza- 
tional changes. Nevertheless, according to figures assembled for the 
committee by the Library of Congress, resolutions of disapproval 
were introduced in at least one House or the other in 61 of the 93 
occasions in which reorganization plans were submitted to Con- 
gress. In 66 instances committees in at least one House held hearings 
on the plan. In 51 instances at least one House actually voted in a 
resolution of disapproval. And in 20 of these 51 instances the plan 
was rejected. As a result of an amendment approved by the committee, 
committees of both Houses will henceforth be specifically required 
to consider every plan proposed and to report these recommendations 
on each plan to the full House within 45 days. 

The committee received some conflicting testimony, summarized in 
the following section, on the constitutionality of the procedures uti- 
lized in reorganization acts since 1949 that permit proposed plans to 
go into effect unless one House or the other adopts a resolution of dis- 
approval. The committee concludes, however, that the use of this 
procedure is constitutional in this unique area, where the concerns and 
prerogatives of the executive and legislative branches overlap to such 
an extent. 

The limitations and procedures contained in the Act have over time 
proved adequate both as a constitutional and practical matter to pro- 
tect the responsibilities of both Congress and the executive branch in 
accordance with the principle of separation of powers between the two 
branches of government. Renewing the reorganization authority is not 
an open-ended mandate to the President to reorganize the government 
on his own. Congress should and must be an active participant in the 
process of formulating and implementing reorganization plans. The 
act has proved invaluable precisely because it does provide a practical 
and sound way for the President and the Congress to work together in 
a way neither could alone to improve how the government is organized 
to meet its obligation to the people it serves. 

History of Committee Consideration of S. 626 

On February 4, 1977, President Carter submitted to Congress a 
proposal for renewing the reorganization authority. The bill was 
introduced Febniary 4 by Senator Ribicoff (S. 626) and referred the 
same day to the Government-al Affairs Committee. 

The committee held hearings on the measure Febniary 8, 1977. 



CRS-141 
4 

The committee met on February 24 to consider the legislation. On 
the same day S. 626 was ordered reported favorably by a vote of 16 to 
after the committee adopted, with further amendments, an amend- 
ment in the nature of a substitute. 

At committee hearings on S. 626 Mr. Bert Lance, Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, testified in support of S. 626. Addi- 
tional testimony was received from Mr. John Harmon, Acting Assist- 
ant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and Mr. Antonin 
Scalia, former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel. 
Common Cause submitted a statement supporting renewal of the 
reorganization authority. 

Mr. Lance told the committee : 

The long historical evolution of the Federal Government's 
major agencies and the proliferation of new agencies and 
programs bom of crisis and created to respond to immediate 
needs of our people necessitates a searching look to improve 
organization and hence services, efficiency and effectiveness. 

In particular. President Carter's goals in reorganization 
are to identify and resolve such problems as : 

— Overlapping and fragmented responsibilities. 

— Duplication of effort. 

— Lack of accountability. 

— Unnecessary organization elements. 

Restoration of reorganization plan authority to the Presi- 
dent is a major tool that he needs to apply sound principles of 
organization and management to create an environment 
wherein motivation and innovation can thrive. 

We are committed to a reorganization program that will 
reflect a joint effort on the part of the Executive Branch, the 
Congress, and the American people. Obviously, the compre- 
hensive proposals of this Administration will need to be 
implemented through legislation, administrative direction, 
and very importantly, through the use of reorganization 
plans submitted to Congress by the President. 

Mr. Harmon reviewed a letter from the Attorney General to the 
President concerning the constitutionality of the act. Mr. Scalia's 
testimony also examined the constitutionality of S. 626. Following 
the conclusion of the hearings both Mr. Harmon and Mr. Scalia sub- 
mitted, at the committee's request, additional written comments for 
its consideration. 

Mr. Scalia raised the possibility that S. 626 was unconstitutional 
because it did not follow the procedures established in the Constitution 
for the affirmative approval of legislation by both Houses of Congress, 
followed by subsequent Presidential approval. 

The testimony submitted by the Justice Department concluded, 
however, that the procedures contained in S. 626 are constitutional. 
In the view of the Justice Department the procedures contained in the 
reorganization authority effectively preserve the constitutional pre- 
rogatives of the President to review congressional action since the 
President submits to Congress only those plans which he wishes to see 
implemented. The principle of bicameralism is respected since no re- 



CRS-142 
5 

organization plan can take effect if opposed by either the House or 
Senate. The scheme does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative power by Congress to the executive branch, since the 
act's delegation of reorganization power is subject to defined limits 
within which the President can exercise the authority. Furthermore, 
the act delegates to the President the authority only to submit proposals 
concerning the way the executive branch is organized. It does not 
permit the President to change through reorganization plans the sub- 
stantive powers through which the government affects the rights and 
interests of the governed. Finally, the Justice Department concluded 
that the scheme does not constitute an unconstitutional intrusion by 
Congress into executive branch matters, for the legislation does not 
inject Congress into the executive branch's day-to-day administration 
of ongoing programs. 

Appendix 1 to this report contains a copy of the opinion from the 
Attorney General to the President upholding the constitutionality 
of the reorganization authority. 

Summary of Principal Provisions of S. 626 

The reorganization authority, as amended, authorizes the President 
to submit reorganization plans to the Congress in order to (1) promote 
better execution of the laws and more effective management of the 
executive branch; (2) reduce expenditures and increase efficiency and 
economy; (3) consolidate and coordinate agencies and functions 
according to major purposes; (4) reduce the number of agencies by 
consolidating under a single head those having similar functions and 
abolishing those which are unnecessary; and (5) eliminate duplication 
and overlap. The act requires the President to examine, on a continu- 
ing basis, the organization of all agencies of the executive branch and 
to determine what changes therein are necessary to accomplish the 
purposes of the statute. 

Reorganization plans proposed by the President may create new 
agencies, transfer the whole or part of agencies or their functions to 
other agencies, and eliminate all or part of agencies which no longer 
have any function to perform. It may change the name of an agency, 
authorize an agency official to delegate any of his functions, and pro- 
vide that the head of an agency shall be an individual or a commission 
or board with a fixed term not to exceed 4 years. 

Each reorganization plan must be based upon a Presidential find- 
ing that the proposed action is necessary to accomplish one or more^ 
of the purposes of the statute, and a statement to that effect must be 
included in his message transmitting the plan to the Congress. The 
message must specify, with respect to each plan, the reduction of 
expenditures or increased expenditures (itemized so far as practicable) 
which is likely to result from the plan, as well as any improvements 
in the effectiveness or efficiency of the government anticipated as a 
result of the plan. 

The legislation specifically limits in certain ways the content of the 
plans that may be submitted. Reorganization plans, for example, 
cannot create a new executive department, abolish an executive de- 
partment or an independent regulatory agency, abolish any func- 



CRS-143 
6 

tions previously mandated by Congress through statutes — unless they 
are advisory in nature — or increase the term of an office l^eyond that 
provided by law. It may not create new functions not authorized by 
preexisting statutes, or continue a function beyond the period author- 
ized by law. Each plan submitted must deal witli only one logically 
consistent subject matter, including any related policy matters. 

Reorganization plans, submitted in accordance with the require- 
ments of the statute, become law at the end of the first period of 60 
calendar days of continuous session of the Congress after the date on 
which the plan is transmitted to it, unless, between the date of trans- 
mittal and the end of t!he 60-day period, either House, by a majority 
of those present and voting, adopts a resolution of disapproval. For 
the purpose of determining whether there has been a 60-day period of 
continuous session, continuity is considered broken by an adjourn- 
ment of the Congress sine die. However, if either House is not in 
session because of an adjournment to a day certain of more than 3 days, 
such period is excluded in the computation of the 60-day period. 

S. 626 requires ttie appropriate committees in both Houses to file 
recommendations on each plan with the full House within 45 days. 
If the committee recommends that the Congress permit the plan to 
go into effect it will so indicate. If the committee recommends that the 
plan not be allowed to go into effect it will report to the full House a 
resolution of disapproval in the form prescribed by fhe act. 

The reorganization statute makes no provision for the amendment 
of a plan by the Congress. Within the first 30 days after the plan has 
been submitted, however, the President may amend the plan so long 
as a committee of either House has not first ordered reported a resolu- 
tion of disapproval, or any other recommendations it has on the plan. 

The legislation adopts special rules to make sure that if a majority 
of the Members of either House wish to consider or adopt a resolution 
disapproving a plan, they will be able to do so within the 60 days before 
the plan otherwise would become effective. The rules are adopted as an 
exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. If the committee, in adopting its recommendations, 
fails to report a resolution of disapproval, any member may move 
to discharge the committee of such a resolution, so long as the com- 
mittee has first had at least 10 days to consider it. Debate on the floor 
of either House on a resolution of disapproval, and on appeals and 
motions made in connection therewith, is limited to no more than 
10 hours, after which a final vote on the resolution must occur. Motions 
to postpone consideration of the resolution or to amend the resolu- 
tion will not be in order. Similar rules govern the consideration by 
either House of a motion to discharge the committee of jurisdiction 
over a resolution of disapproval, or a motion to move to the considera- 
tion of a resolution of disapproval. 

A reorganization plan that is not rejected by either House of Con- 
gress may go into effect at the end of the 60-day period, or at any later 
date specified in the plan. Additional provisions provide that suits 
brought against an agency affected by a reorganization plan, or 
regulations or other actions taken by an agency under a function 
affected by the reorganization plan, shall not abate as a result of the 
plan, except in the case where the function is abolished. A reorganiza- 



CRS-144 
7 

tion plan may provide for the transfer or other disposition of the 
records, property, and personnel affected by a reorganization. The 
plan may provide for the transfer of unexpended balances appro- 
priated for use in connection with a function or agency affected by 
the reorganization, so long as the transfer is only to enable the con- 
tinued use of the funds for the purpose for which the appropriation 
was originally made. Any portion of appropriations unexpended as a 
result of a plan adopted under the Act mu^ revert to the U.S. 
Treasury. 

Principal Changes From Prior Reorganization Act 

S. 626, as reported by the committee, follows the prior wording of 
the Reorganization Act enacted in 1971 with certain amendments. 
The major changes made in the previous act are summarized below. 

EXPIRATION DATE 

The committee extended the authority for 3 years from the date of 
enactment (section 905(b)). Since the administration may need some 
months initially just to study the best ways to reorganize the govern- 
ment, it was the feeling of the committee that a period of 3 years was 
needed as a minimum to implement the first phase of any compre- 
hensive plan for the reorganization of the government. While longer 
than the 2-year extension provided in a number of cases in the past, 
it is comparable to the approximately 3 year 9 month duration of the 
authority contained in the act when originally enacted in 1949, and 
the appro^mately 3 year 6 month extension provided in 1965. Extend- 
ing the authority for 3 years will assure that the next Congress will 
have the opportunity to review the effectiveness of the act, and consider 
any subsequent request for a further renewal of the authority. 

REQUIREMENTS AS TO THE NUMBER AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE 

PLANS SUBMITTED 

The bill deletes any provision specifically limiting the number of 
reorganization plans that may be submitted within a 30-day period. 
Such a limitation was added to the act for the first time in 1971. 

Tlie committee did so because it did not wish to restrict unduly the 
President's flexibility in submitting reorganization plans to Congress. 
It was felt that a flat prohibition requiring that no more than one 
plan be submitted in any 30 days could unnecessarily delay the reorga- 
nization effort. 

However, the committee agreed to delete this provision only because 
the assurances it has received from the administration have led the 
committee to believe that tlie administration will consult with the 
appropriate members of Congress in advance of the submission of 
each plan. If congressional review of reorganization plans are to be 
meaningful and orderly, and the necessary hearings conducted, this 
consultation must occur so that Congress is not forced to review too 
many plans in too short a period of time. Should reorganization plans 
nevertheless Ix* submitted with such frequency that Congress does not 
have adequate time to review each one, Congress can always adopt a 



CRS-145 
S 

resolution of disapprov^al and require the submission of the plan at a 
later date when there is adequate time to review its provisions. 

The committee also decided to retain the provision in the 1D71 Act 
requiring that each plan submitted deal with no more tlian one log- 
ically consistent subject matter. Section (905(a) (6)). A plan dealing 
with a variety of matters, unrelated to each other, may not be sub- 
mitted. The Congress should have an opportunity to consider and 
vote separately on each logically separate step in the overall reorga- 
nization of the government. In order to avoid any suggestion, however, 
that a plan must only deal with a single organizational entity, or a 
single function, such as energy, the committee amended the provision. 
The new wording makes it clear that a proposed plan meets the re- 
quirements of this provision even if all the portions of the plan do not 
involve the same agencies or programs, so long as the other portions 
of the plan are directly related to the rest of the plan by the common 
policies with which they deal. For example, the plan may implement 
a common policy toward the use of advisory committees, and meet 
the requirements of this provision, even though the plan involves a 
number of different advisory committees concerned with providing 
advice on a number of different government functions. 

AMENDMENTS TO REORGANIZATION PLANS 

Section 903(d) permits the President to submit amendments to his 
plans up to 30 days after the plan is originally submitted. 

In the past, once a plan has been submitted there has been no mech- 
anism to amend it if subsequent consideration discloses ways that the 
plan might be further perfected. Congress either had to vote the plan 
down, or agree to let it go into effect in unperfected form. 

Under the amendment adopted by the committee the President may 
amend his plan at any time during the first 30 days after it is submitted 
to Congress, so long as the Senate Governmental .Vffairs Committee, or 
the House Government Operations Committee, has not first acted upon 
the plan by ordering reported either a resolution of disapproval, or any 
other recommendations pursuant to section 903 (c) . 

In considering possible amendments, the committee expects that the 
President will consult with them before submitting any amendments. 
As committee hearings or other committee considerations suggest ways 
to perfect a particular plan. Members of Congress will J)e able to pro- 
pose changes to the administration and to work with the administra- 
tion in making any necessary adjustments in the plan. 

As in the past, direct congressional amendments of the plan will not 
be authoriz^. 

The amendment also specifies that the President may withdraw a 
reorganization plan any time prior to the end of the 60-day period 
Congress has to review the plan. 

LIMITATIONS ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PL.\NS 

Provisions describing the permissible subject matter of the plans 
have been amended to make it clear that a plan may abolish advisory 
functions, but that a plan may not abolish substantive programs man- 
dated by statutes. 



23-836 O - 78 - 11 



CRS-146 



The term ''advisory functions" include advisory committees and 
other functions which do not involve agency actions which have the 
force or effect of law, or which do not directly administer programs 
servin<r the public. The term "advisory functions'' is intended to he 
used broadly. Its meaning should not be limited to the definition of that 
term in the Federal Advisory Committee Act, or similar statutes. 

"Without this amendment, the act would have the effect of authoriz- 
ing plans which abolish any service the government provides the public 
pursuant to statute, from grants, loans, and other assistance programs 
to investigations and enforcement programs protecting the constitu- 
tional rights of individual citizens, or their health and safety. Author- 
izing the use of reorganization plans to abolish these programs man- 
dated by statute would be inconsistent with the intent of the act to give 
the President the ability to reorganize the means by which the execu- 
tive branch administers the law, not the substantive content of the pro- 
grams it administers. The constitutional justification of the procedures 
utilized in the act are based in part on this assumption that the plans 
submitted by the President would only involve the internal organiza- 
tion of the executive branch. 

At the same time, the section provides the President with authority 
to abolish advisory committees. The committee fully intends that the 
President utilize the reorganization authority, when he so wishes, to 
reduce the number of advisory committees. Similarly, the amendment 
does not restrict the ability of the President to use reorganization 
plans to transfer functions of any kind from one agency or office to 
another, in order to consolidate functions and thereby reduce overlap 
and duplication and eliminate unnecessary expenditures. A plan may 
abolish an agency or office after all its functions have been transferi*ed 
elsewhere. 

Section 903(a) (2) is amended to provide that, just as a plan may 
not abolish a department, a plan may not eliminate an independent 
regulatory agency, either by abolishing it, merguig two independent 
regulatory agencies together, or by merging an independent regulatory 
agency with another department or agency. The term "independent 
regulatory agency" applies to independent agencies of the govemmeiit, 
such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Com- 
mission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Any person 
appointed to head such an agency exercises for a fixed term quasi- 
judicial responsibility for implementing health or safety standards, 
economic regulations, or the like. 

Congress has deliberately made thcvSe regulatory agencies independ- 
ent of the direct control of the President because of the sensitive 
natui-e of their functions. If the existence of such organizations is to 
be abolished, it should be by regular legislation rather than through 
a reorganization plan proposed by the President. 

The amendment would not prohibit the President from submitting 
plans T-corganizing the internal s'tructiire of an indef^endent i-egulatory 
agency, such as by changing the administrative functions of the indi- 
viduals heading the agency. Similarly, a plan could transfer a func- 
tion to or fi-om an independent i-egulatory agency as long as it did 
not amount, in effect, to alx)lishing the agency. 



CRS-147 
10 

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 

The committee added a new subsection 903 (c) requiring the Govern- 
mental Affairs Committee in the Senate and the Government Opera- 
tions Committee in the House to file within 45 days of the submission 
of each plan their recommendations on the plan. In those cases where 
the conmiittee concludes that the plan should not go into effect, the 
committee will report a resolution of disapproval. In those instances 
where the committee concludes that the plan should go into effect, the 
committee will so report its conclusion to the full House. The amend- 
ment provides assurance that the appropriate committees in both 
Houses will consider each plan, and that the full Senate and House will 
be informed in esuch. case of the thinking of the committee within 45 
days. If Members of either House then disagree with the conclusions 
of this committee, there will still be adequate time for the entire House 
to review the matter. 

Since this amendment requires the committees of both Houses to 
act on each plan within 45 days, the committee adopted a conforming 
amendment to the provisions in section 911(a) governing the time 
when either House may discharge a committee of jurisdiction over a 
resolution of disapproval. A motion to discharge a committee of such 
a resolution may be made under the new wording any time after the 
committee has filed its recommendations, so long as the committee has 
had at least 10 days to consider the resolution. On the one hand, this 
means that the full House will have the committee's recommendation 
before it acts to discharge the committee of a resolution of disapproval. 
On the other hand, it means that even if a resolution of disapproval 
is not filed \mtil after the committee acts favorably on a plan, the full 
House or Senate will have adequate time in which it can discharge 
the committee of the resolution, and consider it, before the plan would 
otherwise go into effect. A further conforming amendment in sec- 
tion 910 makes it clear that it is the Governmental Affairs Committee 
in the Senate, and the Government Operations Committee in the House, 
that must review any resolution of disapproval as part of its respon- 
sibility under section 903(c) to submit its recommendations on each 
plant to the House or Senate. 

As a technical matter, since several sections establish timetables for 
committee or full House action based on the period of time in which 
Congress is in continuous session, the definition of that term in section 
906(b) is now made applicable to the entire act. 

PUBLIC PARTICIPATIOX IX REORGAXIZIXG THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 

A new subsection (c) was added to the description of the purposes of 
the act in section 901. The subsection expresses the intent of Congress 
that the President, to the extent practicable, should provide appro- 
priate means for public involvement in reorganizing and restricting 
the government, so as to assure as much openness in the decision- 
making process as possible. The reorganization policies adopted by 
the government will have an important impact on the effectiveness 
with which the government meets the needs of Americans. The pub- 
lic should therefore be involved as much as possible in the reorgani- 
zation process. The President may want to consider creating task 



CRS-148 
11 

forces, advisory committees, or commissions which include represen- 
tatives of the public, or he may choose to hold public hearings, Or 
adopt other measures to assure public input. It is the intent of the 
committee, of course, that congressional review of each proposed plan 
will also provide an opportunity for public participation in the re- 
organization effort including the opportunity for members of the 
public to place comments on particular plans in the record. 

At the same time the provision does not require the President to 
take any specific step in carrying out the goals of this subsection. The 
President should have the discretion and flexibility to achieve public 
participation in the process in the way he deems most practicable and 
useful, and in a way that avoids unnecessary delays. 

DESCRIPTION OF THE BENEFITS ANTICIPATED FROM THE PLAN 

The bill retains the requirement in the previous Act that the Presi- 
dent estimate the savings in expenditures expected from reorganiza- 
tion, but the provision is reworded to require either estimates of the 
savings or, in appropriate circumstances, estimates of the increased 
expenditures anticipated from the plan (section 903(b) ). If the Presi- 
dent does not anticipate that the reorganization plan will result in 
either increased savings or increased expenditures he may so state. 
Or if lie concludes it is feasible to give such an estimate only within 
a broad range he may do so. But in each instance the plan, as in the 
past, should provide the best indication possible of the effect the plan 
may have on expenditures, even if the estimate represents only a goal 
the executive branch has set for itself. 

The amendment also requires the President, when submitting a 
plan, to describe any improvements in "management, delivery of Fed- 
eral services, execution of the laws, and increases in efficiency of gov- 
ernment operations" expected to result from the plan. The purpose of 
reorganization should always include enhancing the effectiveness of 
program management and the quality of services delivered to the 
public. The soundness of individual plans should be demonstrated by 
reference to these criteria, as well as by any expected effect they will 
have on government expenditures. 

APPLICABILITY TO^THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT 

The committee deleted all references in sections 902, 904, and 905 
to the applicability of the reorganization authority to the District of 
Columbia Government. 

Since the last enactment of the Reorganization xVct in 1971, the Con- 
gress passed in" 1973 the Home Rule Act (P.L. 93-198). This act 
provides in section 404(b) that the Citv Council shall have the author- 
ity to reorganize the government of the District of Columbia. 

It appears from this that it was the intention of Congress to give 
the aiithoritv to orcfanize and reorganize the city government to the 
District of Columbia. Any reference to the District of Columbia Gov- 
ernment in the Reorganization Act would be inconsistent with the 
principles embodied in the D.C. Home Rule Act. 



CRS-149 
12 

RULES GOVERNING FLOOR CONSIDERATION OF RESOLUTIONS 

The wording in sections 911 and 912 governing consideration on 
the floor of either House of a resohition of disapproval is clarified to 
assure as much as possible that if a resolution of disapproval is re- 
ported by committee, or if a motion is made to discharge the committee 
of jurisdiction over a resolution of disapproval, full floor considera- 
tion, and a vote on the matter, will occur before the plan otherwise 
would go into effect. 

The amendment provides that after the time allotted for debate on 
the matter and on all debatable appeals and motions made in con- 
nection therewith (1 hour for a discharge motion and 10 hours for 
the resolution of disapproval itself) a final vote shall oc^ur. The 
section provides that there shall be decided without debate appeals 
from the decision of the chair in connection with the procedures appli- 
cable to consideration of the resolution, including any related discharge 
motion or motion to make the resolution the pending order of business. 
Motions to postjx)ne, to prceed to the consideratin of other business, 
as well as any amendments, would not be in order. Once a resolution 
of disapproval becomes the pending order of business, it shall remain 
the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of. A 
motion to recommit the resolution would not be in order. 

As part of the rewording of these provisions, the procedural rides 
formerly contained in a separate section 913 have been incorporated 
into sections 912 and 911. 

Evaluation of Regulatory Impact 

Paragraph 5(a) of Rule XXIX requires each report accompanying 
a bill to evaluate "the regulatory impact which would be incurred 
in carrying out the bill." 

S. 626 will not have any direct regulatory impact. It does not author- 
ize any additional regulation of activities in the private sector, impose 
any new record keeping or reporting requirements on any segment of 
the public, or abolish any existing regulations. The bill, in fact, pro- 
hibits the President from utilizing the reorganization authority to 
abolish a substantive regulator^' program, or to create any new regula- 
tory program. It also specfically prohibits the use of the reorganiza- 
tion authority to abolish an independent regulatory agency. 

The bill may indirectly have some regulatory impact if the authority 
is utilized to reorganize regulatory agencies, and such reorganization 
in turn affects the efficiency or effectiveness of the regulator}^ programs 
themselves. It is impossible, however, to predict the extent of the 
possible, indirect impact of such plans because there is no way of 
predicting at this time what the nature of the plans will be. 

Estimated Cost of the Legislation 

Pursuant to section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed the cost implications of 
S. 626. While the Director of the Congressional Budget Office was 



CRS-150 
13 

unable to predict what, if any, might be the indirect ejffect on costs or 
savings of the procedures established by the act, she concluded : 

* * * it appears no additional cost to the government would 
be incurred as a direct result of enactment of this bill. 

It is possible, of course, that partly as a result of the enactment of 
this act the Office of Management and Budget may reauire additional 
personnel to study and prepare ways to reorganize tne government, 
including the submission of reorganization plans to Congress under 
the authority of this act. 

Recorded Vote in Committee 

In compliance with section 133 of the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1946, as amended, the rollcall vote taken during committee con- 
sideration of this legislation was as follows : 

Final passage : Ordered Reported 10 yeas ; nays. 

yeas (10) XAYS (0) 

Jackson 

Metcalf 

Chiles 

Nunn 

Sasser 

Percy 

Roth 

Danforth 

Heinz 

Ribicoff 

YEAS BY PROXY ( 6 ) 

Muskie 

Eagleton 

Glenn 

Javits 

Stevens 

Mathias 



CRS-151 



ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. ROTH 

The need for executive reorganization in our government has gained 
widespread acceptance and support among the citizens of this country. 
There is no task more pressing than to improve the quality of the Fed- 
eral Government's service to the American public. 

The activities of the Federal Government which are fragmented and 
scattered should be consolidated where possible and duplication and 
waste should be eliminated. 

Therefore, I am very pleased that the President has made reorga- 
nization of the Federal Government a very high priority task. I believe 
Congress and the public should take an active part in the formulation 
of reorganization plans and help create the sense of national partner- 
ship and cooperation for reorganization that is necessary in order to 
accomplish meaningful reform. 

My concern is that the Congress and the President must make a firm 
commitment to reorganization so that it can be a meaningful process 
for restructuring the Federal Government and making better use of 
our Nation's resources. Effective reorganization is not simply a shifting 
of boxes on an organization chart or the shuffling of bureaucrats from 
one building to another. Real reform must involve sensitive decisions 
on how our budget dollars can return the most for each dollar invested. 
Changes in structure alone will not yield any automatic improvements 
in the utilization of resources to achieve national goals. 

No one should underestimate the difficulties of achieving a meaning- 
ful restructuring. I know from long experience with government reor- 
ganization efforts that special constituencies and vested interests grow 
up around each Federal program, and are highly resistant to change. 
For this reason, the President will have to generate a high level of pub- 
lic support for reorganization plans in order to break through the 
resistance of the specialized interests. 

When the reorganization authorization bill was presented to the 
committee, I was concerned because it contained no provision for public 
participation in the formulation of the reorganization plans. In my 
view, the public can provide meaningful advice and will prove to be 
an indispensible source of support when the going gets tough. The 
committee has added language urging the President to establish proce- 
dures to ensure citizen advice and participation. 

The average citizen often feels that no one in government is respon- 
sible for getting things done. We need to devote a concerted effort in 
government to earn the confidence of our citizens that government is 
capabble of confronting critical national problems, making decisions 
and operating efficiently. 

Management functions in the Federal Government must be greatly 
improved. Programs should be consolidated by function and effective- 
ness increased by making one organization fully responsible for the 

(15) 



CRS-152 
16 

activities of one function. The Congress should work closely with the 
President to reduce the fragmentation of department authoiity and 
improve the management of similar functions by one administrative 
unit. 

For example development of the Outer Continental Shelf is pres- 
ently regulated and administered by four different Federal depart- 
ments and at least 15 separate sub-cabinet and independent agencies. 
In the health field there are 302 programs administered by 11 agencies. 
There are some 259 programs earmarked for community development. 

I believe that perhaps the best and most effective means of providing 
full citizen participation and support would be through the creation 
of a commission similar to the Hoover Commissions of the early 1950's. 
These Commissions made valuable recomm.endations that resulted in 
considerable cost savings. 

A Commission could examine and investigate the operation of gov- 
ernment and recommend changes needed to improve management ef- 
ficiency and program effectiveness. I believe a broad government 
reorganization must also include a review of the interrelationships 
among all levels of government — Federal, State and local. Reorganiza- 
tion plans must be more than a simple reshuffling and restructuring of 
agencies and programs and should include an assessment of how 
government resources of our national and local levels can be better 
marshalled and coordinated. 

William V. Roth, Jr. 



CRS-153 



Changes in Existing Law 

In compliance with subsection 4 of rule XXIX of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as 
reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted 
is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and exist- 
ing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman) : 

Chapter 9 of title 5, IJnited States Code, is amended to read as 
follows : 

"CHAPTER 9— EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION 

"§90r. Purpose 

"(a) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United 
States — 

"(1) to promote the better execution of the laws, the more 
effective management of the executive branch and of its agencies 
and functions, and the expeditious administration of the public 
business ; 

"(2) to reduce expenditures and promote economy to the 
fullest extent consistent with the efficient operation of the 
Government ; 

"(3) to increase the efficiency of the operations of the Govern- 
ment to the fullest extent practicable ; 

"(4) to group, coordinate, and consolidate agencies and func- 
tions of the Government, as nearly as may be, according to major 
purposes ; 

"(5) to reduce the number of agencies by consolidating those 
having similar functions under a single head, and to abolish such 
agencies or advisory functions thereof as may not be necessary 
for the efficient conduct of the Government ; and 
"(6) to eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort. 
" (b) Congress declares that the public interest demands the carry- 
ing out of the purposes of su'bsection (a) of this section and that the 
purposes may be accomplished in great measure by proceeding under 
this chapter, and can be accomplished more speedily thereby than by 
the enactment of specific legislation. 

"(c) It is the intent of Congress that the President should provide 
appropriate means for hroad citizen advice and participation in re- 
stnicturina and reorganizing the executive hranck. 

"(d) The President shall from time to time examine the organi- 
zation of all agencies and shall determine what changes in such orga- 
nization are necessary to carry out any policy set forth in subsection 
(a) of this section. 

(17) 



CRS-154 
18 

"§902. Definitions 

For the purpose of this chapter — 
" ( 1 ) 'agency' means — 

" (A) an Executive agency or part thereof ; and 
"(B) an office or officer in the executive branch; [and] 
["(C) any and all parts of the government of the District of 
Columbia other than the courts thereof;] but does not include the 
General Accounting Office or the Comptroller General of the 
United States; 

"(2) 'reorganization* means a transfer, consolidation, coordi- 
nation, authorization, or abolition, referred to in section 903 of 
this title; and 

"(3) 'officer' is not limited by section 2104 of this title. 

"§903. Reorganization plans 

" (a) Whenever the President, after investigation, finds that changes 
m the organization of agencies are necessary to carry out any policy 
set forth in section 901 (a) of this title, he shall prepare a reorganiza- 
tion plan specifying the reorganizations he finds are necessary. Any 
plan may provide for — 

"(1) the transfer of the whole or a part of an agency, or of the 
whole or a part of the functions thereof, to the jurisdiction and 
control of another agency ; 

"(2) the abolition of all or a part of the advisory functions of 
an agency ; 

"(3) the consolidation or coordination of the whole or a part of 
an agency, or of the whole or a pait of the functions thereof, with 
the whole or a part of another agency or the functions thereof; 

"(4) the consolidation or coordination of a part of an agency 
or the functions thereof with another part of the same agency or 
the functions thereof ; 

"(5) the authorization of an officer to delegate any of his func- 
tions; or 

"(6) the abolition of the Avhole or a part of an agency which 
agency or part does not have, or on the taking effect of the re- 
organization plan will not have, any functions. The President 
shall transmit the plan (bearing an identification number) to the 
Congress together with a declai-ation that, with respect to each 
reorganization included in the plan, he has found that the re- 
organization is necessary to carry out any policy set forth in sec- 
tion 901 (a) of this title. 
"(b) The President shall have a reorganization plan delivered to 
botli Houses on t\\^ same day and to each House while it is in session, 
[and furtliermore shall not transmit more than one such plan to Con- 
gress within any pei'iod of thirty consecutive days] In his message 
transmitting a i-eorganization plan, the President shall specify with 
i-espect to each abolition of an advifiory function included in the plan 
the statutory authority for the exercise of the function. The message 
Khali also cfifimafe any reduction ormcrease m expenditures (itemized 
so far as practicable) , aiid descrlhe any imjwmjements in mmmge/ment^ 
delivei'y of Federal seririces, execution of the hws, and increases in 



CRS-155 
19 

efftcieTury of Govemriient operatioris^ which it is expected will be 
realized as a result of the reo7yani2atums included in the plan. 

"(c) Fa^h reorganization plrni which is transmitted to the Congress 
shall he referred to the Comm^lttee on frovemmental Affairs of the 
Senate and the Committee on Govenunent Operations of tJie House 
for a period of J4B calendar days of continu^ous session of Congress. 
Prior to the elapse^ of tlie J^5-day period the. committees shall report 
their recormnendations on the proposed reorganization plan to their 
respective Houses. 

"(<^) Any time during the period of thirty calendar days of con- 
tinuous session of Congress after the date on lohich the, pl-an is trans- 
mitted to it^ but before any resolution described in section 909 has 
been ordered reported in either House., or the appropriate committee 
of either House has otherwise ordered reported its recommendations 
pursuant to subsection {c) of this section.^ the President rn-ay make 
amendments or modifications to the plan^ consistent with sections 
90S-905 of this title., which modifications or revisions shall thereafter 
be treated as a part of the reorganization' plan originally transmitted 
and shall not affect in any way the time limits otherivise jxrovided for 
in this chapter. The President may withdra/io the plan any time prior 
to the conclusion of sixty calendar days of continuous session of Con- 
gress following the date on which the plan is submitted to Congress. 

"§ 904. Additional contents of reorganization plan 

A reorganization plan transmitted by the President under section 
903 of this title— 

" (1) may change, in such cases as the President considers neees- 
- sary, the name of an agency affected by a reorganization and the 
title of its head, and shall designate the name of an agency result- 
ing from reorganization and the title of its head ; 

"(2) may provide for the appointment and pay of the head 
and one or more officers of an agency (including an agency 
resulting from a consolidation or other type of reorganization) 
if the President finds, and in his message transmitting the plan 
declares, that by reason of a reorganization made by the plan the 
provisions are necessary; 

"(3) shall provide for the transfer or other disposition of the 
records, property, and personnel affected by a reorganization; 

"(4) shall provide for the transfer of such unexpended bal- 
ances of appropriations, and of other funds, available for use in 
connection with a function or agency affected by a reorganiza- 
tion, as the President considers necessary by reason of the re- 
organization for use in connection with the functions affected by 
the reorganization, or for the use of the agency which shall have 
the functions after the reorganization plan is effective ; and 

"(5) shall provide for terminating the affairs of an agency 
abolished. 
A reorganization plan transmitted by the President containing provi- 
sions authorized by paragraph (2) of this section may provide that 
the head of an agency be an individual or a commission or board with 
more than one member. In the case of an appointment of the head of 
such an agency, the term of office may not be fixed at more than four 



CRS-156 
20 

years, the pay may not be at a rate in excess of that found by the 
President to be applicable to comparable officers in the executive 
branch, and if the appointment is not to a position in the competitive 
service, it shall be by the President, by and with the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate. [exce})t that, in the case of an officer of the govern- 
ment of the District of Columbia, it may be by the Commissioner or 
other body or officer of that government designated in the plan.] Any 
reorganization plan transmitted by the President containing provi- 
sions required by paragraph (4) of this section, shall provide for the 
transfer of unexpended balances only if such balances are used for the 
purposes for which the appropriation was originally made. 

"§ 905. Limitations on powers 

*'(a) A reorganization plan may not provide for, and a reorganiza- 
tion under this chapter may not have the effect of — 

"(1) creating a new Executive department, abolishing or trans- 
ferring an Executive department or an independent regulatory 
agency^ or all the functions thereof, or consolidating two or more 
Executive de})ai-tments or two or more independent regulatory 
agencies^ or all the functions thereof ; 

"(2) continuing an agency beyond the period authorized by 
law for its existence or beyond the time when it would have ter- 
minated if the reorganization had not been made ; 

" (3) continuing a function beyond the period authorized by law 
for its exercise or beyond the time when it would have terminated 
if the reorganization had not been made ; 

"(4) authorizing an agency to exercise a function which is not 
expressly authorized by law at the time the plan is transmitted to 
Congress ; 

"(5) increasing the term of an office beyond that provided by 
law for the office ; or 

[(6) transferring to or consolidating with another agency the 
government of the District of Columbia or all the functions 
thereof which are subject to this chapter, or abolishing that gov- 
ernment or all those functions ; or] 

"(6) dealing with more than one logically consistent subject 
matter, oi^ any policy matters coordinated therewith. 
"(b) A provision contained in a reorganization plan may take effect 
only if the plan is tiansmitted to Congress [before April 1, 1973] 
iniihin. three years of the date of enactment of the Reo^rgamzat'wn 
Act of 1977. 
"§906. Effective date and publication of reorganizational plans 

"(a) Except as otherwise provided under subsection (c) of this 
section, a reorganization plan is effective at the end of the first period 
of sixty calendar days of continuous session of Congress after the date 
on which the i)lan is transmitted to it unless, between the date of 
ttansniittal and the end of the sixty-day period, either House passes 
a resoliition stating in substance that the House does not favor the 
reorganization plan. 

"(b) Eor the pui'pose of this chapter 

"(1) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of 
(^ongress sine die ; and 



CRS-157 
21 

y, 

"(2) the days on which either House is not in session because of 
an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain are exchided 
in the computation of any period of time in which Congress is in 
continuous session. 
"(c) Under provisions contained in a reorganization plan, a pro- 
vision of the plan may be effective at a time later than the date on 
which the plan otherwise is effective. 

"(d) A reorganization plan which is effective shall Ixi printed (1) 
in the Statutes at Large in the same volume as the public laws and 
(2) in the Federal Register. 

"§ 907. Effect on other laws, pending legal proceedings, and un- 
expended appropriations 

"(a) A statute enacted, and a regulation or other action made, pre- 
scribed, issued, granted, or performed in respect of or by an agency 
or function affected by a reorganization under this chapter, before 
the effective date of the reorganization, has, except to the extent 
rescinded, modified, superseded, or made inapplicable by or under 
authority of law or by the abolition of a function, the same effect as if 
the reorganization had not been made. However, if the statute, regula- 
tion, or other action has vested the functions in the agency from which 
it is removed under the reorganization plan, the function, insofar as 
it is to be exercised after the plan becomes effective, shall be deemed 
as vested in the agency under which the function is placed by the plan. 

"(b) For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section, 'regulation 
or other action' means a regulation, rule, order, policy, determination, 
directive, authorization, permit, privilege, requirement, designation, 
or other action. 

"(c) A suit, action, or other preceding lawfully commenced by or 
against the head of an agency or other officer of the United States, 
in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official 
duties, does not abate by reason of the taking effect of a reorganization 
plan under this chapter. On motion or supplemental petition filed at 
any time within 12 months after the reorganization plan takes effect, 
showing a necessity for a survival of the suit, action, or other proceed- 
ing to obtain a settlement of the questions involved, the court may 
allow the suit, action, or other proceeding to be maintained by or 
against the successor of the head or officer under the reorganization 
effected by the plan or, if there is no successor, against such agency 
or officer as the President designates. 

"(d) The appropriations or portions of appropriations unexpended 
by reason of the operation of this chapter may not be used for any 
purpose, but shall revert to the Treasury. 

"§908. Rules of Senate and House of Representatives on reor- 
ganization plans 

"Sections 909-91^ of this title are enacted by Congress — 

"(1) as an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they are 
deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but appli- 
cable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that 
House in the case of resolutions described by section 909 of this 



CRS-158 
22 

title ; and they supersede other rules only to the extent that they 
are inconsistent therewith ; and 

"(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either 
House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of 
that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same 
extent as in the case of any other rule of that House. 

"§ 909. Terms of resolution 

"For the purpose of sections 908-91^ of this title, ^resolution' means 
only a resolution of either House of Congress, the matter after the 

resolving clause of which is as follows : 'That the 

does not favor the reorganization plan numbered transmitted to 

the Congress by the President on , 19 — .', and 

includes such m-odifications and revisions as are submitted hy the 
President wrvder section 903(d) of this chapter. The hlank spaces 
therein are to he filed appropriately. The term does not include a 
resolution tvhich specifies more than one reorganization plm%. [the first 
blank space therein being filled with the name of the resolving House 
and the other blank spaces therein being appropriately filled, but does 
not include a resolution which specifies more than one reorganization 
plan.] 

"§910. Reference of resolution to committee 

A resolution with respect to a reorganization plan shall be referred 
to the C avymittee on Govemmental Affairs of the Senate or the Com- 
mittee on Government Operations of the Hmise [a committee, (and 
all resolutions with respect to the same plan shall be referred to the 
same committee)] by the President of the Senate or the Speaker o^ 
the House of Representatives, as the case may be. 

"§ 911. Discharge of committee considering resolution 

"(a) If the committee to which a resolution with respect to a reor- 
ganization plan has been referred has not reported it at the end of 
10 calendar days of contimwus session of Congress after its intro- 
duction, or a^ of the date on which the committer reports its recom- 
mendations on the reorganization plan to the House or the Senate, as 
the case may he, whichever occurs later, it is in order to move either 
to discharge the committee from further consideration of the resolu- 
tion or to discharge the committee from further consideration of any 
other resolution with respect to the reorganization plan which has 
been referred to the committee. 

"(b) A motion to discharge may be made only by an individual 
favoring the resolution, is highly privileged (except that it may not 
be made after the committee has reported a resolution with respect to 
the same reorganization plan), and debate thereon, and on. all dehat- 
ahle mMions and appeals in ronnection therewith, shall be limited to 
not more than / hour, to be divided equally between [those] individ- 
uals favoring and [those] individuals opposing the resolution. The 
motion shall nM he s^ihject to amendment^ or a motion to postpone, 
or a motion to proceed to consideration of other husiness. A motion to 



CRS-159 
23 

reconsider the vote hy which the motion in agreed to or disagreed to 
shall not he in order. [An amendment to the motion is not in order, 
and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the 
motion is agreed to or disagreed to.] 

"(c) iTrvmediately following the conclusion of the debate on the 
motion to discharge, and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the 
debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the apirropriate 
House, the vote on the motion shall occur. If the motion to discharge 
is agreed to or disagreed to, the motion may not be renewed, nor may 
another motion to discharge the committee be made with respect to 
any other resolution with respect to the same reorganization plan. 

"§ 912. Procedure after report or discharge of committee ; debate ; 
vote on final disapproval 

" (a) When the committee has reported, or has been discharged from 
further consideration of, a resolution with respect to a reorganization 
plan, it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous 
motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) far any Member of 
the res]}ective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the 
resolution. The motion is highly privileged and is not debatable. Tlie 
motion shall not be subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, 
or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion 
to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed 
to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of 
the resolution is agreed to. the resolution shall remain the unfinished 
business of the respective House until disposed of. [An amendment 
to the motion is not in order, and it is not in order to move to recon- 
sider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.] 

"(b) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable rwotions and 
appeals in connection thereuyith. shall be limited to not more than 10 
hours, which shall be divided equally between [those] individuals 
favoring and [those] individuals opposing the resolution. A motion 
further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment 
to^ or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration 
of other business, or amotion to recommit the resolution is not in order. 
A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or 
disagreed to shall not be in order. [An amendment to, or motion to 
recommit, the resolution is not in order, and it is not in order to move 
to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or dis- 
agreed to.] 

"(c) Iminediately following the conclusion of the dehate on the 
resolution with respect to a reorganization plan, and a single quorura 
call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance uyith the 
rules of the appropriate House^ the vote on final approval of the 
resolution shall occur. 

"(d) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the appli- 
cation of the rules of the Senate or the House of Rejyresentatives, as 
the case may be^ to the procedure relating to a resolution with respect 
to a reorganization plan shall be decided vnthout debate.'''' 



CRS-160 
24 

[''§ 913. Decisions without debate on motion to postpone or 
proceed 

[" (a) Motions to postpone, made with respect to the discharge from 
committee, or the consideration of, a resolution with respect to a re- 
organization plan, and motions to proceed to the consideration of other 
business shall be decided without debate. 

["(b) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the appli- 
cation of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives as 
the case may be to the procedure relating to a resolution with respect 
to a reorganization plan shall be decided without debate.] 



CRS-161 



APPENDIX 1 

Department of Justice, 
WasMngton, D.O., Janiuzry 31, 1977. 
The President, 
T?ie White House, 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: I have the honor of responding to your 
request for my opinion on the constitutionality of section 906 (a) of the 
executive reorganization statute, 5 U.S.C. § 901, et seq., which provides 
that an executive reorganization plan shall become effective 60 days 
after its transmittal to Congress by the President unless during that 
60-day period either House passes a resolution disapproving the 
reorganization plan. 

For the reasons set forth below, I am of the opinion that the proce- 
dures provided in section 906(a) of the reorganization statute are 
constitutionally valid. I should emphasize at the outset that my 
opinion is limited to this particular statute, as explained below, and is 
to be taken in no manner as appro\ang the constitutionality of the 
procedure of congressional disapproval of executive action by 
resolution in other statutes. 

Article I, § 7, clause 3 of the Constitution provides that "every 
Order, Resolution, or Vote" to which concurrence of both Houses is 
necessary shall be presented to the President for his approval or veto. 
Section 906 of the reorganization statute authorizes Congress to take 
action by simple resolution of either House, a form of congressional 
action which is outside the legislative procedures set out in Article I. 
That statute authorizes Congress to exercise procedural power not 
explicitly granted to it by the Constitution. However, the statement in 
Article I, § 7, of the procedural steps to be followed in the enactment 
of legislation does not exclude other forms of action by Congress. 

The first Congress contemplated congressional action outside the 
normal Article I legislative process when it provided in the Act creat- 
ing the office of Secretary of the Treasury that either House could 
require the Secretary to make reports and furnish it certain informa- 
tion. Act of September 2, 1789, ch. XII, § 2, 1 Stat. 65-66 (1789). In 
1789 the House of Representatives acting by simple resolution directed 
Secretary Alexander Hamilton to conduct certain studies and report 
the findings to the House. 2 Annals of Congress 904 ( 1789) . 

In 1897 the Senate Judiciary Committee specifically addressed the 
question whether Article I, § 7 required that congressional resolutions 
be submitted to the President for his approval or veto. Citing past 
practices of the Congress, the committee took the position that the 
requirement of submission to the President of every vote for "which 
the concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives may 
be necessary" applied only where there was constitutional necessity. 

(25) 



23-836 O - 78 



CRS-162 
26 

The committee further determined that such constitutional necessity 
existed only in the case of the enactment of legislation, S. Rep. No. 
ia35, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897). The procedures prescribed in 
Article I, § 7, for congressional action are not exclusive. That has been 
the consistent interpretation of Article I by Congress since 1789. 

The constitutional question, therefore, is not whether the congres- 
sional action contemplated by section 906 of the reorganization statute 
literally conforms with the procedural steps specified in Article I, 
§ 7, cl. 3. Rather, the question is whether the provision in the reorga- 
nization statute authorizing single House disapproval of an executive 
reorganization plan respects the constitutional checks on legislative 
power provided by the Framers of the Constitution in the presidential 
veto and the principle of bicameralism. 

Congressional action outside the check of the presidential veto should 
be constitutionally suspect as it carries the potential for shifting the 
balance of power to Congress and thus permitting the legislative 
branch to dominate the executive. If a statute authorizing control by 
Congress over executive action by later resolution has the effect of 
evading the constitutional safeguards of concurrence of both Houses 
and the presidential veto, then it violates Article I, § 7 of the Constitu- 
tion. 

However, if the procedures provided in a given statute have no 
effect on the constitutional distribution of power between the legisla- 
tive and the executive — that is, the power of presidential veto is 
effectively preserved and the principle of bicameralism is respected — 
the fact that the procedure is not explicitly authorized by the lan- 
gnage of Article I is not enough to render the statute unconstitu- 
tional. I am of the opinion that the procedure provided in the re- 
organization statute for congressional disapproval of a reorganization 
plan submitted by the President satisfies this test and, therefore, is 
constitutional. 

Under the reorganization statute procedure the two Houses of Con- 
gress and the President possess the same relative power as under the 
normal Article I legislative process. First, the President has ultimate 
veto power in his formulation of the reorganization plan. The Presi- 
dent will submit to Congress only plans which he approves and rather 
than be forced to accommodate the demands of Congress as to the shape 
of the plan, he can decide to submit no plan at all. 

This power to take no action with respect to reorganization plans 
should be carefully distinguished from the situation created by statutes 
which provide for subsequent resolutions disapproving presidential 
actions in the administration of continuing programs. The pressures 
of an ongoing program with prior commitments force the President to 
act. And he must take action acceptable to Congress if that action is 
to stand. This urgency for action which pervades the administration 
of continuing substantive programs subjects presidential decisions to 
increased congressional influence and effectively compromises the 
President's control over his actions. Such statutes frustrate the consti- 
tutional check of the presidential veto in violation of Article I and 
infringe on the doctrine of separation of powers. 



CRS-163 

27 ' 

Second, the principle of bicameralism, that each House of Congress 
has the right that there be no change in the law without its consent, 
is respected by the reorganization statute as no reorganization plan can 
take effect if opposed by either House. Both Houses have equal power 
with respect to the congressional decision to accept or reject the reor- 
ganization plan. 

Third, in contrast to statutes which authorize subsequent congres- 
sional resolutions disapproving executive action in continuing pro- 
grams, under the reorganization statute there is no assumption by Con- 
gress of discretionary control over administration of the law, and 
consequently, no invasion of the traditional role of the executive 
branch. The reorganization statute does not involve creation of a new 
substantive program or congressional interference with authorized 
administrative discretion in an ongoing program. The doctrine of 
separation of powers is not violated. 

In conclusion, I reiterate that my opinion as to the constitutionality 
of the legislative veto device is limited to the narrow context of the 
reorganization statute. This procedure is uniquely appropriate to 
executive reorganization. The reorganization statute does not affect 
the rights of citizens or subject them to any greater governmental 
authority than before. It deals only with the internal organization of 
the executive branch, a matter in which the President has a peculiar 
interest and special responsibility. 

For the above reasons it is my conclusion that the procedure pro- 
vided for in section 906(a) of the reorganization statute does not vio- 
late the Constitution. 
Respectfully, 

GmFFiN B. Bell, 
Attorney General. 



CRS-164 
28 



Appendix 2 



Action taken on reorganization plans under authority of reorganiza- 
tion statutes, 81st-93d Congresses : 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 81ST CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1949 



Ptan Date presented Plan accepted or 

N«. TiUt to Congress rejected EiTective datt 

1 Department of Welfare June 20. 1949 Rejected 

2 Bureau of Employment Securl^r -do Accepted Auf, 20.1949 

3 Post OfTice Department ..do do Do, 

4 NationalSecurity Council and National Security Resources do do Do. 

Board. 

5 CivilService Commission do do Do. 

6 Maritime CommissJon do do Do. 

7 Public Roads Administration do do Do. 

8 National fyliliUry EstablislimnnL July 18,1949 >Au|. 10.1949 

REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1950 

1 Treasury Department _ Mar. 13,1950 Rejected ,. 

2 Department of Justice do.., Accepted May 24,1950 

3 Department of the Interior do do _. Do. 

4 Department of Agriculture do Rejected „ 

5 Department of Commerce do Accepted Do. 

6 Department of Labor do do Do. 

7 Interstate Commerce Commission...^ do Rejected 

8 Federal Trade Commission do Accepted D«t 

9 Federal Power Commission do do Do. 

10 Securities and Excfiange Commission do do Do. 

11 Federal Communications Commission do Rejected 

12 National Labor Relations Board do do _ 

13 Civil Aeronautics Board do Acceptod Do. 

14 Department of Labor do do....... Do. 

15 Alaska and Virgin Islands public works do do Do. 

16 Assistance to school distiictsand water pollution control _do ^ do Do. 

17 Advance planning and war public works do do Do. 

18 Building and space management functions do do .>,,.-. *July 1,1950 

19 Employees' compensation functions do do May 24, 1950 

20 Statutes at large and other matters do,., do Do. 

21 Maritime Commission liO do Do. 

22 Federal National Mortgage Association May 9,1950 do <Sept7. 1950 

23 Loans for factory-built homes ;do do Do. 

24 RFC transfer to Department of Commerct., do Rejected 

25 National Security Resources Board do Arr«pttd July 9 1940 

26 Treasury Department, functions of Secretary May 31,1950 do July 31 1950 

27 Creation of Department of Health, Education, and Security do Rejected 



The substance of Plan No. 8 Of 1949 was incorporated in Public Law 216. 81st Cong.. (Ant 10. 1949), which providM 
(hat the plan shall not take effect 
' Effective date specified in thit plan. 



CRS-165 
29 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 820 CONGRESS 
REORGANIZ/nrioN PLAN OF 1951 



Plan Oat* presentad Plan acc*pt*d or 
No. TItIi to Congresj rajtcttd 


Efltctivtdati 


I Reconstruction Finince Corporation Feb. 19,1951 Accapttd 


.. May l.ltSl 


REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1952 



1 Bureau of Internal Revenue Jan. 14.1952 Accepted Mar. 14,19S2 

2 Post Office Department Apr. 10.1952 Rejected 

3 Bureau of Customs in Treasury Department do do 

4 Department of Justice U.S. marshals do do 

5 District of Columbia government May 1,1952 Aaepted July 1,1952 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 83D CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1953 

PUn Date presented Plan accepted or 

No. Titio to Congress rejected Effective data 

1 Department of Health. Education, and Welfare Mar. 12. 1953 Aaepted' Apr. 11.1953 

2 Department of Agriculture Mar. 25, 1953 do June 4.1953 

3 Office of Defense Mobilization Apr. 2.1953 do June 12. 1953 

4 Department of Justice Apr. 20,1953 do June 20, 1953 

5 Export-Import Bank of Washington Apr. 30,1953 do June 30. 1953 

6 Department of Defense do do Do. 

7 Foreign Operations Administration June 1,1953 do> Aug. 1,19S3 

8 U.S. Information Agency do do Do. 

9 Council of Economic Advisers : do do Do. 

10 Payments to air carriers do do» OcL 1,1953 

REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1954 

1 Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United Apr. 29,1954 Accepted July 1.1954 

SUtes. 

2 Liquidation of certain affairs of the Reconstruction Finance do do Do. 

Corporation. 

i Public Law 13. 83d Cong. (Apr. 1. 1953) was enacted to provide that plan take affect 10 days after approvaL 
i Repealed by Public Law 89-195 (Sept. 4. 1961). 
> Repealed by Public Law 85-726 (Aug. 23. 1958). 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 84TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1956 



Plan 
No. 


Date presented Plan accepted or 
Tito to Congress rejected 


Effoctiva daU 


1 


Department of Defenso - May 16. 1956 Rejecte< 




2 


Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation May 17,1956 do _ 


- 


ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 85TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1957 


Plan 
Mo. 


Date presented Plan accepted or 
.TiU« to Congress rejected 


EffecUve data 


.1 


Abolition of the ReconstrucUon Finance Corporation Aor. 29. 1957 Accepted 


. Juno 30. 1957 


REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1958 


1 


Consolidation of Federal Civil Defense Administration with Apr. 24.1958 Accepted 

Office of Defense Mobilization. 


.iJuly 1.1958 



lEffwtivt date spocifitd in the plan. 



CRS-166 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 88TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 19S9 



DaU 
Plan presented Plan accepted or Effective 

No. Title to Congress reJKted date 

1 Transfer of certain functions from the Secretary of the May 12. 1959 Rejected r. 

Interior to the Secretary of Agriculture. 



1 Basic provisions of the plan were enacted by Public Law 8G-509 (June 11, 1960). 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS. 87TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1961 

Date 
Plan presented Plan accepted or 

No. Title to Congress rejected Effective date 

1 Securities and Exchange Commission functions... Apr. 27. 1961 Rejected 

2 Federal Communications Commission functions do do 

3 Civil Aeronautics Board— Reorganization May 3, 1961 Accepted July 3,1961 

4 Federal Trade Commission do do July 9,1961 

5 National Labor Relations Board May 24,1961 Rejected 

6 Federal Home Loan Bank Board— Reorganization June 12. 1961 Accepted Aug. 12,1961 

7 Reorganization of maritime functions do do Do, 

REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1962 

1 Department of Urban Affairs and Housing... Jan. 30,1962 Rejected 

2 Certain science agencies and functions Mar. 29, 1962 Accepted June 8.1962 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 88TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1963 

Plan Date presented Plan accepted or 

No. Title to Congress rejected Effective date 

1 Reorganization of certain functions relating to the Franklin May 27,1963 Accepted July 27,1963 

D. Roosevelt Library. 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 89TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1965 

Plan Date presented Plan accepted or 

No. Title toCoegnesa rejected Effective date 

1 Bureau of Customs Mar. 25,1965 Accepted May 25,1965 

2 Department of Commerce: Weather Bureau and the Coast May 13,1965 do July 13,1965 

and Geodetic Survey. 

3 Interstate Commerce Commission, locomotive inspection.. May 27,1965 do July 27,1965 

4 Reorganization of various committees and other similar do do Do. 

bodies. 

5 Certain reorgan'uations relating to the National Science do do Do. 

Foundation. 

REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1966 

1 Community relations functions In civH righU aroa Feb. 10.1966 Accepted Apr. 22,1966 

2 Water pollution control functions Feb. 28.1966 do May 10.1966 

3 Reorganization of health functions of the Department of Apr. 25,1966 do June 25.1966 

HEW 

4 National Zoological Park In the District of Columbia June 13,1966 do Aug. 23.1966 

5 National Capital Regional Planning Council June 29.1966 do SepL 8,1966 



CRS-167 
31 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 90TH CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1967 



PUn Dite Diesent- Plan accepted or 

No. Titit ed to congress rejacttd Eflectiva datt 

1 Transfer of functions relating to ipprovil of surrender of Feb. 27, 1967 Acceptod May 9,1967 

certain ship documents. 

2 U.S. Tariff Commission Mar. 9.1967 Rejected 

3 Government of the District of Columbia June 1,1967 Accepted Aug. 11.1967 

REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1968 

1 , Creating a new Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Feb. 7.1968 Acceptod Apr. 8,1968 

2 Transferring certain functions of the Department of Hous- Feb. 26, 1968 do May 7,1968 

ing and Urban Development to the Department of 
Transportation. 

3 Bringing recreation programs under the authority of the Mar. 13,1968 do May 23,1968 

District of Columbia Commissioner. 

A Transfer authority to appoint RLA board members from the do do Do. 

President to the D.C. Commissioner and give him author- 
ity to prescribe rules and regulations for the RLA. 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 91ST CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1969 

1 Interstate Commerce Commission July 22 1969 Accepted Oct 11, 1969 

REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1970 

1 Telecommunications management and policy Feb. 9,1970 Accepted Apr. 15,1970 

2 Officeof Management and Budget, Domestic Council Mar. 12,1970 do July 1.1970 

3 EnvironmenUl Protection Agency July 9,1970 do Dee. 2.1970 

4 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration do do Oct 3,1970 



REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1970 



Date pre- Plan 

Plan sented to accepted or Effective 

No. Title Congress rejected date 



1 Telecommuncations Management and Policy.. Feb. 9,1970 Accepted Apr. 15,1970 

2 Office of Management and Budget-Domestic Council Mar. 12,1970 do July 1,1970 

3 Environmental Protection Agency July 9,1970 do Dec. 2,1970 

4 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration do do Oct. 3, 1970 

ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 92D CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLAN OF 1971 

Date pre- Plan 

Plan sented to accepted or Effective 

No. Title Congress rejected date 

1 ACTION Mar. 24,1971 Accepted July 1,1971 



CRS-168 
32 



ACTION ON REORGANIZATION PLANS, 930 CONGRESS 
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1973 



Plan 
No. 


Title 


Date pre- 
sented to 
Congress 


Plan 

accepted or 
rejected 


Effective 
date 


1 


Executive Office of the President 


Jan.26.1973 


Accepted.... 


. Apr. 7.1973 


? 


Drug Enforcement Administration 


Mar28, 1973 


. July 1,1973 











Amended by Public Law 93-253 (Mar. 16, 1974) wfiich nullified those provisions of the plan which transferred certain 
migration inspectors to the Treasury Department. 



CRS-169 



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GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 

U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern- 
ment. Final report to the Congress. June 30, 1955. Printed as House 
Doc. no. 209, 84th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1955. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Disapproving 
Reorganization Plan no. 2 of 1970; report to accompany A. Res. 960. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. (91st Congress, 2d session. 
House. Report no. 91-1066). 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Extension of the 
reorganization authority of the President. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 95-105). 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Summary of the 
objectives, operations, and results of the Commissions on Organization 
of the Executive Branch of the Government (first and second Hoover 
Commissions). 88th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1963. 

At head of title: Committee print. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on 

Legislation and Military Operations. Reorganization of executive depart- 
ments (part 1 - overview). Hearings. 92d Congress, 1st session, June 2, 
3, 7, 8, 14, 16; July 7, 8, 22, and 27, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1971. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on 
Legislation and National Security. Providing reorganization authority 
for the President. Hearings on H.R. 3131, H.R. 3407 and H.R. 3442. 
March 1 and 8, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on 
International Operations. Survey of proposals to reorganize the U.S. 
foreign affairs agencies, 1951-1975. Part I. [Congressional Research 
Service] Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 
At head of title: Committee print. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Extending the 

period within which the President may transmit to the Congress plans for 
the reorganization of agencies of the Executive Branch of the government. 
[Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. (92d Congress, 1st session. 
Senate. Report no. 92-485) 



CRS-175 



U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Government 

economy and spending reform act of 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1971. (94th Congress, 2d session. Senate. Report no. 94-1137). 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee 

on Intergovernmental Relations. Government economy and spending reform 
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sion, March 17, 18. 19. 24. 25; and April 6 and 7, 1976. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. To renew the 

reorganization authority. Hearing. 95th Congress, 1st session, Feb. 8, 
1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Reorganization 
Act of 1977; report to accompany S. 626. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 95-32). 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Reorganization 
Act of 1977; report to accompany S. 626 Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 95-32). 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Program evalu- 
ation act of 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. (95th 
Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 95-326). 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. Government 
economy and spending reform act of 1976. Hearing on S. 2925. 94th 
Congress, 2d session. September 8, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1976. 

U.S. Congress. Office of Management and Budget. Papers relating to the 

President's departmental reorganization program. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., March 1971. 

(Rev. ed., February 1972). 

U.S. President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization. Establishment 
of a Department of Natural Resources (and) Organization for social and 
economic programs. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 

U.S. President's Committee on Administrative Management. Report with special 
studies. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1937. 



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